

AD-A072 150

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
THE POLITICS OF BALANCE IN TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA.(U)
MAR 79 P W DAHLQUIST
NPS-56-79-004

F/G 5/4


UNCLASSIFIED

NL

1 of 3

AD
A072150





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

14 NPS-56-79-004

2 LEVEL II

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California

AD A 072150



DDC
RECEIVED
AUG 2 1979
B

9 Master's

THESIS

DDC FILE COPY

6	THE POLITICS OF BALANCE IN TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA
	by
10	Paul William Dahlquist
11	March 1979
12	279p.
17	RR0000101
Thesis Advisor: J. Valenta	

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

16 R0000101

251 450
79 07 30 056

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER NPS-56-79-004	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) The Politics of Balance in Tito's Yugoslavia ✓		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis; March 1979
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Paul William Dahlquist		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940 ✓		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS 61152N;RR 000-01-01 N0001478WR80023
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		12. REPORT DATE March 1979
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 278
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Communism Nonalignment Eurocommunism The Balkans Mediterranean Sea Tito Yugoslavia Foreign Policy Eastern Europe Multinationalism		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This research provides an analysis of the forces and actors, internal and external, that presently effect Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policies. The departure of Josip Broz Tito will challenge the country's multinational balance, its socio-economic system, and the leadership capabilities of both the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Peoples Army. Additionally, Yugoslavia's relationships with the Soviet Union, the United (Cont'd)		

DD FORM 1473
1 JAN 73
(Page 1)

EDITION OF 1 NOV 66 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014-6601

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

1

251450

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE/When Data Entered

States, the Eurocommunists, the nonaligned nations, and the Peoples Republic of China will be severely tested. Thusfar, the interactions of these forces and actors have resulted in a delicate balance of multinational and economic pressures interwoven with an equally precarious foreign policy. Much evidence indicates Yugoslavia can survive Tito's passing, but internal weakness combined with external superpower interests may lead to instability. A concerted dedication to peace in Yugoslavia and Europe will be necessary if stability is to be assured in Yugoslavia's post-Tito era.

←

Accession For	
NTIS GDA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DDC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By _____	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or special
A	

DD Form 1473
1 Jan 73
S/N 0102-014-6601

2

Unclassified
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE/When Data Entered

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

The Politics of Balance
in
Tito's Yugoslavia

by

Paul William Dahlquist
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1972

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 1979

Author

Paul William Dahlquist

Approved by:

Juri Valente Thesis Advisor

D.P. Burke Second Reader

[Signature]
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

[Signature]
Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

ABSTRACT

This research provides an analysis of the forces and actors, internal and external, that presently effect Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policies. The departure of Josip Broz Tito will challenge the country's multinational balance, its socio-economic system, and the leadership capabilities of both the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Peoples Army. Additionally, Yugoslavia's relationships with the Soviet Union, the United States, the Eurocommunists, the nonaligned nations, and the Peoples Republic of China will be severely tested. Thus far, the interactions of these forces and actors have resulted in a delicate balance of multinational and economic pressures interwoven with an equally precarious foreign policy. Much evidence indicates Yugoslavia can survive Tito's passing, but internal weakness combined with external superpower interests may lead to instability. A concerted dedication to peace in Yugoslavia and Europe will be necessary if stability is to be assured in Yugoslavia's post-Tito era.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION -----	6
II.	DOMESTIC BALANCE: DIVERSITY, LEGITIMACY, STABILITY -----	10
	A. ORIGINS OF THE YUGOSLAV STATE -----	10
	B. PROBLEMS OF MULTINATIONALISM -----	18
	C. IDEOLOGICAL LEGITIMACY AND SELF- MANAGEMENT -----	44
	D. THE CHALLENGES OF MARKET SOCIALISM -----	50
	E. POWER: STRUCTURE AND DISTRIBUTION -----	65
III.	THE BALANCE OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS: THE SUPERPOWERS -----	94
	A. SOVIET INTERESTS AND RELATIONS -----	96
	B. AMERICAN-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS -----	110
	C. IMPLICATIONS OF A YUGOSLAV ALIGNMENT -----	138
IV.	THE ABSENCE OF BALANCE: THE SOVIET THREAT -----	146
	A. YUGOSLAV NATIONAL DEFENSE -----	146
	B. WILL THE SOVIET UNION INVADE? -----	165
V.	MAINTAINING THE BALANCE: THE SEARCH FOR ALLIES --	180
	A. NONALIGNMENT AND THE AFRICA CONNECTION -----	180
	B. EUROCOMMUNISM: A TWO-EDGED SWORD? -----	196
	C. THE CHINA CARD -----	211
VI.	AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE -----	227
	NOTES -----	246
	BIBLIOGRAPHY -----	269
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST -----	276

I. INTRODUCTION

It is often stated that Yugoslavia has played a much greater role in international politics than would normally be expected of a country of its limited size, population, and resources. This has been true primarily of the past 30 years, during which it has managed to be intermittently courted by the superpowers, treated with suspicion by communist and democratic states alike, and respected and emulated by Third World nations. Yugoslavia has not always enjoyed such an exalted international status. On the contrary, it has been a state only a relatively short time and its people are historically more accustomed to subjugation than independence.

The past 30 years have also marked one of the most domestically stable and economically affluent periods in the history of Yugoslavia's peoples. The traditional ethnic animosities between Yugoslavia's numerous nationalities and the economic underdevelopment that once characterized this Balkan region have ceased to dominate the people's lives. Instead there has been at least an appearance of unity and growing wealth.

It is no coincidence that Yugoslavia's recent era of stability and international importance corresponds directly to the period of Josip Broz Tito's leadership. He became head of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1937 and leader of the newly formed Communist state of Yugoslavia in 1945.

Since that time, his leadership has dominated the internal and external affairs of the country. There is little debate over the assertion that it is Tito's talents and abilities that have achieved for Yugoslavia its present stability and its status among the world's nations. There is considerable argument, however, over whether the country can maintain its present degree of stability and elevated international status without him. Despite the fact that scholars have been discussing the post-Tito era for well over two decades, he continues, almost defiantly, to celebrate birthdays. He turned 86 years old in May of 1978. But not even Tito can go on forever, and it can be assumed that Yugoslavia is moving ever closer to the post-Tito era.

During the last three decades the world has grown comfortable, so to speak, with Tito-led Yugoslavia. In fact, his departure would cause little concern if Yugoslavia could be expected to remain as it is today; that is nonaligned, independent of military, political, and ideological blocs, and politically and economically stable. But it is very questionable whether it can do so, and it is what Yugoslavia might become that causes great concern in Washington and Moscow, as well as in various other capitals in Western and Eastern Europe.

This study will investigate the unique combination of social, political, and economic characteristics and policies that sets Yugoslavia apart from other European socialist states. By describing the country's historical evolution and its present status on several separate but interwoven levels,

a picture will be developed of the balanced nature of Yugoslavia's society and international posture, as well as the principal forces, actors, and relationships likely to bear upon the country in the post-Tito era.

Chapter II deals with Yugoslavia's domestic environment. It is a state whose ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity dates back to the very settlement of the region. Superimposed upon this diversity are conflicts between old ways and the new, between East and West, between Communism and democracy, and between urban industrialization and rural peasant values. Consequently, Yugoslavia is a state with potential internal conflicts that may make it ripe for upheaval.

Chapter III examines the mutual and conflicting interests of the Soviet Union and the United States regarding Yugoslavia. Additionally, Yugoslavia's position between the major military blocs and its role in the European balance of power will be analyzed in order to assess the implications of any shifts in its alignment.

Chapter IV will provide an examination of Yugoslavia's defense policy in order to test its validity vis-a-vis the Yugoslav foreign policy. In addition to describing the organization and strategy of its security, an investigation of the often mentioned "Soviet Attack Scenario" will be presented in order to assess the likelihood of attack and its possible outcome.

Finally, Chapter V will investigate Yugoslavia's rather distinctive role in relation to other states on the global and

Communist scenes. Few states can claim to practice both a balanced nonalignment and a balanced socialism. Yugoslavia can, and its policies of nonaligned leadership and active support of Eurocommunism are examples of its unique posture. Additionally, its rapidly improving relations with the Peoples Republic of China bear close analysis due to their implications for Yugoslavia's relations with various other countries and Communist parties.

It is the thesis of this research that the various dimensions presented are interrelated to such a degree that only through a complete understanding of each aspect and its relationship to the others, can an understanding of Yugoslavia now, and in the future, be achieved. By studying Yugoslavia in this manner, it is hoped that a better understanding of its possible courses in the post-Tito era will result.

This study has benefited greatly by the excellent Soviet and European studies program at the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Jiri Valenta and Dr. David P. Burke were especially helpful, both by their personal tutelage and by virtue of those who they brought to the school from other institutions. Their seminar in Soviet-European affairs in the Spring of 1978 and the Conference on Eurocommunism and the USSR and Eastern Europe afforded the author the opportunity to meet and to benefit from some of the preeminent American scholars in the fields of European, Soviet, and Communist affairs. The guidance received has been invaluable.

II. DOMESTIC BALANCE DIVERSITY, LEGITIMACY, STABILITY

A. ORIGINS OF THE YUGOSLAV STATE

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) is a Balkan country, a Danubian country, and an Adriatic-Mediterranean country. It is part of the land bridge between central Europe and the Middle East. It shares borders in the northwest with Italy and Austria, in the north with Hungary and Romania, in the east with Bulgaria, and in the south with Greece and Albania. (Figure 1) The western limit of the country is defined by over 1300 miles of Adriatic coastline. With an area of 98,766 square miles, it is roughly the size of Wyoming. Mountains and rugged terrain on the west coast and in the south and east cover about three quarters of the land. The remaining quarter, in the northeast section of the country, is part of the Danubian plain.

A comparatively young state, Yugoslavia was created in 1918. Born out of the wreckage of World War I and out of the intentions of the world's leaders to grant self-determination to the peoples of Europe, it was to be the independent and unified home of the several diverse groups of South Slavs that had settled in the Balkans. The South Slavs were people who migrated from north of the Carpathians into the Balkans in the 6th and 7th centuries. Those who settled in the north came under Frankish rule while those who settled in the south had Byzantine rulers. The people remained in small, loosely organized groups of tribes. In the 8th and 9th centuries most were converted to



FIGURE 1

Christianity. Those in the south and east, who were to become the ancestors of the Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians, received their conversion from the Orthodox Church in the East. Ancestors of the Croats and Slovenes received theirs from the Roman Church in the West. The eventual split between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches divided the South Slavs into two contentious religious groups.¹

Until the late 19th century, the South Slavs had little in common other than domination by external powers. By 1389 most of the southern and central Balkans had been overrun by the Ottoman Turks. The remaining Adriatic coastal regions, as well as some northern territories were controlled by Venice and the Kingdom of Hungary. By the early 1800's, however, other powers such as France, Russia, and Austria began to dominate the region.² Especially noteworthy was Napoleon's intervention during which he created the Illyrian Provinces, merging the Slovene lands with major portions of Dalmatia and Croatia. According to most authors, this union was the birth of the "Yugoslav idea."³ It was the first time different South Slav peoples were grouped together in one political unit. As nationalism took root amongst all the peoples of Europe and the Balkans, the idea of a union of South Slavs grew more and more popular.

At the outbreak of World War I, Serbia (which included what is now the Republic of Macedonia) and Montenegro were small, independent states. The remainder of modern-day Yugoslavia was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the end of the war

these three political units were unified as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes with King Alexander of Serbia on the throne. Nationalism and the Yugoslav idea had coincided with Woodrow Wilson's desire to employ the concept of self-determination in the drawing of national boundaries. At that time, the South Slavs were willing to accept union under a Serbian King as a major step forward, especially when compared to domination by Austria, Hungary, or Turkey. It was the first time that all of present-day Yugoslavia was united under one ruler.

The new state faced enormous problems from the beginning. It was much easier to draw boundaries than it was to actually make the new state function. Political inexperience born of centuries of domination was reflected in the Yugoslav's scant understanding of such concepts as pluralism, democracy, and voting. Finally, the diversity of the various peoples made democracy even more difficult. Not only were they ethnically different, but centuries of influence by opposing Western and Byzantine cultures had imbued the various groups with very different attitudes regarding the role and purpose of government. All of this became evident when the leaders began to organize their new state.

The first indication of conflict was the realization that two types of nationalism existed in Yugoslavia. The first focused on a unity of the South Slavs; that unity that had won them their independence. The second was a local or ethnic nationalism. The two did not necessarily coincide. According to Thomas Hammond:

As long as many Yugoslavs were fighting together against common enemies, Yugoslav nationalism had considerable appeal. However, when the enemies had been defeated and independence became a reality disputes arose regarding the rights and powers the respective peoples would have in the new state, and local loyalties tended to compete with loyalty to the country as a whole.⁴

The fierce competition that resulted characterized the Yugoslav state throughout the entire interwar period.

The new government, while a monarchy, of necessity had to embrace some form of federalism. The degree of federalism to be adopted became the basis of a major political conflict, and divided the people into two opposing factions. The centralists, mostly Serbs, argued for a strong government based upon their already well established monarchy, organization, and army. The autonomists, led by the Croats, resented having achieved independence to be ruled by Serbia, and therefore demanded a liberal federation.

The debate made the new state virtually ungovernable during the interwar years.⁵ In 1928, a Croat leader was assassinated and the government was a shambles. In 1929, King Alexander suspended the Constitution, dissolved parliament, banned political parties, restricted civil liberties, and proclaimed a royal dictatorship named the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In 1934 he was assassinated in France by members of a Croatian chauvinist group called the Ustashe. The King's son, Peter, was only 11 at the time, so his uncle, Prince Paul, ruled in his stead.

There was little improvement under Paul. In 1939, an agreement was reached which gave the Croats a degree of autonomy. While it temporarily satisfied the Croats, in reality it served

only to alienate other ethnic groups who began to resent the Croats as well as the Serbs.⁶ Then on March 25, 1941, in an effort to find a place for Yugoslavia in Europe's political scene, Prince Paul joined the Axis Pact. This proved to be his undoing, for on the following day he was overthrown by a group of Serbian officers who proclaimed Peter the King. Hitler, displeased with the Yugoslav people's insulting attitude toward the Axis, invaded the country on April 6, 1941. The weakness of the state was clearly illustrated when, within just a few days, Peter fled the country and the Yugoslav army surrendered.⁷

When the Axis powers overran Yugoslavia the state collapsed and virtually ceased to exist as a political entity. It was immediately divided among the German, Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Albanian occupation forces. Furthermore, when they invaded, the Nazis found willing allies in the Ustashe in Croatia. Hitler therefore gave control of Croatia over to the Ustashe leader, Ante Pavelic. It was not long before there were four groups of people fighting each other in Yugoslavia. The first group was comprised of the occupation forces. The second group was the Ustashe. Third was a group of Serbian royalists known as the Chetniks, and led by Draza Mihajlovic. The last group was the Yugoslav Partisans, comprised mainly of Communists and led by Josip Broz (his code name was Tito). Tito and the Partisan leaders claimed no loyalty other than to Yugoslavia, and wisely spoke very little of Communism during the war. For Yugoslavia, World War II very rapidly became a civil war.

Like most of history's civil wars, Yugoslavia's was characterized by the bloody antagonism of the feuding sides. The Ustashe committed many atrocities in the name of Croatia and Roman Catholicism, striking mainly at their traditional foes, the Orthodox Serbs. According to George Hoffman, "...in some cases whole village populations were herded into Orthodox churches and burned alive. These atrocities produced a frenzy of fear and hatred on both sides which led only to greater excesses."⁸ The Partisans and the Chetniks, who occasionally fought side by side and occasionally fought against each other, were equally brutal in their reprisals. By the close of World War II, 1,100,000 Yugoslavs had died.⁹ Of those, it is estimated that only about 300,000 were killed by the Germans. The majority of the rest were the victims of the fratricidal warfare between the Ustashe, the Chetniks, and the Partisans.¹⁰

Tito made wise use of the opportunity provided him by World War II. It was not hard to muster support against the Axis forces or against the turncoat Ustashe. After a while, Yugoslav people and Allied leaders became hesitant to support Mihajlovic, for his forces were not resisting very actively. Tito, on the other hand, practiced a dynamic resistance, displayed an unswerving desire to liberate Yugoslavia, and thus won the support the Chetniks had lost. His Partisan forces were organized on a territorial basis and were characterized as the "...combat forces of the Yugoslav peoples."¹¹ This, coupled with the specific effort made to avoid linking the Partisans with Communist political ambitions, enabled Tito to present

himself and his movement as a group with broad "Yugoslav" appeal. The Partisans continued to grow, and with Allied assistance, eventually achieved victory and control of the country. The Yugoslav Communists faced little post-War political competition and on 29 November 1945, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) was established (the name was changed to the present Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1963).

In the immediate post-War years the Yugoslavs took their place as faithful followers of Moscow's Communist leadership. But disagreements between Stalin and Tito regarding foreign policy and Soviet mistreatment of Yugoslavia caused a break between the two leaders in 1948. Stalin, assuming he could force the Yugoslavs back in line, excommunicated them from the Communist bloc, imposed an economic boycott, and threatened military invasion. He proved wrong and the Yugoslavs, with military and economic assistance from the West, remained independent.

Despite occasional rapprochements between Belgrade and Moscow, Yugoslavia has remained poised between the two blocs since 1948. In the 1950's it founded the Nonaligned Movement with the assistance of Nasser's Egypt and Nehru's India. Internally it developed the concept of worker's self-management, achieved a degree of ethnic stability unknown during the inter-war period, and made extensive economic progress. Today Yugoslav officials refer to their country as "Socialist, Self-Managing and Nonaligned Yugoslavia."¹²

B. PROBLEMS OF MULTINATIONALISM

1. The People

Due to Yugoslavia's location, it is not surprising to find that it is a multinational state "par excellence". The 1971 census listed no fewer than twenty-four nationalities living within the country's borders. While the majority of these each represent less than one per cent of the total population, even the most numerous group, the Serbs, accounts for slightly less than 40 per cent of the total. As a result of the diversity of its peoples, according to Charles Jelavich, "The chief internal problem of the state of Yugoslavia,...has been that of governing and attempting to develop a national consciousness among peoples with different historical experiences and at various economic levels."¹³ This is as true today as it was in 1918, for the country remains as ethnically diverse as it ever was. One still hears it said that there is "...only one true Yugoslav: Tito."¹⁴

The men who assumed control of the government in 1945 recognized the challenge of nationalist divisions and responded by establishing a federal state which openly honored the dominant peoples living within its borders. The federation they established consists of six Socialist republics and two Socialist autonomous provinces. The criteria used to establish these units was based on an official distinction between "Yugoslav nationalities", those ethnic groups indigenous to the Yugoslav state, and "national minorities", those ethnic groups living in Yugoslavia but indigenous to another state. There are six

official Yugoslav nationalities. They are the Serbs, the Croats, the Slovenes, the Yugoslav Muslims, the Montenegrins, and the Macedonians. With the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina where most of the Muslims reside, the names of the republics correspond to the principal nationality living there. While there are numerous national minorities, the two largest groups are the Albanians and the Hungarians, who reside mainly in the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina respectively. Both of these provinces are located within Serbia. It is important to note that the ethnic groups are not nicely compartmented within their respective republics or provinces. Instead they tend to be spread amongst each other throughout the country. (Table I)

There are a number of factors which have caused Yugoslavia's nationalities to develop into distinct cultures and ethnic groups. The first is religion. According to George Hoffman, it is "...intrinsically bound up with the complex nationality problems of the country."¹⁵ Most of the people are either Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, or Moslem. Over 50 per cent of the population is Serbian Orthodox. Strongest in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, this Church has its own Patriarchate and it differs slightly from both Russian and Greek orthodoxy. Roman Catholicism is practiced by about 31 per cent of the people, most of whom live in Slovenia and Croatia. Roughly twelve per cent of the people are Moslems, who live primarily in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Fewer than one per cent of the population are Protestants. The

National Distribution by Territory

	Croats	Macedonians	Montenegrins	Moslems	Serbs	Slovenes	Albanians	Hungarians
Bosnia-Herzegovina	17.4	0.1	2.5	85.0	17.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
Croatia	77.6	0.4	1.9	1.0	7.7	1.9	0.2	7.4
Macedonia	0.0	95.9	0.6	0.0	0.5	1.0	21.3	0.0
Montenegro	0.2	0.0	70.3	4.0	0.4	0.0	2.7	0.0
Serbia: Total	3.9	3.5	24.4	8.9	74.1	0.8	75.6	90.4
Proper	0.8	2.1	11.2	7.2	48.2	0.6	5.0	1.1
Kosovo	0.1	0.0	6.1	1.5	2.6	0.0	70.4	0.0
Vojvodina	3.0	1.4	7.1	0.2	13.3	0.2	0.2	89.3
Slovenia	1.9	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.2	97.1	0.0	2.0

Table I

(Source: "National Structure of the Yugoslav Population," Yugoslav Survey, February 1973)

differing religious practices are closely associated with the differing empires that have conquered the Yugoslav peoples.

Historical masters have also directly effected the cultural development of Yugoslavia's nationalities. Croats and Slovenes had the "advantage" of being part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and thereby received the benefits of the Western world's educational and cultural systems. The Macedonians, on the other hand, have been ruled primarily by the Ottoman Turks, who governed with a heavy hand and did little for the cultural development of the area. The Serbs and Montenegrins were also greatly influenced by the Byzantine Empire.

Another factor that has greatly influenced the outlooks of the different nations is the degree of historical autonomy they have achieved. The Slovenes have never had an independent state. The Serbs, though ruled by outsiders for hundreds of years, were a growing Balkan power in the early 1900's. And the Montenegrins were never fully conquered even by the Turks. The differing levels of independence have tended to shape the attitudes of the ethnic groups toward the value of being members of the Yugoslav federation.

The fourth and most obvious difference between the nationalities is language. The principal languages of Yugoslavia evolved from primitive Slavic and belong to the South Slavic linguistic group.¹⁶ Over many centuries the common language broke into a number of dialects due to differing cultural, political, and religious development. There is no Yugoslav language. The major ones spoken are Serbian, Croatian,

Slovenian, and Macedonian. All four are related enough to enable communication between the various peoples. The first two are alike enough to be called Serbo-Croatian, though Serbian utilizes a cyrillic alphabet and Croatian employs the Latin alphabet. Slovenian is similar to Slovak, and though it uses the Latin alphabet, it is more akin to Russian than to Serbo-Croatian. Macedonian utilizes the cyrillic alphabet and tends to be a cross between Serbian and Bulgarian. Other commonly spoken languages are Albanian, Hungarian, and Turkish. In cases where languages differ a great deal, the people tend to be bilingual simply out of necessity.

a. Serbs

The Serbs, like the other nationalities, are descendants of the Slavs who moved into the Balkans from south-western Russia in the 6th century.¹⁷ They are centered in the eastern part of the country, though they tend to be more spread out than most of the other nations. Linguistically and racially, they are almost indistinguishable from the Croats. Religiously however, they are quite different and while under Byzantine rule, the Serbs founded their own Orthodox Church, which contributed to their national consciousness.¹⁸

After the Byzantine period, the Serbs achieved their independence and lived under native kings, who in the mid-1300's ruled much of the Balkans. In 1389, however, the state was conquered by the Turks and remained under their domination for almost five centuries. It was during this period that many Serbs moved into Croatia, Slovenia and Hungary, where they

lived under the Habsburgs and led a more prosperous life than their fellow Serbs in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹ By the early 19th century, Serbia had once again achieved autonomy, and at the outbreak of World War I it was an expansionist Balkan "power". Since the creation of the Yugoslav state in 1918, Serbs have been identified with a "centralist" attitude that is equated by other ethnic groups to a desire for Serbian hegemony within the federation. Today, the 8,143,000 Serbs account for about 40 per cent of the Yugoslav population. (Tables II and III, pages 28, 29)

b. Montenegrins

The Montenegrins number slightly over 500,000 and comprise only 2.5 per cent of the total population. They are closely related to the Serbs and, in fact, are descendents of Serb tribes that moved to the mountains along the Adriatic coast during the Middle Ages. They are a rugged people and are known as fierce fighters.²⁰ Though the Turks overran Montenegro several times, they were never able to achieve control over the population. Due to a common struggle against the Turks, there is a tradition of friendship between Russians and Montenegrins that may still exist today.²¹ In 1799, they became the first Yugoslavs to acquire full independence. Though they speak Serbian and are predominantly Orthodox, they possess a fiery nationalism that is distinctly Montenegrin and not Serbian.

c. Slovenes

The Slovenes occupy the northwest corner of Yugoslavia. Their population of 1.7 million is 8.2% of the

country's. Slovenia is the most homogenous of the republics since 97% of its people are Slovenes. Part of Austria until 1918, Slovenia benefited greatly from its contact with Austria's relatively advanced German culture. Slovenia traditionally has had higher levels of literacy, industrialization, and general cultural development than other parts of Yugoslavia. The Slovenian language is the most difficult for other Yugoslavs to understand, but communication is still possible. The Slovenes are strongly Roman Catholic. While they have occasionally expressed nationalistic tendencies, there has never been a serious independence movement in Slovenia. In fact, according to one author, at least one reason why the Slovenes seem to enjoy the federation is because it gives them an excellent market for their manufactured goods.²²

d. Croats

The Croats, who number 4,527,000, are the second largest Yugoslav ethnic group and the source of the most active independence movement in the country. They have historically occupied the land southeast of Slovenia, between the Adriatic and the Drava River. An independent state until 1102, Croatia was in that year acquired by Hungary. Thereafter, various parts of Croatia enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy. The Dalmatian coast along the Adriatic was for centuries associated with Venetian culture, and the effects of that relationship can still be seen in the architecture of some of Yugoslavia's seaports. Other sections of Croatia were captured and held by the Turks.

The rest continued under Hungarian rule, at times with considerable independence, until 1918.²³

It is the rivalry between the Croats and the Serbs that has the most potential for violence. The Croats, besides being Roman Catholic, like to call Croatian a separate language. It is the Croats who have been most opposed to Serbian hegemony in the Yugoslav government. It does not help that Belgrade, seat of the central government is located in Serbia. It is among the Croats that the concept of independence is most commonly discussed. Finally the Republic of Croatia has its own minority problem in that there are 626,000 Serbs living there, 14.2% of the Croatian population.

e. Macedonians

The Macedonians occupy one of the most strategic areas of the Balkans, for their territory lies at the juncture of Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and historical Serbia. According to Jelavich, it "...is the most controversial of the republics. Macedonia has throughout its history been fought over by Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs and Albanians, all of whom maintain claims on her territory."²⁴ Bulgaria and Greece actually deny the existence of a Macedonian nation, while Yugoslavia recognized it and gave it republican status at the end of World War II.²⁵ Today the Macedonian people are divided among Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece.

One of the most backward regions of Yugoslavia, Macedonia and its people have made substantial economic and educational progress. There is now a Macedonian Orthodox Church

which has a degree of freedom from its parent in Serbia and represents the growing nationalism of the Macedonian people. They number approximately 1.1 million and represent about 6% of Yugoslavia's population.

f. Moslems

Yugoslav officials now allow the term Moslem to be used to identify those Yugoslavs who were muslimized during the five centuries of Turkish rule.²⁶ Thus, some 1.8 million people who previously called themselves Croat-Moslems or Serb-Moslems now call themselves Moslems in an ethnic sense. They have become the third largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia and account for almost 8.5% of the population. They are located primarily in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a region of mountainous territory lying between Serbia and Croatia, and long disputed over by the two. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina itself is populated 40% by Moslems, 37% by Serbs and about 20% by Croats and is, therefore, the least homogenous republic in the federation.

g. Minorities

Only the two major national minorities residing in Yugoslavia will be discussed, the Albanians and the Hungarians. It is interesting to note that the Albanians outnumber both the Macedonians and the Montenegrins. Furthermore, there are more Hungarians in Vojvodina than there are Montenegrins in Montenegro. Yet due to the definition of national minorities, the Albanians and Hungarians were established in provinces rather than republics. The autonomous provinces were not meant to be homelands for these minorities. Rather, these regions were regarded

as areas in need of special handling due to the mixture of nationalities living in them.²⁷ The number of Serbs living in both Kosovo and Vojvodina is the principal reason that special handling was required.

(1) Albanians. There are about 1.3 million Albanians in Yugoslavia, over three quarters of whom reside in Kosovo. They are almost all practicing Moslems and speak a distinct Albanian language that uses a Latin alphabet.²⁸ They are the least assimilated of Yugoslavia's minorities. They live in the most densely populated but least productive region of the country. In recent years the Albanian percentage of Kosovo and of Yugoslavia has been increasing. It has been increasing so rapidly, in fact, that by 1981 it is predicted that the Albanians will be the third largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia.²⁹ That trend has been paralleled by increased demands for "republican" status. While that status has not been forthcoming, greater autonomy and representation have been granted, and the central government has recently spent more funds on raising living standards in Kosovo than in the past.

(2) Hungarians. About 90% of Yugoslavia's 477,000 Hungarians live in Vojvodina. They are not considered a major ethnic problem since Vojvodina itself is 56% Serb. The Hungarians speak their own language, but are normally fluent in Serbo-Croatian as well. Most are Roman Catholic. They have been less demanding for greater autonomy than the Albanians for the simple reason that they do not predominate in their region.

Distribution of the Population by Nationality

	Croats	Mace- donians	Monte- negrins	Moslems	Serbs	Slov- enes	Alben- ians	Hunger- ians
Yugoslavia	4,526,782	1,194,784	508,843	1,729,932	8,143,246	1,678,032	1,309,523	477,374
Bosnia-Herze- govina	772,491	1,773	13,021	1,482,430	1,393,148	4,053	3,764	1,262
Croatia	3,513,647	5,625	9,706	18,457	626,789	32,497	4,175	35,488
Macedonia	3,882	1,142,375	3,246	1,248	40,465	838	279,871	229
Montenegro	9,192	723	355,632	70,236	39,512	658	35,671	296
Serbia: Total	184,913	42,675	125,260	154,330	6,016,811	15,957	984,761	430,314
Proper	38,088	25,100	57,289	124,482	4,699,415	10,926	65,507	6,279
Kosovo	8,274	1,048	31,555	26,357	228,264	392	916,168	169
Vojvodina	138,561	16,527	36,416	3,491	1,089,132	4,639	3,086	423,866
Slovenia	42,657	1,613	1,978	3,231	20,521	1,624,029	1,281	9,785

Table II

(Source: "National Structure of the Yugoslav Population," Yugoslav Survey, February 1973)

Percentage Composition

	Croats	Macedonians	Montenegrins	Moslems	Serbs	Slovenes	Albanians	Hungarians
Yugoslavia	22.1	5.8	2.5	8.4	39.7	8.2	6.4	2.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina	20.6	0.0	0.3	39.6	37.2	0.1	0.1	0.0
Croatia	79.4	0.1	0.2	0.4	14.2	0.7	0.1	0.8
Macedonia	0.2	69.3	0.2	0.1	2.8	0.1	17.0	0.0
Montenegro	1.7	0.1	67.2	13.3	7.5	0.1	6.7	0.1
Serbia: Total	2.2	0.5	1.5	1.8	71.2	0.2	11.7	5.1
Proper	0.7	0.5	1.1	2.4	89.5	0.2	1.2	0.1
Kosovo	0.7	0.1	2.5	2.1	18.4	0.0	73.7	0.0
Vojvodina	7.1	0.8	1.9	0.2	55.8	0.2	0.2	21.7
Slovenia	2.5	0.1	0.1	0.2	1.2	94.0	0.1	0.5

Table III

(Source: "National Structure of the Yugoslav Population," Yugoslav Survey, February 1973)

2. Communism and Nationalism Since 1945

With the creation of the FPRY, Tito completed a truly meteoric rise to power in Yugoslavia. Prior to the war, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was weak and illegal. The principal reasons for the ease with which the Communists assumed power were the disastrous ineffectiveness of the inter-war parties and the broad national appeal achieved by the Partisans during the war. Faced with possible annihilation, sickened by fratricide, and probably just tired of the nationalist feuding, the people were willing to give federation under Tito a try. Thus, while national feelings remained strong, Paul Shoup writes that "...the Party could with justification claim that the advent of Communist rule was marked by a sharp decrease in national tensions."³⁰

Since 1945, however, Tito and his fellow Communists have faced a revival of the national problem. They have been forced to deal on an increasing basis with a resurgence of nationalistic trends. Since the centrifugal forces of nationalism threaten not only the success of Yugoslav socialism, but the whole concept of the Yugoslav state, the two concepts have found their destinies intertwined.³¹

At the outset, it was fortunate for the Communists that nationalist tensions were temporarily set aside because, ideologically, Communism and nationalism do not mix well.³² Marx hardly dealt with the concept of nationalism at all and discounted it as a major force. Lenin recognized it to be tactically useful in revolution, but of no use after that.³³

Yugoslavia's own Communist Party of the 1920's had split on the question to the extent that the Party was severely weakened.³⁴

The Yugoslav Communists, however, had learned some lessons about nationalism; at least Balkan nationalism. They had discovered that it could not be ignored. As a result, it was dealt with directly and openly in the new state. In addition to creating a federation, the Communists passed a law against inciting national antagonisms or discriminating for reasons of race, religion, or nationality.³⁵ Such measures resulted in a further decrease in national tension and a growth in allegiance to the new central, and apparently, all-Yugoslav government. As George Hoffman states, "If the new regime was unpopular, it was primarily for reasons other than national favoritism."³⁶ Serbian domination had, in reality, been replaced by domination by a pan-Yugoslav Communist elite.

The new government was not entirely free of ethnic problems, however. As early as December 1944, the Albanians in Kosovo had rebelled in hopes of achieving association with Albania instead of Yugoslavia. The rebellion was forced underground, but in order to quiet things, the Party established Albanian schools, allowed Albanian to be considered an official language in the area, granted Kosovo its semi-autonomous status, and gave some Albanians access to government.³⁷ These offerings virtually satisfied the Albanian minority for almost 20 years. Other anti-Yugoslav opposition existed in the mid-1940's, but only the Albanians took part in an actual armed uprising.

The Albanian uprising illustrates an important aspect of the "federation" established in 1945. Theoretically the union had been established due to a mutual desire of the separate nations to live together. In the Constitution, the right to self-determination and even the right to separation were guaranteed. In fact, however, it is doubtful that even a republic, not to mention an autonomous region like Kosovo, would have been allowed to secede. According to Wayne Vucinich, the Yugoslav Communists may very well have provided for equality among nationalities, "But they never gave the peoples of Yugoslavia the opportunity to exercise self-determination..."³⁸ The Communists may not have been Serbs, but they were most definitely centralists, regardless of what the Constitution might have said.

The unity of the Yugoslav peoples was strengthened considerably by the split between Stalin and Tito in 1948. As was the case during the war against Germany, unity was the only possible course to follow in defying outside pressure. R.V. Burks, in The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia, states that "...the unity displayed by all the populations of Yugoslavia in the face of heavy Cominform pressure amounted to a major political victory for the CPY."³⁹ The spoils of that victory are still evident in the Soviet-Yugoslav relationship today.

Thus Yugoslavia entered the 1950's with its national problems suppressed, united against a Soviet threat, and proud

of its successes as an independent state. The Party optimistically set out to create a Yugoslav nationalism. It is most important to keep in mind that the Party hierarchy was a group of dedicated Communists, who had set aside their own nationalist loyalties. It was natural for them to believe they could motivate the people to do the same, especially in light of the unity achieved during the war and in response to Stalin.

Throughout the 1950's the Communists tried to elevate the concept of a Yugoslav nation. They called for an end to the cultural isolation that still existed between the ethnic groups. Emphasis was placed on cultural, educational, and linguistic integration, while use of ethnic languages was discouraged. Amendments to the Constitution removed the previous emphasis on the federal nature of the state. The Party's principal theoreticians began writing of the importance of national development in the achievement of Socialism -- that is Yugoslav national development as opposed to the republican variety.⁴⁰ It was hoped that Bosnia, the meeting point of Croatian, Serbian, and Moslem cultures would prove to be a "melting pot" and produce the first example of a new Yugoslav consciousness.

Despite this significant campaign, the Party was fighting a losing battle. To begin with, some of the policies of the Party and the government tended to revive or indirectly contribute to national feelings. First, in order to ensure equal representation amongst the groups, government staffing and political posting was done with indigenous personnel up and down a direct line from local community, through the republic,

to the central government. This vertical bureaucratic structure resulted in six chains of official communication that met only in Belgrade.⁴¹ Otherwise contact between republics was limited or nonexistent.

Isolation also occurred as a result of the state's policy toward cultural practices. The Party tried to spread Yugoslav nationalism more by example than by cultural repression. In truth, cultural autonomy was a necessity, because there simply was no Yugoslav culture. As Paul Shoup points out, there was no Yugoslav theater, or ballet, or Academy of Sciences.⁴² On the other hand, there were ample Croatian, Macedonian, Serbian, Montenegrin, Moslem, and Slovenian cultural traditions that would not be forgotten and could not be repressed.

In the late 1950's, another situation began to develop which further isolated nationalities and therefore contributed to the national revival. Economic and industrial development had not taken place evenly among the six republics. Yugoslavia had its own internal North-South problem. Croatia and Slovenia were much more developed than the southern republics. Those in the South resented the wealth of those in the North. Furthermore, in their efforts to distribute wealth equally throughout the federation, the Communists had made a practice of utilizing northern profits to subsidize southern industrial development. While this pleased those in the South, the policy was far from popular in Croatia and Slovenia. Hoffman describes the situation very clearly:

If to the people of Macedonia, for example, economic betterment means advancement to the level of Croatia and Slovenia, for the people of these republics economic betterment means advancement to the level of Western Europe. In a country as comparatively poor as Yugoslavia, both goals cannot be achieved simultaneously.⁴³

It is not difficult to imagine how such conflicts of interest were transformed into national animosities.

As the 1960's dawned, the Party began to realize that if it was to maintain close contact with the people it would have to shift its emphasis back toward recognition of historical nationalities. It was clear that national tendencies could not be eclipsed by pride in the Federation, and the Communists chose to allow the national revival to continue. There was growth in the use of ethnic languages and increased display of cultural-national emblems. Not only did historical nationalities reassert themselves, but new ones were actually born when the Macedonians and Moslems achieved ethnic recognition.⁴⁴

Greater recognition of the national groups led to more emphasis on the federal concept of the state. In order to satisfy the demands for greater republican independence, the government continued a general move toward decentralization which it had started during the fifties. This was done first in the area of economic controls and later took hold in politics and government. This trend, combined with the continued national isolation enabled Republican leaders to build a political machine of their own. Thus, according to Paul Lendvai, "The dynamics of economic decentralization steadily increased the importance of the republican parties, which in turn broadened their popular

support to the extent that they were standing up for the interests of their nations."⁴⁵ Yet Yugoslavia's leaders granted even more independence, as in 1964 when republican parties were allowed to convene their own congresses prior to and in preparation for the statewide Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY).

Eventually the revival of nationalism infiltrated the LCY's top ranks as well. The opposite of the dreams of 1945 had occurred. Instead of imbuing the people with a Yugoslav consciousness, many of the Communists had themselves become nationalists. The Party was deeply split along national lines. Burks asserts that it had actually become "...a set of six organically related but nationally distinct parties that carried on the business of the country by negotiating with each other."⁴⁶

These negotiations were not always very productive. They caused union of the traditionally close national groups, the Croats and the Slovenes opposing the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians. This was especially true regarding economic questions since Slovenia and Croatia were growing tired of supporting their less fortunate brothers to the south. On the other hand, the political support Serbia received from areas like Macedonia and Montenegro caused renewed accusations of Serbian hegemony. The debate evolved into a political question between hardliners, who felt decentralization had clearly gone too far, and nationalists, who desired even more autonomy, especially in regard to their finances.

In July 1966, the hardliners were dealt a severe blow. Alexander Rankovic, long a close associate of Tito, was purged on the grounds that he was responsible for abuses in the operation of the state security organs. He had been expected by many to succeed his aging leader, but it appeared that he was trying to speed the process along. One of the abuses referred to was the bugging of Tito's home and offices.⁴⁷ Rankovic was also a major proponent of centrism and very much a Serbian nationalist. His demise assured the continuation of decentralization for at least a while longer.

The Rankovic case caused even greater mistrust of Serbs and, therefore, more passionate nationalist feelings among the other groups. Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians led the way in asserting their rights. People in Kosovo and Vojvodina demanded greater autonomy. It was discovered that Rankovic had discriminated heavily against Albanians and Hungarians, and realization of that resulted in violent demonstrations for republican status for Kosovo in 1968.⁴⁸ In response to such pressures, the Party did grant increasing amounts of freedom and again attempted to acquire widespread appeal by "...sacrificing the Yugoslav idea for the sake of maintaining its multinational character..."⁴⁹

The nationalist revival of the 1960's culminated in a domestic crisis in Croatia in 1971. The new nationalism had been expressed clearly in 1967 when Croatian intellectuals had demanded official separation of the Croatian and the Serbian languages. Then, in January 1970, the Croatian League of Communists called for work to promote Croatian, rather than

Yugoslav interests, and for a purge of all centrists.⁵⁰ By 1971, Croatian leaders felt strong enough to bargain for greater independence and to express the growing Croatian resentment over use of Croatian profits to subsidize the South.

Impending constitutional amendments in 1971 actually set things in motion. The amendments had been designed to provide for a smooth transition after Tito. They indicated a definitional change in the federation such that it would be considered a creature of the republics and the provinces. Central government would thus be more responsive to the demands of the republics. The Croats openly greeted this reform and employed it to demand immediate economic change. By April, their nationalist movement had picked up considerable momentum. Croats tried to replace Serb officials in local positions. Again there were demands for purification of the Croatian language. Additionally, there were demands for currency reform and complete financial independence. Finally, Croatian nationalists assumed the leadership of student organizations and made demands for Croatian representation in the United Nations.⁵¹

Croatian nationalism was causing reaction in other parts of the country. Serbs, especially, were concerned about the rights of the 626,000 Serbs living in Croatia. Denunciation of the entire movement by Tito in April proved to have little effect. Events quieted but did not slow significantly. Then, in late November, students at Zagreb University struck and demanded Croatian independence. Croatian Party leadership indicated their support through inaction. Tito, however, did take definite

action. He called for a halt to the strike, met with top Party leaders from all parts of the state, employed the state police to maintain order, hinted at a renewed military role in domestic stability, and purged Croatia's leadership. The crisis was over by the first part of 1972.

The events in Croatia had been brought under control, but ironically, only through Tito's unifying presence and concern. According to Robin Remington, the amendments had clearly backfired. They "...became the vehicle of both national (ethnic) demands and a republican (regional) challenge to the central Party authority of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia..."⁵² Tito set about immediately to meet the challenge of republicanism.

Tito saw the threat to Belgrade's authority as a function of Party ideological weakness and disunity. It was in the Party structure and its role in society that he instituted changes. The LCY was strengthened at the national level and new attention was given to the concept of democratic centralism. William Zimmerman states that, "...the term (democratic centralism) was interpreted in ways more confining for dissenting party members at any given level. Competence within the LCY was recentralized, at the expense of republic party organizations."⁵³ Some powers, however, were left with republican party cadres and local government officials. The crackdown was a "limited recentralization" and was designed to make the Party a more effective instrument of political authority and ideological guidance.⁵⁴

Tito did not crack down on nationalist movements, at least not those external to the Communist Party. The amendments

became part of the new Constitution of 1974 and some of the Croatian demands actually came to pass. Generally, ethnic rights improved. According to A. Ross Johnson, "...since 1971 the rights of national self-affirmation in Yugoslavia have expanded providing that they are exercised within the framework of a larger Yugoslav community and not in direct opposition to other national groups."⁵⁵ It would appear that Tito felt limited in dealing with nationalism on a large scale, but fully capable of dealing with it in the Party.

3. The Federation Today

Yugoslavia today is organized and theoretically based upon the Constitution of 1974. According to the Constitution, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is "...a federal state organized as a community of voluntarily united nations and their socialist republics..."⁵⁶ The equality of nations and nationalities is guaranteed, as are the rights of cultural expression, linguistic freedom, sovereignty, independence, and self-determination. The republics are equally represented in all government bodies including the two chambers of the Federal Assembly and the nine-man Presidency of the Republic. The provinces receive equal representation in the Presidency, but a lower (about two thirds) representation in other government bodies. A requirement for mandatory inter-republican agreement on key issues prior to enactment of legislation results in harmonizing divergent positions. Thus according to A. Ross Johnson, the members strive "...for compromise policies through

negotiations among shifting coalitions of republican representatives, not unity enforced from above."⁵⁷

There is little in Yugoslavia that is not touched or affected in some way by the ethnic diversity of the people. In addition to the government, the Party itself recognizes each nation, and each republic has its own League of Communists. As will be demonstrated, problems in the economy are both a cause and an effect of national problems. The Yugoslav Peoples Army, often called the only all-Yugoslav organization in the country, is at least slightly suspect due to disproportionate Serbian representation in its officer ranks. Finally it must be pointed out that ethnic mixing does not stop neatly at Yugoslavia's external borders. There is, as a result, a multitude of disputes between this country and its neighbors regarding reciprocal treatment of minorities and contradicting claims to certain territories and peoples.

As A. Ross Johnson very accurately states, the national groups are intermingled "...without assimilation, like oil and water, throughout most of the constituent units..."⁵⁸ The problem this intermingling causes is perhaps the basis for many national animosities. One group of people simply cannot express its own nationalism and demand ethnic rights without threatening the rights, and in some cases the very existence, of at least one other group. Thus, increases in national feelings tend to spread in waves.

The three groups that are today most prone to nationalist feelings are the Serbs, the Croats, and the Albanians.

Though Croats are not likely to admit it, however, it would seem that Serbian hegemony and centralism have been dealt a significant blow by the passage of time, the Rankovic purge, and the purges of 1971-1972. At any rate, Serbs seem to be more content than the other two with the present federation and distribution of power. Thus it is probably only Croatian and Albanian nationalism that pose a threat to the unity of the Yugoslav state, and they are both examples of how one nationalism can touch off another. Croatian emigre groups in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe regularly call for the establishment of an independent Croatia. But the state they would like to see created would include all of what is presently Croatia, much of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and parts of Serbia. And it would include millions of Serbs who clearly would not accept Croatian dominance.

The Albanians' demands are a similar threat to the Serbs. Statistically speaking, there are about 1.4 million Albanians in Yugoslavia, one million of whom live in Kosovo. There are only 2.2 million Albanians in Albania itself. Thus one encounters evidence of two sorts of Kosovo Albanian demands. One is the demand for "republic" status within Yugoslavia. The second is the demand for union with Albania instead of Yugoslavia.⁵⁹ While the first is the most common, both pose an interesting threat to Serbia. Dusko Doder points out that:

...Kosovo has a special meaning (to Serbs). It was the sight of a medieval Serb kingdom which was destroyed in 1389 by the Turks, but legends and folk songs have kept the glories of the vanished kingdom alive. For five centuries every Serbian child has been reared on the legends and folk songs of Kosovo.⁶⁰

As Albanians nationalism rises then, it can be expected that there will be a corresponding rise in nationalist feeling among Serbs living in and near Kosovo.

The official policy regarding expressions of nationalism is ambivalent, for one can find instances of repression as well as examples of complete freedom. Tad Szulc, in a 1976 article, cites three cases which were typical of the regime's occasional repressive policies: A lawyer was imprisoned for defending a political dissident who was regarded as a Serbian nationalist; a district judge in Slovenia was convicted and sentenced for treason for allegedly advocating Slovenian separatism; and numerous incidents of arrests for publicly singing nationalist songs had also been recorded.⁶¹ What one sees as a reaction to such repression is nationalist behavior by crowds at sporting events which are an apparently acceptable outlet for such displays. Dusko Doder cites several instances of name calling, fights aboard trains, and automobiles being tossed into the Adriatic, all following or related to soccer games between Serbs and Croats.⁶² The importance of such examples is that the government has given its tacit approval to such actions. Thus, despite the evidence of repression, official recognition and handling of the national problem seems quite tolerant comparatively, and has prompted at least one author to assert that Yugoslavia "...is the first multinational state in the history of Eastern Europe, including Russia, to have achieved a genuine ethnic equality."⁶³

Tito's own attitude is rather interesting and probably explains the government's unpredictable policies. He seems to fully accept the permanent multinational character of Yugoslavia and has actually encouraged the trends toward decentralization and greater republican autonomy. On the other hand, he does not tolerate nationalism among those who are responsible for the management and security of the Yugoslav state. In reference to the Party, he has stated "...that although nationalism is dangerous, worse yet are Communists who are nationalistically minded."⁶⁴ And in speaking to his generals he has referred to nationalism as a "cancer" which can destroy the entire socialist state. It seems that nationalism is permissible among the masses but not among the leadership.

C. IDEOLOGICAL LEGITIMACY AND SELF-MANAGEMENT

The Communists did not invent ideology. It has been a tool of politicians and diplomats for centuries, for it has consistently proven to be a useful means of justifying demands or explaining actions. Despite its historical usage, however, the persistent ideological barrage originated by Communist leaders and theoreticians leads to the feeling that they did, in fact, invent it and now maintain a monopoly on its employment. The reason is relatively straight forward: The formal teaching and spreading of Communist ideology is of the utmost importance to each individual Communist regime and to the movement as a whole.

To each ruling Communist Party, the ideology provides the legitimacy for its continued rule. It justifies one party

domination because other parties would only endanger the "socialist achievement" and threaten the dictatorship of the proletariat. It explains away the repression of news media, dissent, and closed frontiers because outside influence and contact threaten the socialist moral fiber of the people. And it justifies tight central control of economies and continuous "Spartan" living by promising equality for all once imperialism and capitalism are defeated. In short, the ideology, and the dream that accompanies it, are used extensively to justify dictatorial rule and repression of the masses. Naturally the level varies amongst Communist states, but each regime's continued place in power is to a large degree based upon a dependence on ideological concepts.

On the international level the dependence on ideology is at least as important as at the internal state level. Here the Communists strive to display unity, for unity provides the greatest potential for a Socialist victory over Capitalism. Thus, the ideology is utilized as a rallying point, a theoretical unifier providing a banner which all Communist states can follow. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union attempts to assume leadership of the movement at this level. In fact, for many years it was the undisputed leader of socialism since it was the only Communist state in existence from 1917 until 1945. Today Moscow still proclaims itself the ideological leader of the Communist World and regularly calls for unity under its leadership and direction.

Ideology provides internal legitimacy for ruling Communist parties, it provides a theoretical framework for an anti-Capitalist alliance of socialist states, and it defines relationships of Communist states with other states on the international scene. Its importance can hardly be exaggerated. Perhaps, in truth, ideology has become a little too important to the Communists. While it still performs the above functions, problems within the Communist world would seem to indicate that ideology can be a heavy burden at times.

The beneficial aspects of Communist ideology apply to all Communist states but none have felt its burdensome side as much as the Soviet Union. The ideology of Soviet Communism has proven too rigid and inflexible to allow for variations amongst Communist states. Its relations with Yugoslavia have characterized this rigidity for not only was it necessary to excommunicate the Yugoslavs, but the ideological transformations that have taken place since 1948 have made it nigh impossible for Communists to agree on even the most basic questions of strategy. Ideological conflicts have been seldom solved and have if anything caused greater rigidity due to an ironic corresponding increase in the threat to internal legitimacy.

Due to Yugoslavia's early ideological challenge to Moscow-led Communism, it has always played a special role in relations among Communist states and parties. Since 1948 there has been very little agreement between the Communists in Yugoslavia and those in the Soviet Union regarding the proper internal structure of a socialist state, the role of the Communist Party in society

and government, and the relationship between Communist states and parties. The ideological conflict between the two may be the strongest barrier to a true Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement. The roots and the importance of their ideological differences therefore require closer investigation.

Excommunication posed a serious problem for Yugoslavia's leaders in 1948. Of course there was the military and economic threat of the Soviet bloc. But worse in the long run was the threat to the legitimacy of the Communist regime. The question of two or more communisms had never arisen. Since the Bolshevik Revolution there had been but one center of Communist thought and practice and it had not been located in Belgrade. The Yugoslavs had never questioned this fact. Yet on June 28, 1948, they were accused of following deviationist foreign and domestic policies, faulty agricultural practices, and pursuing a non-Marxist-Leninist conception of the role of the Party, among other things.⁶⁵ The entire Cominform censured the Yugoslav Communists, accused their leaders of heresy, and appealed to the rank and file to oust Tito and his associates.

The regime's continued tenure was threatened at two levels. First, its own Party was forced to question itself in order to determine who was correct, the CPY or the CPSU. They were not in the habit of questioning the CPSU. Secondly, they owed an explanation of some sort to the Yugoslav population at large. Policies between 1945 and 1948, not to mention the Constitution, were based upon Soviet Communism, and an avowed allegiance to the "socialist fatherland". If Moscow was correct, then Tito

would have little to stand on ideologically. Fortunately, whatever threat there was to Tito's regime was largely overcome by the Yugoslav nationalism created by Stalin's threats. Whether they were ideologically correct or not, the Yugoslavs were determined to withstand the bullying tactics of the Kremlin.

Political and security problems thus deflected interests temporarily away from the ideological inconsistencies facing the CPY. The Party leaders utilized the time well. After withstanding the initial shock of their excommunication they began to accuse the CPSU itself of not properly adhering to Marxism. They pointed to the degree of overcentralization in the Soviet Union and the power of the state bureaucracy. The Yugoslavs claimed that the Soviet system had become a form of state capitalism and was far from withering away.⁶⁶ As the debate continued, the Yugoslavs looked increasingly closer at Marxist ideology in an attempt to reestablish their own credibility, for it was hardly enough to merely criticize the CPSU. An alternative had to be formulated.

Milovan Djilas and Edvard Kardelj were two of Tito's chief lieutenants and the most intellectually capable of inventing a non-Soviet Communist ideology that would still be based upon Marxist theory.⁶⁷ They discovered that Marx had written of free association of producers, of workers in control of their own lives, and of differing material conditions in various countries.⁶⁸ Furthermore, Tito added to the research by recalling a civil war slogan used by Lenin: "Factories to the Workers."⁶⁹ According to M. George Zaninovich, such Marxist philosophy and

theoretical concepts when "...coupled with the doctrine of socialism in one country, could be used to justify an independent road."⁷⁰ It was in a way fortunate for the Yugoslavs that the Leninist model of Communism in the USSR, especially as practiced by Stalin, was itself a significant departure from Marx's visions. This departure provided much of the latitude necessary to establish a new road to socialism.

Self-management was presented to the Yugoslav Party in June of 1950. Immediate efforts were begun to reindoctrinate the Party members who had to be sold on the new ideas. Simultaneously the people were promised that self-management would enable them to exercise greater freedom and increased participation in social decision-making. The entire concept was made more palatable by its advertised superiority over Soviet Communism and its applicability to conditions unique to Yugoslavia. Interestingly, self-management was little more than a propaganda device for at least ten years after its initial billing, for the state remained in control of both economic and political decision-making.

Nevertheless, as a propaganda device self-management was extremely successful. While other methods were utilized to fend off political and security threats, Yugoslavia's new Communism successfully withstood the onslaught of ideological criticism from the rest of the Communist world. Even more importantly, it provided a basis for internal legitimacy for Tito and his associates. The people certainly felt self-management was worth a try and that "...the uncertainty of

social experimentation was more palatable than the tyranny of a fixed model."⁷¹ Thus, by establishing a new Communism which was fundamentally different from that practiced in the Soviet Union, not to mention more "correct", the Yugoslav Communists were able to transfer what began as a serious threat into a source of Yugoslav national pride and unity.

Yugoslavia's survival as a Communist state outside of the Soviet bloc was much more dangerous to the Kremlin than self-management itself. It was not so much that this particular alternative to Soviet Communism existed, but that any alternative existed at all. The form of socialism originated by the Yugoslavs eventually became known as Titoism, and its greatest significance was that it necessitated a change in the relationships between Communist states and parties. According to Vernon Aspaturian:

What was ultimately significant about Titoism was not its doctrinal substance, but its form - the idea of a pluralistic Communist universe of autonomous nation and states, starting from a common point of departure, but charting different roads to socialism or Communism...⁷²

This was not an original goal of the Yugoslav Communists. It came about solely because they were successful in their efforts to survive as a state and remain in power within that state. It was to be a very contributory factor in maintaining their political legitimacy since it would elevate their leader to international fame.

D. THE CHALLENGES OF MARKET SOCIALISM

Yugoslavia's independent posture has precluded full membership in the Communist economic community, while at the same time,

political-economic orientation has barred full integration into the Western system. As a result, it has assumed a position on the periphery of both communities. This unique status has allowed, if not necessitated, extensive experimentation with economic reforms designed to make the Yugoslav economy and foreign trade system compatible with both the market and centrally planned economies. It has not been an easy task and has required constant management and frequent alteration to make it work.

Yugoslavia emerged from World War II an economically poor and devastated country. The major economic goal of the post-War leadership was the rapid industrialization of the economy within a socialist framework. It was hoped that a self-sufficient economy could be created by severing all relations between domestic and foreign firms, by placing a barrier between the economy and the capitalist world, and by keeping trade to a minimum.⁷³ Economic planners realized, however, that rapid industrialization would initially require extensive importation of the machinery and associated equipment necessary for industrial production. They hoped to offset these distasteful imports with agricultural exports and with technical assistance from the Soviet Union.

The new Communist government took immediate steps to consolidate its control and to socialize its economy. It had an exceptionally easy time in its nationalization because, first there was no political or economic resistance, second the Germans had already confiscated most foreign owned enterprises,

and third the bourgeois power base had been wiped out by the economic devastation of the war.⁷⁴ By the end of 1948 the new government had nationalized almost all large manufacturing, mining, and power companies, as well as all banks, transportation companies, foreign trade firms, and wholesale and retail trade firms.⁷⁵ The nationalization was not total, however, in that artisan shops were left to private ownership and large land holdings were confiscated and redistributed to the peasants. Extensive nationalization was actually just one aspect of total economic centralization during this period, since all major decisions regarding the operation of Yugoslavia's commercial sector were made by the federal government.

The economy would probably have remained totally centralized had not the economic boycott of the Soviet bloc caused Yugoslav planners to reevaluate their goals. Yugoslavia simply was not self-sufficient enough to achieve industrialization completely on its own. For the next few years the government tried various reforms, including massive seizure and collectivization of agriculture, in an attempt to make its system even more traditionally socialist. But the boycott and other uncontrollable forces, such as severe droughts, caused the leaders to contemplate more liberal reforms and force them to look to the West for assistance. The general direction of reform moved toward decentralization of economic planning and control. The early changes, which were first implemented in 1950, involved a decrease in the degree of government activity at the local level and the inauguration of the concept of workers'

self-management. Workers' councils became responsible for the operation of their enterprises and the market mechanism was instituted on a limited basis. The central government, however, continued to maintain almost full control of investment funds, foreign trade, and through economic plans, still directed the economy as a whole. Assistance from the West included massive amounts of American aid and foreign trade with the capitalist bloc. In 1954 economic association and trade with the Communist bloc was also resumed. The reforms, the trade, the aid, and the government's continued emphasis on industrialization combined to cause Yugoslavia's economy to grow at a phenomenal rate. During the 1950's its rate of growth was second only to that of Japan.⁷⁶

Despite reform and rapid growth, Yugoslavia's economy still remained highly centralized and faced various problems. The Communists controlled the economic sector since they held the only political power in the country.⁷⁷ Their members held key economic positions and exercised enough power to limit the amount of self-management the workers really had. But their control could not keep imports from far outbalancing exports, and their trade deficit was being embarrassingly corrected only by large amounts of American aid. Disparity in growth and development continued to exist between sectors of the economy and regions of the country. Prices and the value of the dinar were variable and confusing since government control set different rates of exchange for internal and external transactions. Finally, by the late 1950's, American aid was beginning

to dry up and the trade barriers imposed by the newly formed European Economic Community were causing problems in non-member European countries such as Yugoslavia.

Reforms during the early and mid-1960's were designed to integrate the Yugoslav economy into the world market system. The desire, as Fred Singleton points out, was to "...induce efficiency through the discipline of the market."⁷⁸ Integration was extremely difficult due primarily to the disparity that existed between domestic prices and world market prices. These differences were the result of the previous domestic insulation from foreign markets. Through foreign loans the Yugoslav banks secured the foreign currency necessary to help pay for imports. By 1966, these loans, in addition to devaluation of the Yugoslav dinar, had made domestic prices roughly compatible with those on the world market.

Government control of internal economic transactions at the local level became almost non-existent. Rudolf Bicanic, in Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia, suggests that federal planning was reduced to "...only a suggestion for action for the enterprises."⁷⁹ While this was true of internal transactions, there was still state control over foreign trade practices. Import restrictions were maintained in order to keep imports down, and taxation of export proceeds continued in order to build foreign exchange reserves.

Today Yugoslavia is in fact part of both the centrally planned economic system (which itself is becoming increasingly integrated with the West) and the market system of the Western

economies; thus "Market Socialism". Workers' self-management continues to be the theoretical foundation of the system, and compared to other Communist states, there is a minimal amount of federal control. Though there is a small amount of federally controlled agricultural production, independent peasant proprietors now account for about 85 per cent of all agricultural land.⁸⁰ State subsidies have been eliminated and only profitable enterprises can survive. Finally, while there is considerably less government control of investment, redistribution of government investment funds continues to favor the poorer, southern republics.

After three decades of experimentation, solutions such as worker self-management, market socialism, and rapid industrialization have not solved all of the problems and have actually created some new ones that are alien to other Eastern European Communist states. Several are rather embarrassing to the Yugoslav Communists for they are problems that are theoretically nonexistent in Communist states. For example, unemployment is an evil of capitalism. Or so most Communist regimes would assert. But unemployment is very much a part of Yugoslav society and economic conditions. The unemployment problem became widespread as a result of the reforms of the early 1960's because integration with the world market mechanism implied simultaneous integration with the international division of labor. When government subsidies were lifted, many inefficient firms could not compete and were driven out of business. The workers that these inefficient enterprises had previously hoarded now found themselves out of work.

The Yugoslav Communists, in responding to this very un-socialist problem, took a correspondingly un-socialist step in order to affect a solution. Gradually the visa policy was liberalized, the frontiers were opened, and Yugoslav workers were allowed to leave the country to find work in Western Europe. Today it is commonly estimated that in excess of one million Yugoslavs are employed in Western Europe, most of them in West Germany. These gastarbeiter, as they are known in Europe, partially solve the Yugoslav unemployment problem and furthermore return roughly \$1 billion to Yugoslavia annually.⁸¹ The money they return plays a major role in balancing the constant trade deficit. Federal officials are in fact anxious to get more funds sent home since about 60 per cent of gastarbeiter earnings are spent or tucked away in foreign banks.⁸²

The Yugoslavs abroad are a mixed blessing, however. To begin with, their experiences with Western European societies and democracies are also being carried back to Yugoslavia. Andrew Borowiec estimates that since visa policies were liberalized, in excess of three million Yugoslavs have come in direct contact with Western political practices and rights.⁸³ And as Dusko Doder points out, most of them return home after three to five years when they have earned enough to build homes and purchase the trappings of middle class life.⁸⁴ The political values and knowledge of the West is thus being imported into Yugoslavia at a significant rate and might one day become a political force limiting the repressive tendencies of some of the more traditional Communist leaders.

Another aspect of the gastarbeiter situation is linked to the possibility of a recession in Western Europe. The effects could be disastrous for Yugoslavia if hundreds of thousands of its migrant workers suddenly returned home en masse. Not only would they be out of work, but their families which are presently well fed would be very hungry. Market socialism and the export of labor has made Yugoslavia vulnerable to instability in the world economic system. Finally, export of labor has not entirely solved the unemployment at home where about 500,000 Yugoslavs are still out of work.⁸⁵

Openness, a term not normally associated with Communist states, has been a proverbial two-edged sword. On the one hand, it has had some of the desired economic effects. In addition to the money returned by workers, tourism has also proved to be a major source of foreign currency and a significant tool in reducing the trade deficit. It is estimated that tourists bring in \$800 million per year. But openness also causes social problems that could easily be translated into social instability. Western political contact has already been discussed. A related and equally unsettling problem is the cultural effect of the consumerism that has resulted from economic development, tourism, and migrant workers' remittances. They have all caused the creation of a new middle class in Yugoslavia. The society has even been called "il socialismo borghese" or middle-class socialism.⁸⁶ While the Communists do not like to admit such an abhorrent concept such as this, there is little they can do about it. The problem is that

middle-class socialism has evolved too quickly in Yugoslavia. The people are still culturally eastern and prone to their old ways. Yet they are attempting to live with the symbols of Western culture. The result is that the people are torn between East and West, fearful of losing the old ways in which they are secure, but anxious to attain more and more of the physical comforts available to them.⁸⁷ Superimposed on the ethnic and cultural diversity already characteristic of Yugoslavia, this problem is especially hard to deal with since it is a direct result of one of the government's most successful policies.

Workers' self-management has attracted the attention of economists in the West, the East, and in the Third World, for economic as well as ideological reasons. Some aspects of it have been adopted in Romania, Poland and Hungary and are being considered elsewhere. But its economic viability continues to be debated extensively. Since Yugoslavia is thus far the only long-term testing ground it is impossible to reach a final judgement. The rate of economic development there has surpassed that of most other Communist states, and this seems to support Yugoslav claims to self-management's success. Their claims have been convincing enough to generate the interest of the People's Republic of China, an interest which has given the image of the concept a significant boost. There is, however, an inherent fallacy in attributing too much of Yugoslavia's success to self-management principles. The economy differs from all others so greatly that it is impossible to measure which aspects are responsible for the economic success. In reality there is

debate even in Yugoslavia regarding the efficiency and success of workers' self-management.

In his book, Yugoslavia After Tito, Andrew Borowiec provides some enlightening statistics concerning the actual practice of self-management. The 5,000 workers of a certain shipyard are represented by 672 self-management and socio-political councils which hold 11,525 meetings per year. The 31,911 hours involved translates into 26.8 working days per worker per year. This further translates into the equivalent of one small tanker that was not built due to meetings.⁸⁸ Borowiec goes on to point out that this example represents the rest of Yugoslav industry and that there is apparently little that can be done to change it since Yugoslav workers have grown accustomed to this inefficient mode of operation. Hence, Yugoslav leaders seem destined to live with low productivity compared to other industrial nations.

Judgment of self-management cannot be limited solely to economic figures which measure productivity or growth. Where the system seems to have failed in efficiency, it has succeeded in allowing, even encouraging, initiative and private enterprise and investment.⁸⁹ Dusko Doder even attributes some degree of Yugoslavia's overall stability to self-management. In his opinion:

The main accomplishment of self-management lies in the fact that Yugoslavia has managed a smoother transition to industrialization than any other Eastern European country. There have been no food-price riots and bloody clashes between workers and police, as in Poland, and no famines and widespread misery as in the Soviet Union, Romania, and other countries.⁹⁰


Furthermore, self-management, as seen in Yugoslavia is a symbol of the liberalization and decentralization of the Yugoslav system as a whole. It is the symbol of changes that began in the 1950's and that are equated with greater freedom and better living standards. It must be considered at least somewhat successful since most Yugoslavs support the system. Doder quotes a Yugoslav journalist who seemingly represents the typical attitude of the citizenry: "'It is not important whether it works or not. What is important is that whatever personal freedoms we enjoy rest on self-management. What is the alternative? A return to Eastern-type centralism.'"91

Finally it should be reemphasized that all returns are not in regarding self-management. Though on paper it has existed since 1950, it has in truth been implemented very slowly. The Yugoslav leaders themselves are quick to admit that it is still not fully operational. Some of the short-term criticisms therefore bear qualification. Doder, for example, points out that though productivity may be low, it is actually higher than it was prior to self-management. Duncan Wilson, in an article devoted to this system, cites impressive figures showing that inflation has dropped, industrial and agricultural production have increased, and there has been improvement in the balance of trade. His statistics apply to the early and mid-1970's, during which there has been an increasing emphasis on and participation in self-management.⁹² It may be that an accurate measurement of self-management's success is not possible. However, for the present it does seem to be serving the goals

of both the regime and the workers. That is a measure of success of any system in any country.

One of the more persistent problems facing the central government is the difference in standards of living and industrial development that exists between the northern and southern republics. Figure 2 clearly illustrates the disparities in regional development. Obviously the situation has

Regional Economic Disparities in Yugoslavia, 1975
(gross social product per capita in equivalent US dollars*)



* Calculated at one dollar for 17 dinars.

* Exclusive of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina.

SOURCES: Computed from gross social product figures in *Indeks* (Belgrade), No. 10, 1976, and from population estimates for 1975 in *Statistički godišnjak, Jugoslavije* (Yugoslavia Statistical Yearbook), Belgrade, Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1976.

Source: William Zimmerman, "The Tito Legacy and Yugoslavia's Future", Problems of Communism, May-June 1977.

FIGURE 2

changed very little since 1971 when it served as the root of the problems in Croatia. The Federal Development Fund is designed to alleviate the differences by collecting contributions

for development and distributing the funds according to the following scale of needs:

Bosnia-Herzegovina	30.7%
Kosovo	30.0%
Macedonia	26.2%
Montenegro	13.1%

Slovenia and Croatia are still the principal contributors, thus those two republics continue to subsidize development elsewhere in the federation.⁹³ That may seem proper to idealistic Communists, but it is still hard to swallow amongst nationalistic Croats and Slovenes who would rather see their money spent within their own republics. The problem is not likely to disappear since the southern, poorer republics are not likely to give up their demands for development funds.

There are two other aspects of Yugoslavia that distinguish its economy from those of other Communist states. First, since 1967, the Yugoslavs have permitted foreign investment, and though the government imposes restrictions on ownership and the use and distribution of proceeds, fourteen joint ventures had been established by 1974. By January 1977 this number had risen to twenty, and the Dow Chemical Company was building a joint \$750 million petro-chemical complex there.⁹⁴ The actual amount of foreign investment is thusfar minimal, but it is significant that it is even permitted. Secondly, Yugoslavia trades with the West far more than her Communist neighbors. This has been true since the tumultuous early 1950's, and though the percentages sometimes vary according to politics, Western Europe continues to account for just under 50 per cent of Yugoslavia's total trade.

It should be emphasized that Yugoslavia is far from totally divorced from the economies of the Soviet bloc. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), which was established in 1949 in part as the instrument of the Soviet economic boycott of Yugoslavia, ironically has granted special status to the Yugoslavs since 1964.⁹⁵ As a result, Yugoslavia is permitted to participate when it is beneficial to its own economy. After the original blockade was lifted COMECON quickly became Yugoslavia's second largest region of trade. The primary trading partner is the USSR, which in 1975 accounted for over fifteen per cent of Yugoslavia's total trade.

Yugoslav trade with COMECON differs significantly from its trade with the West, for while it normally faces a deficit on the capitalist side, it achieves a surplus with the Communist nations. The Communist bloc accounts for about one third of Yugoslavia's exports, but only one quarter of its imports. Interestingly, it has often achieved a surplus of trade with the USSR while running a deficit with Eastern Europe. The deficit results from Yugoslavia's historical tendency to import, and her inability to find a market in Eastern Europe for her exports. The surplus on the Soviet side is due to the high price that Yugoslav goods demand in Russia, the strict Soviet trade policies, and the poor quality of Soviet goods.⁹⁶ Interestingly, the high demand for Yugoslav goods in the Soviet Union may be a direct result of the improved quality of these goods that has resulted from competition in Western markets.

Trading extensively with both the West and with COMECON makes trade management and accounting a bit confusing for the Yugoslavs. Trade with COMECON is conducted on a bilateral clearing house basis in which commodities are merely exchanged for other commodities. To accomodate this system, Yugoslavia, at least partially, has had to retain its pre-reform centrally controlled trade structure. Furthermore, this dual system of trade can lead to inefficiency in production since Yugoslav businessmen often prefer the COMECON trade because it is simpler and not as demanding or risky as trade on the world market.⁹⁷

Whatever may be said about the Yugoslav economy, most authors and visitors agree that Yugoslavia's people live better today than they did 30 years ago, and more importantly Yugoslavs live better than their neighbors in Eastern Europe. The regime predictably attributes the economic success to its hybrid system. Borowiec offers four very different reasons:

- (1) massive Western (mainly U.S.) help to Yugoslavia during the difficult years which followed the break with the Cominform;
- (2) intensive trade with the West and Western investment in Yugoslavia;
- (3) the flow of Western tourists;
- (4) the one million Yugoslav guest workers in Western Europe, with their hard-currency remittances and support for relatives in Yugoslavia.⁹⁸

Probably both the regime and its opponents are partially correct. But more importantly, the Yugoslavs have in fact achieved a significant degree of economic success and development utilizing a system that is, in Borowiec's words, "neither fish nor fowl".

Continued success is certainly very possible. But in viewing the various challenges that market socialism poses, one over-riding factor seems to stand out; that of great economic

dependence and linkage with Western economies. In 1965, John C. Campbell wrote, "The great bugbear haunting the Yugoslavs is...the European Common Market and what its mere existence will mean to Yugoslavia."⁹⁹ Campbell was speaking principally of the effects of preferential tariffs. Ironically, thirteen years later, it is the Western European economy that still poses the greatest challenge to Yugoslav economic stability. Foreign trade, tourism, workers abroad, and foreign investment have done more to link Yugoslavia to the West than any political or ideological policy practice of the past thirty years. On the other hand, the linkage has positive aspects which will make it the interest of Yugoslavia's leaders to maintain the contact that now exists with the West. In short, Yugoslavia's stability is very greatly dependent on economic stability and policies of Western Europe.

E. POWER: STRUCTURE AND DISTRIBUTION

Much has been written concerning succession in Communist states. Successors, generally the winners of power struggles, whether they rule individually or collectively, have a way of defying the predictions of Western observers. Furthermore, it seems that despite succession arrangements or designations, there is little that even the departing leaders can do to orchestrate the process.

Another, yet different, succession process is that which follows the passing or retirement of a dictator or ruler who has possessed a majority of power and has ruled for a relatively

long period of time. Often such a leader is seen as the embodiment of the country's internal and external policies. In this case also it has proven difficult to predict the source of power and the type of rule that will follow. Such a leader tends to dwarf those around him and after a while it begins to appear as though there is no one qualified to succeed him.

It is probably a misfortune for Yugoslavia that Tito's succession will fit into both of the above categories. It would be much easier for all concerned and stability would be much more probable if there existed an unquestioned succession process that would produce a leader acceptable to all Yugoslavs. But what man or system could possibly replace Josip Tito? The following quotations exemplify the diversity of opinion and the difficulty of determining the answer to that question. The problem is much more than that of identifying individuals. It is a problem of identifying the sources and institutions of power and their linkages within the framework of Yugoslavia's political structure.

...whoever replaces Tito cannot hope to enjoy his prestige or authority and is liable to be more of a broker than an authoritarian leader. In the final analysis, therefore, it will be the manner in which the institutional structure, centered largely around the State Presidency, functions that will be the deciding factor, rather than the role played by the individual upon whom Tito's mantle falls.

F. Stephen Larrabee
Balkan Security

One thing is certain: The burden of trying to preserve Titoism without Tito will rest on the LCY. The Party, ..., will be the main guarantor of Titoist continuity.

Andrew Borowiec
Yugoslavia After Tito

...the army's political role has evolved to the point where military support is central to the preservation and extension of authority; the political influence which has been gained by the military institutions is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.

Robert W. Dean
"Civil-Military Relations in
Yugoslavia, 1971-1975"

With the exception of the ailing Kardelj, all ranking Yugoslav politicians suffer one enormous disadvantage; they do not have a national constituency and so their policies most likely will be tactical, motivated essentially by insecurity.

Dusko Doder
The Yugoslavs

...we should anticipate a political process that includes competition (which need not be antagonistic) among personalities and institutions.

A. Ross Johnson
"Is Yugoslavia Leninist?"

Power, for over thirty years, has resided principally in Tito's hands. But most observers would agree that another Tito is not in the offing for Yugoslavia because no individual even remotely approaches his stature. There are now laws that govern the succession process. But due to the nature of Communism it is still not likely that they will provide the entire answer. They may provide a basis, or structure of rule and decision-making, but no more. The Army and the Party are natural


allies and will most probably be the greatest guiding influences, but even they cannot necessarily get along without other sources of power and certainly not without each other. Finally, while it is true that no single individual wields the power necessary to rule alone, personalities will obviously play a major role and must be therefore considered when envisioning a post-Tito Yugoslavia.

1. Government Structure

The institutional structure of the Yugoslav state provides considerable insight into the thinking of Yugoslavia's leadership and the limits within which it must work. It provides balance between the member republics and provinces, respecting their desires for autonomy, and between opposing blocs of Communists who want either greater decentralization or increased centralization. It prepares, via written regulations and specific political bodies, for Tito's succession. It allows the Yugoslav people a say in their government by providing a delegate system of representation. And finally, and in spite of all this balance, it maintains the principle of democratic centralism and controls over decision-making.

The diagram on page 69 reflects the basic structure of the federal government in Belgrade and its linkage with the individual republics and provinces. The upper portion of the diagram depicts the major federal bodies, including the SFRY Assembly, its associated Federal Executive Council, and the State Presidency. The lower half of the diagram depicts the organizations which provide the Republican, Provincial, and

BASIC STRUCTURE OF REPRESENTATION



Source: Fred Bernard Singleton, Twentieth Century Yugoslavia

FIGURE 3

Communal delegates to the central bodies. The system is designed first to guarantee representation to all major national groups. Secondly, it provides political or social representation to the six major sectors of Yugoslav society. Theoretically, each individual fits into one group or another.

The SFRY Assembly is, constitutionally, "the supreme organ of power operating within the framework of federal rights and duties." It has the authority to amend the Constitution, determine internal and foreign policy, adopt the annual social plan and budget, decide on alterations to Yugoslavia's borders, decide on war and peace, and elect the President of the Republic and members of the Federal Executive Council. These broad powers are acted out according to a rather vague division of labor between the two Chambers. The Federal Chamber appears to have the broader "state" responsibilities while the Chamber of Republics and Provinces acts on legislation which requires consensus of the republics. Obviously all of this is very theoretical since it is doubtful that the Assembly has ever seriously bucked Tito's decisions on foreign policy, or on promotion of individuals to higher government posts. The Federal Executive Council is constituted in accordance with equal republican representation, and is the executive body of the SFRY Assembly.

As the diagram indicates, there are two inputs into the Assembly. The Federal Chamber is comprised of delegates from the Assemblies of Communes. The Communes are organized regionally and operate semi-independently from their respective

Republican governments. They are designed to organize the people in socio-political groups based upon their social lives, work, needs, and interests. Their delegates are nominated by the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY), a peoples' front-type political ally of the LCY, designed to gather broad mass political support. The Federal Chamber is therefore a political-ideological body rather than an ethnic body. The other half of the SFRY Assembly, the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, is comprised of representatives from respective Republican and Provincial Assemblies. These delegates are more clearly representatives of ethnic groups or nations than their counterparts in the Federal Chamber.

At the lowest level within their republics the people are represented through socio-political organizations, party units, military and territorial units, and economic organizations at their places of work. The Law of Associated Labor sets forth the rules by which organizations of this latter group are established. These work units are the basis of the concept of self-management and self-management pluralism, for they provide workers a say in the management of their economic organization and a method of delegate representation in their local political bodies. Through this broad system of representation it is estimated that as many as 700,000 citizens serve on some sort of delegation at any given time.¹⁰⁰

The Yugoslavs claim that this system of direct representation is an improvement over Western democratic practice since it directly involves so much more of the electorate.¹⁰¹ It

does that certainly, because delegates serve for four years and no one can represent the same organization for more than two terms. The above figure can thus be seen to multiply over time. As a result, the population does become highly politicized and conscious and active, at least in the general business of local government. Whether they have much say in the actual decision-making remains an important question.

What the diagram does not show is that the lowest level of representation is in reality the only level at which direct election of delegates is practiced. Thereafter, moving up the ladder from republican or provincial assemblies to federal bodies, indirect elections are utilized.¹⁰² Thus the representatives are less directly linked to the electorate than advertised.

It still appears, however, that consensus should play a major role in policy making due to the representation of both ethnic and social groups. A. Ross Johnson stresses that this is the case and feels Yugoslavia is "more a federal than a unitary state."¹⁰³ He bases this assertion on the fact that during the 1970's much of the decision-making regarding internal policies and economic interests has been done within the governmental structure, free of Party or Leninist type dictates. It can further be argued that representatives to the SFRY Assembly remain loyal to their regional or communal interests. Their election is still dependent on their republican support so very few can afford to be totally independent or "Yugoslav" in their actions. While this does not necessarily imply antagonistic relationships among representatives, it does imply that a certain

amount of consensus must be achieved in Yugoslavia's decision-making process.

The Constitution of 1974 decreased the size of the State Presidency from 23 to 9 men. It is composed of a representative from each republic and each province, in addition to the President of the LCY. The nine men are elected for five year terms. During that five year period, the post of President is to rotate among them on a yearly basis. For the present, however, Tito, who maintains the President of the LCY slot, acts as President of the Republic. He has been elected to that position for life or for an "unlimited term of office." Upon completion of his term, the system of rotation is to go into effect with the vice-president assuming duties as President. It is difficult to ascertain how much power the Presidency will have since it is clearly still dominated by Tito's presence. It thusfar has met primarily to discuss and approve foreign policy issues, though it is also responsible for social, economic, and defense policy decisions. Many of the latter three are handled by the Assembly, though the Presidency has ultimate authority in the event of disagreement.

The structure of the present Yugoslav government is relatively new. While it is the result of evolution, it has in fact been in effect only since 1974. It is clearly designed to provide balanced and representative government to the diverse groups of Yugoslav society now, but more importantly in the future. What makes analysis of its actual effectiveness difficult, however, is the fact that during the period of its

birth and initial testing there has existed a simultaneous recentralization of decision-making and increased emphasis on the role of the LCY within all aspects of government and society. Thus it is not uncommon nor surprising to find disagreement among Western observers over which trend has the greatest momentum.

2. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia

The modern day LCY traces its origins to April of 1919 when a Socialist Worker's Party of Yugoslavia was founded. In June of 1920 it became the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY). Prior to World War II the party was best characterized by weakness and fractious disagreement regarding a consistent policy toward nationalism.¹⁰⁴ During World War II and through 1948, it distinguished itself by its partisan victory and its almost unparalleled loyalty and allegiance to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁵ Since 1948, it has been known for its independence and its decentralized and liberal leadership of the Yugoslav state. Naturally, it has been overshadowed by the dominance of Tito.

As an internal actor, the Party followed the general trends of government and society throughout the 1950's and 1960's. In 1952 it changed its name to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in order to symbolize its changing role in political life. Henceforward it was supposed to play a leading role in politics and ideological education, while leaving room for increasing use of the system of self-management.¹⁰⁶ Economic reforms and greater recognition of republican powers corresponded

to, if not a withering away of the Party's control, then certainly to a decentralization of Party functions.

The events in Croatia in 1971 brought an end to Party decentralization and Communist political control was reasserted. Tito accomplished this in a classical Tito manner. Decentralization had clearly gone too far and the centralists in the Party were clammering for more control from Belgrade and less power in the Republics. Tito reestablished Party emphasis while continuing with the formal decentralization provided by Constitutional amendments. He thus showed once and for all that, despite what is guaranteed or provided for in writing, it is still Tito that holds the power in Yugoslavia. Since 1971 he has tried to transfer some of his power back into the LCY.

In late 1971 and well into 1972 Tito conducted a purge of Party leadership that was not limited to Croatia, but spread into Serbia, Macedonia, and Slovenia as well. It was clear what he desired. According to Robin Remington, prior to these events "...Yugoslavia had not one political party...but eight..."¹⁰⁷ Tito's desire was to recentralize the Party and strengthen it by ensuring that it was once again united. The best way to unite the Party quickly was to ensure that the top leadership of the Republics' Leagues of Communists were dedicated to a strong central party. And the best way to accomplish that was to purge those individuals who were not. Tito began the recentralization process by adopting an "Action Program" which called for greater ideological and organizational unity, greater

attention to ideological education, and an increased role in the formulation and administration of all government policy.¹⁰⁸ In September 1972 he issued a letter addressed to the entire Party membership calling for greater unity and a revival of the basic principles of democratic centralism. This letter warned that members who did not comply would be expelled, as indeed they soon were.¹⁰⁹ The time between December 1971 and 1974 has been referred to as Tito's "crackdown" and as a return to Leninist doctrine.

Other concrete steps were taken to further strengthen the Party's role. Prior to the 1974 Constitution, it had been illegal for a person to occupy top posts in both the Party and the state. This must have proved too great an obstacle to democratic centralism and unity, for it was changed by the new Constitution.¹¹⁰ The absence of such a law thus allows for the consolidation of power into fewer hands. Similarly, there has been contraction in the size of Party bodies. Prior to 1974 the trend had been toward enlargement of even the top units. The 10th Congress (May 1974) and the 11th Congress (June 1978) both decreased the size of the Central Committee Presidium from the 1969 level of 52 members to 39 in 1974 and 24 more recently.¹¹¹ Seen in conjunction with the corresponding contraction of such bodies as the federal Presidency, it is clear that a smaller, more elite group is being placed in the position of making decisions.

Meanwhile, the size of the Party has increased at a phenomenal rate. Between 1973 and 1978 membership went from

slightly over 1 million to 1.6 million.¹¹² In comparison the membership increased by only about 100,000 during the previous 14 years.¹¹³ It seems that as the Party made its leadership more elite, its ranks became less so. The increase is most probably a result of the LCY attempts to reassume a dominant role in society. Ideological education and increased recruitment has swelled Party ranks. While greater numbers tend to imply less hard core Marxism, it is possible that this still serves the Party's purpose since it has become a greater part of society at the lower levels of the decision-making pyramid. These larger numbers also assure the Party that there is member participation in many of the self-management units, which is a goal that Tito himself has stressed.¹¹⁴

The organization of the Party is much like that of the federal government in that the central organization is repeated at the Republican and Provincial levels. Furthermore, the Central Committee and the Presidium are both structured according to the ethnic "key" which dominates Yugoslav politics. At the 11th Party Congress, the Central Committee that was elected was composed of 20 individuals from each Republic and 15 from each of the Provinces and the Yugoslav Peoples Army. The Presidium of 24 members includes 3 from the Republics, 2 from the Provinces, 1 from the Army, and of course Tito.¹¹⁵ Despite past problems, use of the ethnic key will probably continue since it is one method of keeping the various nations loyal to the Party and the state.

Another indication of the Party's expanding role is seen in the number of its cells or basic organizations. Tito placed the number of these ground-level units at 47,212 by the end of 1977.¹¹⁶ Most of those had fewer than 50 members. The purpose of maintaining such a large number of small units cannot be better explained than by Tito's own words: "Communists need a daily dialog and accord with other working people directly at their work place, at a meeting, at a trade union gathering, in the workers council and so forth."¹¹⁷

Political balancing acts, by their very nature, are open to pressure and criticism from a variety of different directions. Such is certainly the case with the LCY. From the day it first took a step in the direction of decentralization, the Party has faced pressure to grant even more independence to the Republics. Self-management and its broader implications tends to run wild now and again. On the other hand, the more the Party has decentralized, the larger has become the detractors on the left who favor greater central control of political and economic decision-making and a return to a more orthodox Communist style of rule.¹¹⁸

There is little doubt that the LCY wields more power today than it did a decade ago. Tito has gone to great lengths to make the Party once again the "connective tissue" which binds multinational Yugoslavia together. Typically, it is difficult to determine how successful he has been. Dusko Doder, after having interviewed hundreds of Party members "...never found one who, when speaking privately, was a true believer."¹¹⁹ Yet William Zimmerman, in an ongoing debate with A. Ross Johnson, is

convinced that the Party will still play a preeminent role in the succession.¹²⁰ It is true that non-believers, that is, non-believers in Marxism in its more classical form, can still be loyal enough to the LCY to make it strong enough to play a preeminent role. But such a supposition is rather suspect and so too is the power the Party allegedly maintains. Again according to Doder, "The extraordinary thing about the Yugoslav Party is its complete submission to one man. The apparatus of power is the office of the president - in short, Tito himself."¹²¹ Thus Tito may speak of the LCY as the "Leading and Guiding Ideopolitical Force of Society,"¹²² but not until he is gone will it have an opportunity to lead or guide.

3. The Yugoslav Peoples Army

The Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA) is fast becoming a major factor in Yugoslavia's future, and not only from the standpoint of national defense. In recent years an increasing amount of attention has been directed toward the YPA because it is one possible source of cohesion amongst the array of multi-directional forces existing in the country. It has often been referred to as the most "Yugoslav" institution in existence. It is also considered to be the most centrally controlled and therefore the most unified organization of those that guide Yugoslavia. An even greater emphasis has been placed on the military due to its apparently changing role in the internal security of the state. Today, army officers have much more political power and responsibility for domestic security than ever before.

Most writing traces the army's expanded political role to the 1971 events in Croatia. Certainly that period marked the beginning of an increase of military involvement in political affairs. It can be argued, however, that this involvement symbolizes a revival of an historical precedent, for Yugoslavia's military establishment played a very important role in the consolidation of power in the country at the end of World War II. The importance of this role lies in the fact that both the YPA and the LCY elite share common roots in the partisan struggle for national liberation. It is not so surprising then to see the Army considered as a factor in Yugoslavia's internal stability.

The army's post-war role was manifested in the use of the National Defense Corps of Yugoslavia (KNOJ) which was the military member of the security forces. The KNOJ has been described as "...a uniformed elite troop separate from the regular army and from the secret police (UDB)...its main tasks were to smash any attempts to overthrow Tito; to destroy all remnants of political opposition;..."¹²³ Its strength during the post-War period was estimated at about 75,000 men and it was clearly strong enough to put down any internal uprising. Thus in 1946 Tito had no qualms about using military means to maintain domestic stability, or to maintain his position in power.

After 1948 Tito faced little, if any, internal threat. His security forces had rid the country of most opposition and the Russian threat served to unify the Yugoslavs. By late 1952

Tito felt secure enough to eliminate the KNOJ and in December of that year Col. Gen. Ivan Gosnjak stated that "The political consolidation of our country enables us to leave matters of internal order and protection of property to the peoples's militia."¹²⁴ The KNOJ was converted to an elite border guard of 25,000 men. It would not be until the early 1970's that Tito would consider it necessary to speak of a military role in the maintenance of domestic stability.

It was in December 1971 that Tito looked once again toward the army as a domestic tool. On the 11th of that month he met with top army and territorial defense force leaders and apparently received their support regarding his plans for Croatia. In a speech ten days later, he stated, 'The task of our army is not merely to defend the territorial integrity of our country, but also to defend our socialism when we see that it is in danger and that it cannot be defended by other means.'¹²⁵ This was not to be the last such reference to the army's renewed responsibility for internal order and it certainly had its effect in ending that particular crisis.

These events are generally considered a turning point for the YPA. There had been steps toward a decentralization of the military along republican lines.¹²⁶ Tito's realization that the army was his most reliable instrument apparently caused him to reconsider such moves. As Johnson states, the Croatian crisis gave "...the YPA ample ammunition to ward off any renewed radical demands for its reorganization into republican national armies."¹²⁷

Not only did decentralization of the army cease but measures to strengthen its political role were soon undertaken. In 1974 an active duty general was named to the LCY's twelve member Executive Committee, two generals retained positions on the LCY Presidium, and fifteen military representatives were elected to the Central Committee in addition to five other army representatives from the republics. As Robert W. Dean points out, army representation in the Central Committee accounted for 12% of the total membership and had thus assumed "...a status within the Party formally somewhat akin to a province."¹²⁸ In government the most noteworthy changes were the appointments of army generals to the posts of Minister of Internal Affairs (which controls the security apparatus) and Public Prosecutor.

Thus today, there are two aspects of the army's political role that bear looking into. First is its increased representation at high levels of the LCY and government. Most important here is its relationship with the Party and its ability to affect decisions. The second area is its potential as a weapon of force either in putting down domestic disturbances or in reacting to the outbreak of an actual civil war.

At the outset, it is important to remember that the army's changing role vis-a-vis Yugoslav politics is only one aspect of the much wider reform to recentralize political power. Tito had learned that the Party was not only incapable of acting as a "connective tissue" but was actually part of the cause of crisis in Croatia. Where the Party failed, however,

the army was successful. As Robert Dean suggests, Tito was most probably very hesitant to actually use the army directly "...for fear of forfeiting a measure of his political control over both it and the situation."¹²⁹ The idea of depending on the army after the crisis was probably equally distasteful. But it was a logical step to include the army in the shoring up of the power base, for it ensured not only the loyalty of the army, but also served to strengthen the LCY itself.

The military has not become politicized to the extent that there is potential for a military coup. In fact it appears that the military representation has been successfully coopted into the Party leadership. This is not really very surprising considering their common roots. They have a common ideological orientation that makes existing institutional boundaries more permeable.¹³⁰ In reality, only the increased representative function of the army since 1971 is truly new. Until more time has passed, the army and the Party will probably both be driven by the same basic values. Foremost among those values is the preservation of the state that they mutually created thirty years ago.

Robin Remington describes the army as a "...righteous defender of the correct and proper Party line."¹³¹ The army can therefore be depended upon to back the Party's decisions. But direct military influence on actual decision making will probably be minimal. Even its "righteous defender" role may be minimal if the Party remains strong enough to effectively maintain domestic control. This the Party must do, however,

because according to Dean, the army's voluntary subordination is "conditional" and "Should...(Party) leadership or its resolve be seriously weakened, the Army could assume a more direct political role as arbiter, factional ally, or challenger."¹³² It seems probable that the Army will simply remain in the shadows ready to support the Party when necessary.

What level of support the army may be called upon to provide is unknown and naturally would depend upon the nature of the threat to the regime. There would undoubtedly first be a warning of potential YPA intervention on the side of the LCY and issued in the manner Tito used in 1971. If such threats failed to serve the purpose, it is certainly very possible that the army might be called upon to restore order and to "mop up" opposition as it did following World War II. Furthermore, Tito has granted the army a rather clear mandate as the protector of Yugoslav socialist society. In December of 1977, he received eleven of the top military leaders on the island of Brioni at which time he reiterated the army's responsibility for domestic stability:

We still have enemies: There are still internal enemies who would like the situation of former times to return. We must not allow this. Our army must not merely watch vigilantly over our borders but also be present inside the country...You must not allow anybody to undermine the achievements of our revolution to undermine brotherhood and unity.¹³³

With such a sanction from Tito himself neither the Party nor the YPA should feel very hesitant to invoke military force to maintain internal unity.

Short of overt military force, there may be other methods of control available to the army. The appointment in 1974 of active duty General Franjo Hrljevic as Minister of Internal Affairs, and a year later as head of the State Security Service (UDB), is an extremely significant action. It means that for the first time since 1946 the civilian security service is under the control of the military. It not only gives the army control of the UDB, but also provides a direct link between internal security operations and YPA troops. While it is doubtful that the YPA will become an internal police force, it is clear that its future responsibilities could include roles in internal security.

There is one characteristic of the YPA that tends to cast a shadow over its potential as an internal stabilizer. It has not entirely escaped the ethnic problem. Serbs and Montenegrins are highly over-represented in the officer corps. Together they account for approximately 67.7 per cent of all officers and 66 per cent of the generals, but only 42.2 per cent of the total population. On the other hand, while Croats are adequately represented at the highest levels of command, they comprise only 14.7 per cent of the total officer corps.¹³⁴ These imbalances are traditional in the Yugoslav army and are due primarily to differing ethnic attitudes regarding military careers.¹³⁵ Since such attitudes are deeply ingrained, it is doubtful that the imbalances can be redressed in the near future.

The apparent pro-Serbian slant of the army could be significant in a crisis. For one thing, it shows that the army

may not be as all "Yugoslav" as has often been suggested. Its reaction to a crisis involving Serbia and Croatia for example, may be unpredictable and might be based more on nationalistic tendencies than on dedication to socialism or the Yugoslav state. Much is being done to avoid such an outlook. At Brioni, Tito made clear his views on nationalism in the military:

...the army must be united, regardless of its nationalities;...Nationalism is an ugly disease which,... treacherously eats away at the organism, not merely of an individual but entire organizations and sectors. We must be very vigilant to prevent such a thing happening in the army.¹³⁶

What Tito hopes is that a truly Yugoslav army linked to an ideologically united Party can overcome the centrifugal tendencies of nationalism.

There is also a certain amount of political opposition to the army's internal role. Vladimir Bakaric, a very high ranking official of Party and government, and one who has managed to maintain his identity as a Croat and a Yugoslav, outlined some typical objections to the army in politics. They center around the fact that it is unpredictable in a crisis, could eventually cause political troubles by desiring too great a role, and that any attempt by the army to seize power might itself unleash a civil war.¹³⁷ Bakaric would clearly prefer to see the military remain clear of Yugoslav politics.

The YPA will most probably not remain clear of Yugoslav politics. Instead, according to Robin Remington, "...representatives of the armed forces within the party...(might) adopt a

'leading role' within the LCY itself..."¹³⁸ Short of that, the YPA will be clearly present in all that happens after Tito dies. It may never be needed but its mere presence will be influential in major decision-making and its influence will be felt by the members of the regime as well as its opponents.

4. The Successors

It is obvious that no individual can succeed Tito and rule as he has for the last three and a half decades. Not only are all pretenders to the throne lacking in power, but it is furthermore difficult to imagine any of them possessing the talent necessary to manage Tito's system of checks and balances internally and externally. Tito himself has long been aware of the detrimental influence his rule will have on those that follow him. It is for that reason that he has endeavored to engineer his succession by means of institutions such as the State Presidency.

What of the men who will actually inherit the structure thusfar described? It is not difficult to identify the group of individuals who will be responsible for continuing Tito's policies. In fact it is relatively simple to narrow the future powerholders to a group of about eighteen men. The leaders shown on page 88 held the highest Party and government positions as of the 11th Party Congress of June 1978. The information presented was gleaned from a variety of sources. It is useful in identifying the nature of power in Yugoslavia's future.

One of the first items of importance is the fact that the eight individuals comprising the State Presidency (the

EIGHTEEN TOP LEADERS

<u>Name</u>	<u>(Age)</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>Nationality</u>
Vladimir Bakaric (66)		X	X					X	X	Croatia
Dobroslav Culafic (52)					X				X	Montenegro
Stane Dolanc (53)		a							X	Slovenia
Stevan Doronjski (59)		X	X					X	X	Vojvodina
Veselin Djuranovic (53)		X		X					X	Montenegro
Kiro Gligorov (61)							X	X	X	Macedonia
Aleksandar Grlickov (55)		X							X	Macedonia
Fadilj Hodza (62)		X	X					X	X	Kosovo
Franjo Hrljevic (63)						c		X		Croatia
Nikola Ljubicic (62)		X				a		X		Serbia
Edvard Kardelj (68)		X	X					X	X	Slovenia
Lazar Kolisevski (64)		X	X					X	X	Macedonia
Cvijetin Mijatovic (65)		X	X					X	X	Serbia B-H
Milos Minic (64)		X			X	b		X	X	Serbia
Berislav Sefer (52)					X					Croatia
Petar Stambolic (66)		X	X					X	X	Serbia
Anton Vratusa (63)					X			X	X	Slovenia
Vidoje Zarkovic (51)		X	X					X	X	Montenegro

- Column 1: Member of Central Committee Presidium; a) executive secretary
2: Member State Presidency
3: President Federal Executive Council
4: Vice President Federal Executive Council
5: Federal Secretary; a) defense b) foreign affairs c) internal affairs
6: President of the Assembly
7: Fought from 1941 on
8: Has held previous high party/government positions

Figure 4

ninth is Tito) were all elected to the LCY Central Committee Presidium by the 11th Congress. While this is not a new concept in Communism or in Yugoslavia, it is noteworthy because prior to the 11th Congress none of the Presidency members were on the Party's old Executive Committee of the Presidium. The fact that all eight are now members of the new, smaller Presidium is a clear example of recentralization of power.

Consolidation of power is made very evident by the table. The eighteen individuals listed hold the following positions:

- 1) 13 of 24 positions on Central Committee Presidium
- 2) 8 of 9 positions on State Presidency
- 3) President plus 4 Vice-Presidents of Federal Executive Council
- 4) The three most important Federal Ministries
- 5) Presidency of the Federal Assembly

Furthermore most of these same individuals have dominated Yugoslav politics for some time. Fifteen of the eighteen have held high office within the Party or government prior to their present term, and laws have been adjusted such that positions can be rotated amongst this group in the future.

Another important characteristic of present Yugoslav leadership is the dominance of the veterans of the Partisan struggle. Thirteen of the eighteen individuals listed took up arms as early as 1941. The so-called "Club of 41", while it may be aging and shrinking, continues to dominate Yugoslav politics. This same group has ruled Yugoslavia since 1945 and is clearly hesitant to turn the reins over to the younger men. Naturally there are a few exceptions, but even a larger sample

of Yugoslav leadership produced similar results. Twenty-two of thirty-one high Party and government officials fought from 1941 in the liberation struggle. Thirty of forty-three such officials were born prior to 1923 and were thus old enough to have fought beginning in 1941. While Tito is about twenty years older than this group of men, actuarial tables would indicate that the Yugoslav leadership is headed for another succession crisis even after that of the old Marshal. They are not yet in the situation of the CPSU, but if they continue to ignore the younger generation, there will be no one with the requisite experience to run the country in the 1980's and 1990's.

It can logically be assumed that at least a few of the men from this group will predominate and achieve greater power than the others. To do so they will have to meet a number of requirements. Andrew Borowiec provides what appears to be an accurate formula for picking post-Tito leaders:

He must have the army solidly behind him, must have the support of the Serbs - the dominant national group - and at the same time must be acceptable to the Croats,...Preferably, he should have a record of World War II resistance of "revolutionary" activity in the initial post-war period.¹³⁹

Additionally he must have significant backing amongst the other members of the elite.

Edvard Kardelj is normally considered to be the obvious choice. After Tito, Kardelj will be the only "surviving" member of the team that formed the core of Yugoslavia's post-War political leaders.¹⁴⁰ He is a Slovene who has served in the central government long enough to be considered a Yugoslav. He

is the Party's leading ideologue, having invented self-management and more recently self-management "pluralism". According to Borowiec, Kardelj "...towers over the men who are to become Tito's collective heirs."¹⁴¹ But Kardelj lacks assertiveness and is not considered a leader. He has always proven a perfect lieutenant but is too much an introvert to assume the sole leadership of the Party and government. Dusko Doder describes him as "...a small, bespectacled white-haired man, absolutely without magnetism, looking as insignificant as a man can look."¹⁴² Certainly not the type to follow Josip Broz Tito! Furthermore, Kardelj, at 68 is known to be in poor health.¹⁴³ So he will not lead alone. His support, however, will be an important source of legitimacy for anyone else who intends to assume a major role.

Stane Dolanc has received a great deal of attention in recent years. He has made what must be called a meteoric rise to the top. A Slovene, and only 53 years old, it is difficult even to trace his career. It would appear that Tito has taken a liking to him and has provided the major boost to his career. But as a result, he lacks a political following at both the national level and the republican level. He is a very effective organization man, capable of achieving order and discipline.¹⁴⁴ At the 11th Party Congress he was again elected to the Presidium and has assumed the new position of "executive secretary", a position which is believed to be a possible designation as Tito's primary successor.

Two other men appear to play potentially important roles. Nikola Ljubicic, a Serb, a Partisan, Minister of National Defense, and a member of the Presidium will have a great deal of power by virtue of his dual role in the Party and as head of the army. Aleksandar Grlickov has played a major role in Yugoslavia's relations with other Communist parties. He has been responsible for inter-Party relationships throughout a period of great ideological importance considering the emergence of Eurocommunism and the rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Peoples Republic of China. A Macedonian, and another of the younger men, Grlickov can be expected to continue in his ascendancy.

What is clear is that none of these men can rule independently. Kardelj and Dolanc are often given a good chance of ruling in tandem with each other. Dolanc would serve as the "prime mover" in such a relationship while Kardelj would provide the necessary continuity and legitimacy. Additionally the two have the added advantage of being neither Serbs or Croats. Even these two will depend on others for support, however. Others normally included are Ljubicic, due to his combination Serb-army orientation, and Bakaric due to his relatively strong statewide and Croatian prestige.

All of these men have the ability to at least partially determine whether Tito's succession is a solution to other domestic problems or whether it becomes a cause of even greater instability. A power struggle might spread elsewhere in the federation and could easily become uncontrollable. On the other

hand, a united effort by all of the principals in the succession could result in a degree of stability far beyond that predicted by many observers of the Yugoslav scene. Their own dedication to unity might prove the example for all of the diverse elements in Yugoslavia.

The source of order and stability in the post-Tito Yugoslav state will be based upon the accumulation and maintenance of the political power necessary to control nationalist forces, economic pressures, a variety of political and ideological challenges, and foreign pressures designed to pull or push the country out of nonalignment. Political power, if it is to be sufficient, if it is to meet these challenges, will be based upon the Yugoslav institutional and constitutional system, the ideological power and unity of the LCY, the latent armed force of the politicized YPA, and the individuals who control these various organizations of Yugoslav politics and society. It is possible that they will all come together and Tito will prove correct when he says "I can leave at any time and nothing will change."¹⁴⁵ Despite Tito's confidence, however, that seems a bit optimistic.

III. THE BALANCE OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS: THE SUPERPOWERS

Yugoslav diplomats and writers often note that a country's foreign policy is a reflection of its internal policy.¹ While that may be debatable as an international rule, it is most certainly true of the modern Yugoslav state. As Chapter II demonstrated, contemporary Yugoslavia is in a state of transition, poised between old and new, East and West, and Communist and capitalist. It is similarly situated on the European scene, balanced between the blocs, while it almost religiously maintains its dedication to nonalignment and the rights of small, independent nations. These policies cause Yugoslavia to play a rather unique role in European politics and in the regional balance of power. Hence it is an important, and possibly vital, aspect of the European policies of the Soviet Union and the United States.

The European security system, since World War II, has been based primarily on bloc politics. In terms of the alignment of specific nations, very little has changed since the late 1940's. Nations have been classified as Western or Eastern, depending upon their allegiance to, or dependence on, the United States or the Soviet Union respectively. Additionally, several nations have practiced policies of neutrality or non-alignment. Though recent trends and events such as Eurocommunism, expanding East-West trade and cultural exchange, the

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, arms limitation talks, and force reduction meetings are believed to be capable of reorienting European politics, superpower competition and East-West alignments still predominate today. The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), composed today of six nations of East Central Europe and the Soviet Union, is felt to serve mainly as an instrument of Soviet policy. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, composed of the United States and Canada, in addition to most of the Western European nations and Greece and Turkey, has existed primarily as a defense against those nations' mutually perceived threat of Soviet/Communist aggression in Europe and the North Atlantic. Yugoslavia has remained clear of both these pacts since its nonalignment precludes entry into military agreements with any country.

Yugoslavia's unique combination of nonalignment, Communist orientation, and geo-strategic value, make it significantly more critical to European security than the other extra-bloc nations of the region. The consensus is that Yugoslavia is at least one key to stability in the entirety of Europe. Paul Lendvai, in an article on sources of instability in Eastern Europe, sees "...Yugoslavia as the pivotal area both in terms of social upheavals, and future security in Europe."² And according to F. Stephen Larrabee in Balkan Security, any changes in Yugoslavia's policies "...would affect the security of all the Balkan countries and shift the balance of power in the entire area."³ Such statements are understandable since Yugoslavia borders on two NATO countries (Greece and Italy),

AD-A072 150

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
THE POLITICS OF BALANCE IN TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA.(U)
MAR 79 P W DAHLQUIST
NPS-56-79-004


F/G 5/4


UNCLASSIFIED

NL

2 OF 3

AD
A072150





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

three Warsaw Pact countries (Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary), one neutral nation (Austria), and one nation until recently aligned with the PRC (Albania).

Belgrade's principal goal has been to retain its socialist orientation while maintaining independence in its internal and external policies. This implicitly means freedom from Soviet dominance. But it also means keeping a proper distance from the United States and the Western bloc. That Yugoslavia has done so with considerable success is a function of Tito's global foreign policy and the mutually conflicting interests and policies of the Soviet Union and the United States regarding Yugoslavia's alignment. The two superpowers, along with their respective allies, continue to have important stakes in Yugoslavia's role in European politics. The extent of their conflicting interests is likely to be very influential in shaping that role in the future.

A. SOVIET INTERESTS AND RELATIONS

1. Soviet Interests

Soviet interests in Yugoslavia are best understood in terms of Moscow's historic policy toward all of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. At the end of World War II, Joseph Stalin moved quickly to establish dominance over the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. By installing pro-Soviet Communist leaders in power in these countries, he was able to build a system of buffer states that served several purposes.⁴ First, it provided the Soviet Union with a defensive perimeter that isolated the USSR from any direct contact with Western Europe.

Second, it enabled the Soviets to place and maintain direct military pressure on several Western European states. Finally, it enabled Moscow to orchestrate political and ideological control over the nations of Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Treaty Organization is generally felt to have been an evolutionary by-product of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. Instituted chiefly in response to West Germany's entry into NATO, the Warsaw Pact has since been recognized as a legal justification for the stationing of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe.⁵ Thus while Stalin himself has been denounced by Soviet leadership, his policy of controlling Eastern Europe has been consistently upheld.

Prior to June of 1948 it was expected by all concerned that Yugoslavia would assume its proper place in the Moscow-led Communist movement. Tito and the Yugoslav Communists had, for sometime, been among Stalin's most loyal followers.⁶ Yet they were unwilling to subject themselves to his dictates. The result was a rare political defeat for Joseph Stalin and the creation of a severe ideological fissure in the Soviet bloc.

Soviet interests in Yugoslavia since that time have been based upon one major goal; the correction of the political and ideological damage inflicted by the existence of the Yugoslav model. Moscow's principal desire has been the return of Yugoslavia to full membership in the socialist community. Implicit in such membership is Soviet dominance of Yugoslavia's internal and external affairs. Realization of this goal would neutralize much of the negative effect Yugoslavia's defection

has had on Moscow's control of Eastern Europe, and its leadership of world Communism. Short of full control, Moscow has, at times, attempted to reduce Yugoslavia's influence by branding Tito and his associates as heretics and revisionists and by excluding them from participation in Communist affairs. Recently, a growing interest in Yugoslavia's geo-strategic value has made the Soviets even more interested in regaining Yugoslavia's allegiance.

As the Communist state that got away from Stalin, Yugoslavia provided a dangerous precedent for other nations of the region. Its effects have been seen time and again. In 1955 Poland, in spite of pressure from Khrushchev, achieved considerably more internal autonomy than previously thought possible. In that same year, the USSR felt compelled to intervene in Hungary in order to reassert control there. In the 1960's Albania shifted its allegiance to Communist China, while Romania acquired significant independence. Then in 1968, Moscow felt it was necessary to intervene in Czechoslovakia in order to halt liberal trends in that country. While all liberalization in Eastern Europe cannot be attributed to Yugoslavia's defection, there is little doubt that its example has been closely watched by all of the countries and peoples of Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia has shifted from the outright denunciation of the late 1940's to the occasional complete forgiveness and rapprochement of the mid-1950's. This has been particularly costly since it has made it even more difficult for Moscow to keep explaining its

stand regarding Tito. As Vernon Aspaturian states, "We can date the beginnings of the subversion of Soviet primacy in the Communist world to Khrushchev's opportunistic maneuvers in using China and Yugoslavia against his factional rivals."⁷ Finally, the Yugoslav example can now be seen to be hurting Moscow's influence among Western European Communist parties. Thus politically and ideologically, Yugoslavia's separate road has weakened the Soviet Union's international image.

Recently, Moscow's interests in Yugoslavia have included a distinctly strategic dimension. While Yugoslavia's nonalignment does not cause any physical threat to the Soviet security system, it does symbolize lost strategic opportunities. With the advent of Soviet sea power in the Mediterranean, Moscow has created a grave challenge to America's historical preponderance of power in the region. That challenge is weakened, however, by Russia's lack of port facilities outside of the Black Sea. Until 1973, the Soviet Navy had use of extensive port facilities at Alexandria, Egypt. Soviet relations with Egypt deteriorated during the 1973 Middle East War and have not improved since. Having lost the use of Egyptian naval installations, the Russians have once again gone searching for support facilities, because it is extremely difficult to maintain and provision a deployed naval force without nearby bases. A further aggravation is the Montreaux Convention which imposes various limitations on warship passage through the Turkish controlled Dardanelles. With these factors in mind it is easy to understand Russian interest in Yugoslavia's 400 miles of

Adriatic coastline and its well protected harbors. As recently as January of 1977, Leonid Brezhnev was reported by Yugoslav officials to have pressed for the use of the Yugoslav port of Kotor as a site for naval repairs and supplies. The request was flatly denied.⁸

Tito's rigid policies regarding military alliances can also be seen to limit the Soviet Union on the ground and air theaters. Southeastern Europe has become the weakest section of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact security system. As John C. Campbell states in his article, "Soviet Strategy in the Balkans", "... Soviet political influence in the area had reached an extraordinarily low point by the end of the 1960's...The consolidation of Soviet power in Central Europe,...contrasted with the situation in the Balkans, where there were no Soviet forces at all."⁹ Little has changed to strengthen the Soviet position in the area. Inclusion of Yugoslavia in the Warsaw Pact would significantly strengthen Soviet military and political influence throughout the entire region. Yugoslavia controls valuable air space as well. Larrabee reports that both the USSR and the United States had to obtain permission to overfly Yugoslavia and other Balkan countries in order to provision their respective allies during the 1973 War.¹⁰ At the Brezhnev-Tito meeting in January 1977, the Russian leader also requested permanent over-flight rights and the assignment of a ranking Yugoslav military official to the Warsaw Pact Council, obviously in hopes of attaining use of Yugoslav territory and air space. These requests were also rejected.¹¹

2. Soviet-Yugoslav Relations

Soviet-Yugoslav relations since 1948 are best understood in light of two basic concepts. One, irreconcilable differences exist between the two countries that are based entirely on the Stalin-Tito disagreement of 1948. Two, Moscow-Belgrade relations are intricately entangled with both nations' affairs with the Eastern European countries. The years between 1948 and 1978 have been characterized by a repeating cycle of affairs between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Each cycle has begun with a period of Russian wooing of Tito and an improvement of both diplomatic and economic relations until a rapprochement is reached. These periods have generally paralleled liberalizing trends in Eastern Europe. Each cycle ends with a severe breakdown in relations based either on Soviet ideological denunciation of Tito's policies, or upon Yugoslav denunciation of Moscow's policies toward Eastern Europe. Two themes dominate: (1) Soviet desire to reinstitute the long-lost unity of the Communist movement in Europe; (2) Yugoslav desire to maintain its sovereignty and openly follow its own road to socialism.

The first period began in June of 1948. Until his death in 1953, Stalin utilized political and economic pressure, and the threat of military attack in trying to force Yugoslavia back into its orbit around Moscow. In the face of a strong Yugoslav-American commitment, his efforts failed. Once he was gone, his successors began immediately to feel the effects of his failure to overcome the Yugoslavs' defection. It was

difficult and embarrassing to explain Tito's success. Furthermore, under Stalin Soviet Communism had evolved into a system of totalitarian and repressive domination by one man. Those who undertook to lead the USSR and the Communist world could not expect to rule in the same manner as their predecessor. Changes in relationships were required at all levels.

With nationalism growing in Eastern Europe and a power struggle taking place in the Kremlin, most Soviet leaders set out to create a new atmosphere within the bloc. As Robert Lee Wolff states, it soon became "...clear that Malenkov and his colleagues were making strenuous efforts to erase the incredible blunders of Stalin. They were wooing Tito assiduously,..."¹² Though he did so hesitantly at first, Nikita Khrushchev was one of those who began to associate their interests with those of Tito. Such tactics would prove useful to Khrushchev in attaining power, but ultimately they were to prove extremely damaging to Soviet-led Communism. In his attempts to win control of the Communist world and cement relations in Eastern Europe, Khrushchev implemented a pattern of relations with Yugoslavia that would, instead of stabilizing the bloc, contribute to the further erosion of Soviet dominance.

Between 1953 and 1955 Khrushchev ascended to power in Moscow and Tito gained influence in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, Yugoslav-Soviet relations warmed considerably. By May of 1955 Belgrade and Moscow were ready to make their growing regard for each other public and Khrushchev astonished the entire world by visiting Yugoslavia. With this

move he set in motion the process by which he hoped to reassert full Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe. He planned to undermine Tito's influential position as leader of the revisionist movement by establishing himself in that role. By weakening Tito, Khrushchev felt he would strengthen his own hand at home, as well as in Eastern Europe.¹³

That Khrushchev's visit occurred at all was significant. But as though the visit was not eventful enough, he commented on the period of poor Soviet-Yugoslav relations by saying:

We sincerely regret what happened and resolutely reject the things that occurred, one after another, during that period. On our part, we ascribe without hesitation the aggravations to the provocative role that Beria, Abakumov and others...played in the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR.¹⁴

He went on to say that Stalin's accusations against Tito and Yugoslavia had been false. One week later, in a Joint Yugoslav-Soviet declaration, Khrushchev publicly acknowledged the "...principle of mutual respect for, and noninterference in, internal affairs..., because questions of internal organization, or difference in social systems and of different forms of Socialist development, are solely the concern of individual countries."¹⁵ Thus heralded Tito's eventual victory over Khrushchev. One year later, at the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev denounced Stalin and his policies. Thus was complete Tito's victory over Stalin.

The other Communist regimes in Eastern Europe watched with awe as Khrushchev admitted Stalin's responsibility for the mistakes of 1948. Many Eastern European leaders had "hung their hats" on Stalinism and the excommunication of Tito. Now times

were changing and they were forced to justify the ideological zig-zag. Furthermore they began facing increasing demands for liberalization and independence within their own countries. Eventually, they themselves began to exercise greater freedom of action than had previously been allowed by Moscow.

These countries and their leaders were not, however, rushing to embrace the principles of Yugoslav independent Communism. On the contrary, they were experimenting with their own ways while moving further from Moscow in their outlook and structure. Within one year these trends caused the Soviets to revert to stricter methods of control. In October 1956, a Soviet delegation, led by Khrushchev himself, landed in Warsaw to attempt to reimpose Soviet dominance of Poland. Later that month, he used military intervention in Hungary to stem the tide of liberalization in that country. Khrushchev thus made it clear that what applied to Yugoslavia did not necessarily apply to members of the Soviet bloc. The Soviet actions in Hungary repulsed Tito and he blamed the Soviets for forcing the Hungarian revolution to take on anti-socialist tendencies.¹⁶ On the other hand, the Soviets accused Tito of encouraging the destructive movements in Hungary.¹⁷

This debate continued through 1958. Meanwhile, Khrushchev, seeing his Eastern European community in disarray, began to re-establish an ideological platform. In its draft for the Moscow "declaration of principles," the Communist Party of the Soviet Union emphasized the need for a united Socialist Community and clearly implied that the leading role in the community would

be assumed by the USSR.¹⁸ Tito, if he were to maintain his credibility as an independent leader, could not possibly accept the implications of the Soviet draft. Therefore, in preparation for the Seventh Congress of the LCY, the Yugoslavs published and circulated their own statement of political and ideological beliefs. In it they criticized both imperialistic Western diplomacy and tendencies toward monopolism within the Socialist community.¹⁹ The rapprochement thus came to an abrupt halt. Khrushchev, speaking at the Seventh Party Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, accused Yugoslav leaders of deviation from Marxism-Leninism, allowing imperialism to subvert Socialism by accepting American aid, and of being a Trojan Horse in the Socialist camp.²⁰ Tito responded in kind.

The events of the mid-1950's formed the basis of Soviet-Yugoslav relations for the next twenty years. While the two countries intermittently moved politically closer together and then further apart from each other, the Yugoslavs never let the relationship be based on anything less than the principles of the 1955 Joint Declaration. They at times engaged in ideological polemics vis-a-vis proper socialist practices and correct foreign policies. They almost continuously debated over the proper relationships between members of the Communist world movement, for while Yugoslavia may have enjoyed independence and the respect of the USSR, other Communist states obviously did not.

Relations improved slightly between 1958 and 1964, because for the most part, both leaders were too involved with

other difficulties to spend much time denouncing each other. Khrushchev was busy challenging the United States in Berlin and Cuba, while trying to deal with China, the newest competitor for leadership of the Communist world. Tito was faced with severe economic problems due in part to the effects of the highly successful Common Market, and in part to the disparity of economic growth between Yugoslavia's republics.²¹ By 1964, however, Khrushchev was once again facing severe problems in Eastern Europe. Albania had defected to the Peoples Republic of China and Romania was clearly striving for greater independence. To reconcile the growing ideological differences, Khrushchev called for a meeting of 26 Communist parties, but he did not invite Yugoslavia. Khrushchev was dismissed prior to the meeting, but it was clear that he was once again attempting to establish unity behind Moscow's leadership and at Belgrade's expense.

Following Khrushchev's ouster, relations between Moscow and Belgrade slowly but progressively improved. The new leadership in the Soviet Union neither actively supported nor strictly opposed revisionism in Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe. What was thought to be tacit approval of Yugoslavia's legitimacy resulted in growing liberal trends in other Eastern European countries. Trade and diplomatic exchange between Yugoslavia and the Warsaw Pact states increased significantly. This growing relationship came to a sudden halt with the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The effects of the invasion on Soviet-Yugoslav affairs were predictable. Once again the irreconcilable differences of the two states were resurrected. Obviously the Soviet action did not fit Belgrade's understanding of the 1955 declaration guaranteeing noninterference. Tito responded quickly on August 21, saying, "By this step the sovereignty of a socialist country has been violated and trampled upon, and a serious blow inflicted on socialist and progressive forces all over the world."²² The Yugoslavs were so verbally brutal in the weeks following the invasion that they elicited one of the most encompassing attacks by the Soviets since 1958 and 1948.

The Soviets scoffed at Yugoslav nonalignment and asserted that in this case the Belgrade stand was more a simple "...one taken against the Soviet Union and against the socialist countries."²³ They accused the Yugoslavs of supporting the West's policy of "softening socialism," and alleged that Yugoslav sovereignty was a virtual slide toward dependence on imperialism. Furthermore, in reference to Yugoslavia's calls for the dissolution of military blocs, the article put forward that Yugoslavia's security was actually dependent on the Warsaw Pact. Finally, the Soviet attack included criticism of internal economic policies, suggesting that the Yugoslavs were attempting to divert attention away from its internal problems by creating a security threat in the Soviet actions.²⁴ Seldom have the Soviets gone to such length in their criticism of the Yugoslavs. It can be assumed that they did so in this case in order to

further justify their action in Czechoslovakia and nullify any ideological influence the Yugoslavs may have had on other Communist countries.

Soviet-Yugoslav relations began to improve in 1971, and once again the accord was manifested in the visit of a Soviet leader to Belgrade. Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia marked another battle victory for Tito. The joint declaration of the two nations emphasized that relations between the two were based on the 1955 Belgrade Declaration, the 1956 Moscow Statement and Declaration, and the 1965 Joint Soviet-Yugoslav Statement, all of which are public endorsements of the concepts of different roads to socialism and mutual respect for each other's sovereign rights.²⁵ Relations during the mid-1970's were characterized by greater dialogue between Tito and Brezhnev. The two leaders exchanged numerous visits, each visiting the other country three times between 1968 and 1978. Trade increased enormously. Though due in part to Yugoslavia's difficulties in trading with the economically unstable West, it also indicated a mutual desire to give Moscow-Belgrade relations a stronger foundation. Additionally, the Soviets promised credits of as much as \$1,300 million to Yugoslavia.²⁶ While very little of this money had been delivered by 1978, the promise was still an indication of warming relations.

Throughout the ups and downs of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, one important source of conflict has remained dominant and has never been fully reconciled. It is doubtful, while Tito is in power, that the two countries will be able to

resolve their disagreement regarding the loyalty of nations within the socialist community. Tito, obviously believes strongly in national Communism. Moscow, on the other hand, has preached and has consistently worked to unify Communism behind the leadership of the CPSU. Khrushchev attempted this with his "declaration of principles" in 1957, and his proposed meeting in 1964. Brezhnev rather clearly demonstrated this principle with the intervention in Czechoslovakia, which illustrated a doctrine of limited sovereignty for socialist countries in Moscow's system. The Kremlin once again tried to force acceptance of its dominant role in the 1976 East Berlin Pan-European Congress of Communist Parties. When Yugoslavia joined with the Communist parties of Western Europe in keeping the phrase "proletarian internationalism" out of the Final Document, they helped deal a blow to Moscow's supremacy.²⁷ This Soviet-Yugoslav debate has existed since 1948 and is at the heart of the Soviet desire to return the Yugoslav Communists to the fold.

After the East Berlin Conference of 1976, relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union cooled considerably. The Conference itself touched off debate throughout European Communist Parties that tended to divide them into two groups. The LCY's continued support of the Eurocommunists did little to endear it to Moscow, which perceived the entire trend as an anti-Soviet movement. As though this were not enough, 1978 saw further drifting apart due to Soviet-Cuban actions in Africa and an improvement in Yugoslav-American relations. The

Soviet Union struck at Yugoslavia by supporting Bulgaria's claims to certain sections of Macedonia, while the Yugoslavs continued to accuse the Soviets of neo-colonialism and hegemonistic tendencies. Hua Kuo-feng's 1978 visit to the SFRY tended to exacerbate, yet symbolize, the growing differences between Moscow and Belgrade. He also visited Romania and there is little doubt that the Soviet leaders were extremely displeased with such trends in the Balkans.

In summary, Soviet policies toward Yugoslavia since 1948 have failed to achieve the desired goal. Yugoslavia's nonaligned road to socialism continues to exert negative influence on Moscow's dominance of Eastern Europe and its leadership of the Communist world. While the Russians have learned to live with Tito's Yugoslavia, it is doubtful that they have altered their ultimate goals to any significant degree. According to K. F. Cviic, "...Russian acceptance of Yugoslavia's right to pursue an independent foreign policy and, at home, her own road to socialism has always been qualified."²⁸ The desired shift in Belgrade's position to a closer relationship with Moscow simply will not occur while Tito is in power. Thus, Soviet leadership is probably content to, in the words of F. Stephen Larrabee, "...pursue a policy of watchful waiting..." until a change in Yugoslavia's leadership occurs.²⁹

B. AMERICAN-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS

1. United States Interests

At the end of World War II and during the immediate post-War years, Tito's form of government and his apparent

devotion to Moscow placed him squarely in opposition to the United States. Exemplary were such issues as the dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste and the Communist rebellion in Greece, in which Washington's interests could only be served at the detriment of those of Belgrade. Not surprisingly, the United States perceived Yugoslavia to be "...the most intransigent of all the Soviet bloc countries."³⁰ The Yugoslavs, in turn, saw the United States as their principal external threat and Tito utilized American involvement in Italy and Greece as rationalization for his own rearmament and high military budgets.³¹ In spite of these apparently insurmountable differences, the United States came to Yugoslavia's aid in 1949 and has supported its sovereignty to varying degrees since that time.

The American-Yugoslav relationship has been an interesting one. The two countries are not allies since they have never established a formal alliance in the traditional sense. There have been no statements asserting that an attack on one would be perceived as an attack on the other. Yugoslavia has not been a party to a military alliance since 1954. There have been no agreements between the two nations regarding policies toward other nations, blocs or international crises. Though they have sometimes agreed, they have more often disagreed and they have seldom, if ever, consulted with each other. There have been no agreements pertaining to preferred governmental structure in the world. On the contrary, their systems have been, by definition opposed to each other since the beginning

of the Cold War. They have not agreed on the general orientation of the world order. The United States has been the leader of the Western bloc since World War II, while Yugoslavia has been staunchly anti-bloc in its foreign relations. It would seem then that the two countries had little, if any reason, to establish any kind of a friendly relationship.

However, since 1949 the United States and Yugoslavia have shared one mutual interest of profound importance; that of keeping Yugoslavia separate from the Soviet Union's alliance system. As a result of this single mutual goal, America's relations with Yugoslavia have followed an entirely different pattern than its relations with any other Communist country. Between 1949 and 1966 the United States provided Yugoslavia with over \$3 billion in grants, food, raw materials, industrial equipment and military supplies. While imposing stiff restrictions on foreign trade with other Communist nations, Yugoslavia has consistently been granted most-favored-nation status. Even more significant is that for almost three decades the United States has openly expressed support for Yugoslav sovereignty. No other Communist state has received such special treatment from the United States.

American interests in Yugoslavia today are based entirely on the continuation of Yugoslav independence. Achievement of this goal is fundamental to four basic aspects of America's European and global policy. First, the United States has traditionally been a champion of national sovereignty the world over, and it is felt that Yugoslavia, Communist or not, has the right

to exist free of outside domination. Secondly, Yugoslavia plays an extremely important role in the balance of power in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, the maintenance of which is critical to United States interests in Europe. Thirdly, Yugoslavia's independent posture indirectly contributes to American worldwide influence by detracting from the Soviet Union's leadership of international Communism. Finally, solid American-Yugoslav relations can benefit the United States by improving its own image among the nonaligned nations of the world. These four points define the basis for America's interest in Yugoslavia.

The United States has traditionally and idealistically assumed the responsibility of securing the independence of nations throughout the world. In the case of Yugoslavia, there is much to be gained by this policy. Most significant is that it shows a willingness to secure sovereignty in a Communist state, thereby precluding allegations that the United States is staunchly pro-democratic in its support. Though the bloc system is still predominant in international affairs, coexistence of various governmental orientations is at least a short-term fact of life, and a pragmatic policy which recognizes that fact could be very productive in the long run.

While this particular ideal has not been the principal determining factor in America's policy, it has been the most commonly espoused explanation of American support of Yugoslavia for the last 30 years. The first expression of American interest in Yugoslavia came in 1949, when Tito and his fellow

Yugoslavs turned to the West for assistance in saving their floundering economy. In December 1949, United States policy had become clear and was publicly verbalized by George V. Allen, the newly appointed American ambassador, who when speaking for President Truman stated, "As regards Yugoslavia, we are just as opposed to aggression against that country as any other, and just as favorable to the retention of Yugoslavia's sovereignty..."³² This may have seemed a surprising stance for the United States considering its attitude toward Communism at the time, especially since the West had done little to stop Stalin in Eastern Europe. Yet seen in light of the Truman Doctrine, first expressed in 1947, it is not at all surprising. The United States had already committed itself to stopping Soviet expansion into the Eastern Mediterranean region. The only real difference, albeit a significant one, was that Yugoslavia was a Communist state.

Today, though the American image has been tarnished somewhat, she remains the leader and champion of the Western World. President Carter's emphasis on human rights is clearly designed to improve that image, but is also just as clearly a reaffirmation of America's desire to achieve freedom for all nations on a worldwide basis. Yugoslavia still fits into this mold and the United States still supports its sovereignty. When Tito visited the United States in March 1978, President Carter reaffirmed American support and said that Tito and his country symbolized "...the eagerness for freedom, independence and liberty that exists in Eastern Europe and indeed throughout

the world."³³ Thus, supporting the independent aspirations of Yugoslavia is still consistent with American moral and ideological concepts.

With the imminent possibility of crisis in the Middle East and the numerous struggles presently ongoing in Africa, the Balkans have, in recent years, been all but ignored as a potential arena of conflict. While this is understandable given the "shorter fuses" elsewhere, instability in South-eastern Europe is still characteristic of the region and the possible implications of crisis there are as far-reaching as ever. The diverse nature of the Balkan states' foreign policies and alliances make the regional balance of power precarious at best. Furthermore, Yugoslavia can be seen as either a passage or an obstacle to the Soviet Union's desires to expand its growing naval power and influence into the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. The United States policy of contributing to Yugoslavia's buoyancy is a direct manifestation of the desire to ensure that the country remains an obstacle rather than becoming a passage. While Yugoslavia is not Western, neither is it Soviet and therein lies American strategic interest in that country.

With the advent of Soviet sea power in the Mediterranean and the decreasing size of the United States Navy, American control of the Mediterranean Sea has become increasingly more difficult to achieve. Major factors in America's favor, however, are the Soviet Union's lack of port facilities and its difficulties with unimpeded access to the Mediterranean Sea from

the Black Sea. Though the United States has similar access problems and has no port facilities in Yugoslavia itself, Tito's policy vis-a-vis the Russians serves United States interests by limiting the flexibility of the Russian fleet. The restrictions on Soviet troop deployments and overflight rights are likewise seen to limit the movement of Soviet troops in the region more than the movement of American forces.

Certainly, Moscow would very much like to strengthen its hand in the Balkans and shore up the Warsaw Pact's southern flank. This could not be taken lightly by Washington, however, for Southern Europe has likewise been the weakest section of NATO, if for no other reason than Yugoslavia and Albania cut Greece and Turkey off from the other NATO nations. Due to Yugoslavia's and Albania's independence of thought, this situation has not yet been extremely detrimental to the alliance. If, however, these countries were to become members of the Warsaw Pact and even worse, instruments of Soviet foreign policy, it can be assumed that the NATO Alliance would come under great strain. This is not to say that a Soviet dominated Yugoslavia would spell the end of NATO in Southeastern Europe, but it would certainly warrant a stiffer NATO defense posture in the area.

According to Stephen Larrabee, "...the Balkan situation is probably more unstable today than it has been since the end of World War II. At a time when the old tensions in Central Europe are receding, those in Southern Europe, and particularly in the Balkans are increasing."³⁴ With this in mind, American

interests in Yugoslavia become clear. The domino principle is far from a dated theory and could easily be applied to Southern Europe. A shift in the regional balance of power, such as that already described would have such widespread implications that it is doubtful that it could come about peaceably. As a result, the traditional instability in the area takes on even greater importance and while it may not be in American interests to interfere in historical rivalries there, it is certainly in the American interest to unambiguously support the status quo and Yugoslav freedom from Soviet influence.

Yugoslavia's independence from the Soviet camp has been a thorn in the Russians' side since 1948. Two Russian leaders, Khrushchev in 1955 and Brezhnev in 1971, have journeyed to Belgrade and publicly endorsed Tito's "separate road" to socialism. The inability of the Kremlin to oversee the international Communist movement can be at least partially attributed to Tito's success. As American policy has shifted over the years from that of containing Communism to that of containing Soviet expansion, Yugoslavia's existence outside of the Communist bloc has assumed even greater importance. Here then is another reason for American support of Yugoslav sovereignty, for the weakening, or at least inhibiting, of unified growth of Soviet-led world Communism is tantamount to helping the West contain both Communism and Soviet expansion.

Yugoslavia's non-allegiance to Moscow has been seen as a distinct political advantage to the West. It early on symbolized a crack in the monolithic structure of Soviet-led

Communism. As early as 1958, John Foster Dulles linked Yugoslavia's success "...to the desires and aspirations of other countries of the area to achieve their independence."³⁵ The West has endeavored to encourage Yugoslav independence, for it is perceived to be an impetus to other East European nations as well as a divisive factor in the world Communist movement. Washington, at least, is convinced that the Soviets see it that way. According to a Carter Administration spokesman, "There is no question the Soviets would like both to extend their own political-military influence in the region and to nullify Titoism's ideological attractions."³⁶ Thus, Moscow's loss is the West's gain, and therein lies Yugoslavia's primary political importance to the United States and NATO.

Whether Soviet foreign policy is perceived to be the manifestation of the international Communist movement or simply Russian imperialism is academic. The Kremlin has used ideological policy justification in so many different ways that it has become almost impossible to determine what in Soviet eyes, actually constitutes an acceptable Socialist orientation. This fact makes containment all the more difficult for the United States in that it is no longer very clear just what it is that needs to be contained. As long as "thorns" such as Tito's Yugoslavia exist in the Soviet side, it will be difficult for the USSR to mount any major expansion in the name of Communism. It is in American interest therefore, to try to keep the "thorn" in place.

The fourth American interest in Yugoslavia is based upon Tito's role as the leader of the nonaligned world. While nonalignment may not be as strong a movement as it once was, it is still a major political force and Tito is still its leader. American support of Tito does not necessarily imply support of the United States by the rest of the nonaligned world. But it does not hurt, for it demonstrates an American willingness to endorse nations with policy orientations that are decidedly not pro-Western. However, extreme care must be exercised in attempting to nurture Yugoslav or nonaligned nations' wholesale support of United States policies. Inherent in their ideology is opposition to superpower politics. By making positive efforts in the direction of peace, nuclear arms limitations, economic assistance to developing countries, and intelligent recognition of legitimate claims to national sovereignty, America can gain extensive support of nonaligned nations. These goals are not contrary to American policy and could conceivably be pursued in a manner that would gain greater worldwide support. This would best be done in the form of exemplary action and not in the form of overt endeavors to become an ally of the neutralist countries. The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union have already made that mistake by verbally claiming to be the allies of the nonaligned. They were categorically denounced for trying to align the nonaligned.³⁷ The United States' support of Yugoslavia is sufficient support of nonalignment for the present, but it can and should be used as

a stepping-off point for regaining recognition as the leading proponent of worldwide freedom of choice.

In the final assessment America's interests in Yugoslavia are the direct result of the simple fact that Yugoslavia's posture equals a distinct political and strategic advantage to the United States and NATO. Certainly both Western Europe and the United States might desire a more westward leaning Belgrade, but Tito has never allowed that to be very seriously considered. As K. F. Cvlic states, "In an ideal world, Nato would prefer to see a liberalizing, reform-minded Yugoslavia; but it would settle for a non-liberalizing one....,"³⁸ Therefore, American policy toward Yugoslavia has been characterized by a willingness to accept, and at times, contribute to the maintenance of the status quo in Yugoslavia.

2. U. S. Policy

America's relations with Yugoslavia have been characterized by ups and downs that have roughly depended upon the state of affairs between Moscow and Belgrade. Support of a Communist regime is, at times, a very unpopular policy in the West, regardless of any political or strategic advantages derived from such a policy. Thus whenever Tito has reached a rapprochement with Soviet leadership, his support in the United States has suffered. On the other hand, both NATO and the U.S. have been willing to exploit the intermittent Moscow-Belgrade dissociations. The United States has utilized four forms of assistance to secure Yugoslav sovereignty and to convince Tito to maintain good relations with the West. The policy has

consisted of direct economic assistance, extensive foreign trade, military assistance and public political support. Western Europe has assisted Yugoslavia with extensive foreign trade and with occasional political support. The combined efforts of the United States and Western Europe have contributed to Yugoslavia's success in overcoming the economic difficulties and political pressures that might otherwise have forced her to seek closer ties with the Soviet Union.

Initial American assistance was delivered in the form of economic aid designed to bail Yugoslavia out of its post-War economic crisis. This aid began with two loans, totaling \$40 million, that were arranged solely through the United States Executive Branch. In 1950 Congress passed the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Act which authorized a grant of \$50 million. This bill legitimized the policy of keeping this Communist state viable outside the Soviet bloc. As John C. Campbell states in Tito's Separate Road, "Aid to Yugoslavia had gained a new respectability. Hence forward the administration felt able to go ahead with the inclusion of Yugoslavia in the regular appropriations of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)..."³⁹ Direct economic aid continued until 1966, primarily under the auspices of the Food for Peace Program and Public Law 480. Today, though the United States provides no aid in the traditional sense, American government-owned dinars are often used to finance joint technological and scientific projects.⁴⁰

Economic assistance was also provided in the form of special trade favors. Early on, Yugoslavia was granted

most-favored-nation status while trade with other Communist states was either restricted or outlawed. Today the United States is Yugoslavia's fourth largest trading partner. Yugoslavia's trade relations with Western Europe have been even more beneficial. As Yugoslav leaders have relaxed restrictions and allowed more world market influence, the European Economic Community has exhibited greater willingness to grant Belgrade special status. In 1968, Yugoslavia became the first Communist country to enter into a bilateral agreement with the EEC and in 1973 the EEC accorded it most-favored-nation status. Today, West Germany and Italy are Yugoslavia's second and third greatest trading partners, exceeded only by the Soviet Union.

Military aid to Yugoslavia was understandably a controversial subject in the late 1940's. But both the United States and Tito were willing to bend just enough to enable Yugoslavia to qualify under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. As a result they were able to convince the Soviets that the Americans were in fact committed to Yugoslavia's defense.⁴¹ This military aid continued until 1957. It was so extensive, that by 1958 according to Stephen A. Garrett, "Of the twenty-four Yugoslav divisions, eight had been entirely supplied with American material and the remainder were heavily dependent on such equipment. The Yugoslav air force was almost entirely an American creation."⁴² In 1977 and 1978 the United States concluded agreements to resume arm sales to Yugoslavia and there are indications of increased contacts between military officials of both countries.⁴³

Statements of American support for Yugoslav sovereignty have continued throughout the years since 1949 and have served to underscore the strategic importance of this small Balkan nation. Following in the footsteps of Truman and Dulles, Dean Rusk, in a speech delivered in 1964, emphasized the importance of the Yugoslav example among the nonaligned nations and again linked Yugoslav independence to the aspirations of Eastern Europe.⁴⁴ Following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Rusk, in a clear warning to Moscow linked Yugoslavia's independence to the security interests of NATO, and implied that the Western Alliance would not allow Moscow to have a free hand in the Balkans.⁴⁵ In September 1970, President Nixon became the first American President to visit Yugoslavia and thus clearly established the American commitment to Tito's policies of nonalignment. In the fall of 1974, when Yugoslavia was again receiving various types of pressure from Russia, Secretary of State Kissinger made a symbolic visit to Tito, discussed possible arms sales with him, and reaffirmed American interests in the region as a whole.⁴⁶ He was followed by President Ford in August 1975. In May 1977 Vice President Mondale paid a visit to Belgrade, and in October, Defense Secretary Brown became the first American defense chief to visit there. In March 1978 President Carter stated that "The independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia is one of the basic foundations of world peace now and in the future."⁴⁷ Later, a White House spokesman said, "We have a commitment to support Yugoslavia's independence and integrity."⁴⁸ Ambiguous

as such statements may be, they have been a consistent aspect of the United States policy toward Yugoslavia for three decades.

The four methods of support practiced by the United States have not been utilized on an uninterrupted basis for there are inherent problems in the Yugoslav-American relationship. The mutual interests of the two countries could never go beyond the level of a defacto alliance. Early on Yugoslavia benefited greatly from the assistance in that it achieved a relatively stable economy and received a general assurance of military protection. The United States, while not acquiring an ally, was guaranteed that, at least for a time, Yugoslavia would not be a member of the opposing bloc. It was a rather nebulous arrangement.

3. Limitations on American-Yugoslav Relations

The inherent difficulties of managing such a relationship have derived principally from the ideological incompatibility of the two nations. From the outset, there was a degree of opposition in America toward supporting a Communist state.⁴⁹ The principal anti-Communist opposition has existed in Congress, where constituency pressures often make support of Yugoslavia a rather untenable position. The policy has normally enjoyed strong support in the Executive and State Departments where the positive aspects of Yugoslavia's freedom are generally considered to outweigh the negative aspects of supporting a Communist country. Additionally, Yugoslavia has not been overly anxious to close the ideological gap. Despite their needs, the Yugoslavs were never willing to sacrifice the system that they had

fought so courageously to achieve. As Tito has said numerous times, "I am a Communist and nothing but a Communist."⁵⁰ This obviously has precluded any formal alliance. Eventually, the formalization of nonalignment further prevented the evolution of an actual alliance. These ideological differences have caused the relationship to retain the original format of trade, aid and vague pronouncements of mutual opposition to aggression in Yugoslavia.

Two acute problems resulted from this lack of formality. First, while it was obvious from the beginning what Yugoslavia hoped to gain, there was no clear definition of what the United States expected in return for its aid and assistance. This fact made it increasingly more difficult for American Presidents to recruit Congressional support for aid appropriations. Congress wanted to see concrete results in Yugoslavia's outward orientation. Arguments that the Yugoslavs were still not members of the Soviet bloc began to lose their strength after Khrushchev openly apologized to Tito in 1955. As Tito's policies became more independent and as he became less fearful of Soviet aggression, he began to be more vocal in his criticism of the West. So while Congress had been looking for a Westward leaning Tito, it appeared that just the opposite had evolved.

Secondly, the lack of formality left the relationship lacking in commitment from either party. The United States provided aid, pronounced itself in support of Yugoslav sovereignty and opposed to intervention there. No formal guarantees were made. Yugoslavia merely proclaimed its independence and

its right to follow a separate path to socialism. Tito certainly did not express support of the United States, though he occasionally indicated his desire to maintain good relations with the West. The United States Congress was undoubtedly accustomed to greater allegiance from those countries receiving American aid.

By the early 1960's, two trends served to undermine this tenuous relationship. The opposition in Congress had grown more inquisitive and equally more demanding of the administration to produce some tangible results, such as pro-Western policies in Belgrade. However, by that time, Tito was zealously preaching nonalignment, one aspect of which, was an almost militant denunciation of the great powers' policies. The problems of managing this alliance began to be painfully clear to the Kennedy administration. Tito's policies, despite his nonalignment, were taking a decidedly Eastern slant. Congress responded by making it more difficult to grant assistance to Yugoslavia. Actions by the two countries exacerbated each other until 1966 when American aid to Yugoslavia was finally cut off completely. The 1961-1966 period will be treated in greater detail than other periods of Yugoslav-American relations due to the fact that it illustrates the inherent problems in American policy toward Yugoslavia and hence explains the limitations that still exist today.

The beginning of the breakdown in relations can be traced to the latter months of 1961. At that time, the United States and the USSR were embroiled in such issues as the Berlin

crisis, Castro's Cuba, unification of Germany and nuclear proliferation. Tito, on the other hand, was preparing for the first Conference of Nonaligned Nations, which was to be held in Belgrade in September. On August 30, Khrushchev announced Moscow's decision to end the informal moratorium on nuclear testing, a decision which obviously served to increase tension between East and West. Then, Tito, speaking at the Belgrade conference, made several remarks which were distinctly pro-Soviet. Regarding nuclear disarmament, he criticized "...the tendency of those who continue to make a fetish of controls for a nuclear test ban treaty."⁵¹ This was a direct criticism of American policy. Furthermore, Tito called the Russian decision to resume nuclear testing understandable. Regarding Berlin, he asserted that it was necessary to negotiate a settlement, but he did not publicly recognize the West's right for continued access to West Berlin. These remarks, timed as they were, sparked considerable reaction in the United States for Tito was not only leaning toward Moscow, but he was doing so in a manner that influenced the nonaligned nations of the world.

The Kennedy administration responded by dragging its feet on a Yugoslav request for agricultural aid and by temporarily shelving a pending proposal for a visit to the United States by Tito.⁵² The official announcement stated that the administration was conducting an in-depth review of all aspects of American relations with Yugoslavia. Then in October, the situation grew worse when an Air National Guard pilot discovered

and reported to Texas Senator John Tower, that the United States was selling obsolete military aircraft to Yugoslavia and training Yugoslav airmen in Texas. This procedure was entirely legal and had not been concealed. In fact, in 1957 when military aid to Yugoslavia ceased, "...it was made clear that Marshal Tito's Communist regime would be eligible to purchase military equipment here in view of its continued independence from the Soviet Union."⁵³ The deal in question, which consisted of 130 jet fighter aircraft totalling \$1,300,000, had been arranged under Eisenhower and confirmed early on by Kennedy. Senator Tower, who was supported in his attack of the deal by Senators Henry Jackson and Otto Passman, claimed it was "...foolish to sell arms to the enemy."⁵⁴ The Kennedy administration stated Yugoslavia's sovereignty made it eligible for the purchases, but in light of Tito's Belgrade statements, the argument was not very convincing to Senator Tower.

The Yugoslavs, suffering from the effects of a drought, badly needed economic aid and correctly perceived American assistance to be in jeopardy. They were reportedly bewildered by all the to-do in the United States, for in their opinion, Marshal Tito's policy statements were nothing new. This was, in fact, true, but in light of events on the international scene, Tito's remarks had been taken more seriously than in the past. The American administration, meanwhile, continued to review relations but gave definite indications that its policy had not changed. At a news conference on October 18, Dean Rusk reemphasized Yugoslavia's independent posture,

asserted that American aid had helped the Yugoslavs maintain their freedom, and noted that while the administration was disappointed over Tito's remarks, the United States had never granted aid in order to "purchase agreement" from other nations.⁵⁵

To make things even more difficult for Kennedy and Tito, however, the Senate, on November 11, released a report which claimed that Yugoslavia was channeling American aid to other countries to gain their support for the Eastern bloc. The report also rejected the possibility of winning Tito to the West, stating that in the event of war, Tito would choose the Communist side. Senator James Eastland, in referring to the report, was quoted in the New York Times as saying, "He (Tito) is doing his part in a world-wide red campaign toward these countries (neutrals) and recent events at the...Belgrade conference show how that campaign has paid off for the Communist movement."⁵⁶ While Eastland's view had not yet become a majority view on Capitol Hill, opposition to the Yugoslavs was growing.

With the release of the Eastland report, Tito could remain silent no longer. His response was typical of his actions when his policies are under fire in the United States. On November 13, he accused the United States of using economic pressure to force Yugoslavia to change its policies. In a speech given on that date, he was even more pro-Soviet than normal. He attacked the West for rearming West Germany and supported various Khrushchev proposals on Berlin. He went on to express his gratitude for America's previous aid, but

regarding his policies, he stated, "...we will not yield whether they give us aid or not."⁵⁷ On November 13, the Kennedy administration disclaimed any such use of economic pressure.

Ten days later the administration reported to Tito that it was ready to negotiate the sale of the requested surplus food. On December 15, the sale was concluded. The terms were similar to those of previous years. Under Public Law 480, the purchaser paid for the goods in his own currency, the majority of which was loaned back for development projects. The remainder was used to defray the costs of operating the American embassy in the purchasing country. While Congressional disapproval had apparently died down, the combination of its pressure and Tito's poorly timed remarks had had some effect, for Tito only received about one half of what he had requested. Thus ended the first round of "Congress versus Tito".

The next round proved to be much more costly to Yugoslavia. Congressional opposition had not died at all, it had merely submerged temporarily. It surfaced again in June 1962. On June 6, the Senate voted to attach an amendment to the foreign aid bill which prohibited aid to any country having a Communist or Marxist form of government. The amendment was aimed directly at Yugoslavia and at Poland, which had also been receiving some American aid. Criticism of Tito ran high on the Senate floor. Senators Proxmire, Thurmond and Lausche led the attack which predicted Tito would side with Khrushchev in war, accused him of moving closer to Moscow, and alleged that the

Yugoslavs were giving some of their American aid to Cuba.⁵⁸ Again they questioned the administration's assertions that the aid was keeping Tito away from Moscow.

The next day the decision was, to a certain extent, reversed. Behind the strong leadership of Senators Mansfield and Dirksen, the majority and minority leaders, another amendment was added to the bill. This new amendment restored the President's authority to ship surplus foodstuffs to certain Communist countries. But it required him to first make a finding that the recipient government was not involved in any policy or program advocating Communist world conquest, was not dominated by another country advocating such conquest and that the aid was in the interest of the national security of the United States. Additionally, a \$10,000,000 loan to Yugoslavia for economic development remained negated by the original June 6 amendment. The compromise solution appeared to satisfy the White House while it enabled the Senate to express its hardening attitude toward Communism.

Belgrade's reaction to the Senate amendments was restrained, as Tito probably preferred not to exacerbate the situation if he could avoid doing so. But surely American policy was taking on a rather confused appearance. On June 9, the Yugoslavs did make what the New York Times called a "carefully worded statement" regarding the events in the Senate. A Yugoslav spokesman expressed regret that the Senate action was jeopardizing American-Yugoslav relations and that while the

reversal was appreciated, "...it did not eliminate the negative features of the Senate's original move."⁵⁹

The next blow to relations was struck by the House of Representatives on June 12. An amendment to the pending Export Control Act withdrew most-favored-nation status from Yugoslavia and Poland as soon as the President felt it to be practicable. The bill was further interpreted to indicate that the United States would not be allowed to send anything of economic value to Communist countries. It was felt at the time that this legislation, in conjunction with the Senate action of the previous week, would so significantly tie the President's hands that he would be unable to continue the policy of helping Yugoslavia maintain its independence.

The administration began to fight back. George F. Kennan, then Ambassador to Yugoslavia, was bitter in his own attack on Congress. He called its actions "...the greatest windfall Soviet diplomacy could encounter in this area."⁶⁰ He indicated that great irrevocable damage had been done to Yugoslav-American relations and he pleaded to be called home to try to correct Congress's "appalling ignorance". Other members of the administration protested that the Congressional actions would frustrate the Soviet-aimed fragmentation policy. President Kennedy ascribed the problems to Congressional impatience with the fact that American aid had not produced a new world.⁶¹ In late June, Kennan was summoned to Washington to testify on the necessity of aid to Yugoslavia. The President's offensive proved to be successful, for he received the support

of the House in its own version of the foreign aid bill. In October the final bill was passed. It recognized Presidential discretionary powers regarding aid to Communist states, but only in the form of food surpluses as provided for by Public Law 480. The Presidential finding was also still required. Withdrawal of most-favored-nation status stood, however, and required the administration to notify Yugoslavia of its termination within a reasonable time frame. Eventually, White House persuasion reversed this,⁶² and in fact, Yugoslavia has never actually lost its most-favored-nation status.

Once the basis for future aid was reestablished, Belgrade expressed relief and appreciation. The Yugoslavs were still concerned, however, about the trend in the United States. One spokesman was quoted as saying, "Aid is here today and gone tomorrow."⁶³ Truly, it must have appeared that way. They were even more concerned in the Autumn of 1961 over the loss of most-favored-nation status. Trade was an important aspect of their relations with the United States in that it reduced their trade with the Soviet bloc. Tito had been atypically silent throughout this period. Apparently he desired to maintain his independent policies, but wisely chose to do so more quietly. He was not completely idle, however, for while the President was battling Congress, Tito was improving economic relations with the Soviet Union, probably in an effort to negate the impact of the impending American policies.

On the surface it would appear that Tito and the United States Congress had reached a mutually acceptable compromise,

but such was not the case. In 1964, the act renewing Public Law 480 forbade the sale of surplus food to Communist nations for their own currencies. Then in 1966, the Food For Peace Act forbade even dollar credits to any nations sending supplies to North Vietnam or trading with Cuba. Yugoslavia was guilty, on a small scale, on both counts. Thus ended American aid to Yugoslavia. Apparently Congressional attitudes had not been significantly softened in 1962. Also, according to John C. Campbell, the administration was "...by this time (1966) tired of fighting with Congress over Yugoslavia on one point after another,..."⁶⁴

The debate on aid to Yugoslavia during 1961-1962 exemplifies the difficulties of managing an informal alliance with a nonaligned Communist government. According to Campbell, the outcome was due to a failure of the American government to successfully sell the policy to the public and a failure of the White House to convince Congress to support it.⁶⁵ While this is true, it does not go deep enough. The major obstacle appears to have been the lack of definitive expectations mutually understood by both Congress and the White House. Congress desired to see Tito become progressively more Western leaning. Kennedy's own remarks regarding the impatience of Congress were indicative of this. The administration, however, was willing to accept continued nonalignment as proof of success and as Yugoslav allegiance to the relationship. Given this divergence in expectation, it is understandable that the two should eventually clash.

In Alliances and the Third World, George Liska provides excellent theories regarding the normal origins and arrangements of alliances. In discussing great power motives in allying with lesser powers, Liska cites the following as one of three possible goals:

To divert a smaller state from an alternative alignment may be especially important for powers outside a region in a contest over primacy in regional orbits,...even a burdensome alliance of an extraregional great power with a small state will be a worthwhile objective and gain if the small state was previously within the orbit of an adversary great power.⁶⁶

The American-Yugoslav-Soviet triangle could not be better described from an American point of view. For clearly, it has been America's goal to keep Yugoslavia free of the alignment that it once had with the USSR.

Liska also offers an excellent description of the major principal of nonalignment; "...nonalignment consisted of refusal to enter into formal and permanent alliance or alignment with either party to the East-West conflict. Its...expression was marked by a systematic effort to exploit the conflict between the two superpowers."⁶⁷ A better understanding or recognition of this principle might have led Congress to accept Tito's nonaligned Communist approach. Tito himself admitted that he was first and always a Communist. He could not have become pro-Western, and by definition, should have been expected to often support Moscow. As his policies evolved into non-alignment, he had to be critical of both superpowers, for how else could he claim to be nonaligned? Further, how could he

attract other nations to the movement if he appeared to be aligned? The White House was willing to tolerate an Eastward leaning neutral. Congress was not.

During the 1970's political and ideological differences have continued to obstruct the establishment of a more concrete relationship between the United States and Yugoslavia. Tito has opposed American interests and policies on such issues as Vietnam, the Middle East, and Angola. American declarations such as the notorious Sonnenfeldt "doctrine" have not helped. The Yugoslavs perceived Sonnenfeldt's "organic" approach to Eastern Europe as the equivalent of establishing regions of influence - in this case Russian influence.⁶⁸ President Carter's pre-election statement that he would oppose the introduction of U.S. troops into Yugoslavia if it were attacked by the Soviet Union was probably more candor than the Yugoslavs preferred. While they may have suspected for many years that U.S. military commitment was doubtful, they had continued to rely on the ambiguity of American policy.

More recently there has been a conflict between America and Yugoslavia regarding President Carter's human rights campaign. Despite its openness, Yugoslavia is still repressive by Western standards and has been criticized openly by the Carter administration.⁶⁹ Tito considers such criticism inaccurate and unwarranted. He made this apparent on the occasion of Vice President Mondale's visit when he stated, "We have expressed our concern about a campaign that has been led in some countries about democracy and human rights. And I have said that I consider

that no reproach can be addressed to Yugoslavia in this connection."⁷⁰ Tito simply does not consider domestic politics in Yugoslavia the business of American Presidents or an aspect of Yugoslav-American relations.

Despite the differences that exist, relations between Belgrade and Washington today appear to be better than they have been at any time since the early 1960's. As usual the improvement corresponds to poor relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, and as usual the informal American-Yugoslav alliance has temporarily grown stronger. It is not as strong as it was during the 1950's. Tito's March 1978 visit to the U.S. notwithstanding, arms sales are still relatively minor and American commitment is questionable. The ideological differences between the United States and Yugoslavia will continue to exist. So too, will their mutual interest in Yugoslavia's freedom from Soviet domination. But a formal alliance simply cannot come about within the framework of the present relationship. The strength of the informal alliance will be greatly dependent upon what is most dominant in American attitudes at any given time, whether it be strategic interests or ideological differences.

In summary, American policies toward Yugoslavia since 1949, as compared to Soviet policy, have been fairly successful. The proof of this success lies in the fact that Yugoslavia is still independent of Moscow's dictates. Internally and externally, militarily, politically, and economically, Belgrade

determines and follows its own independent policies. The United States and Western Europe can be expected to continue their support of the status quo in the Balkans. Any negative effects of Yugoslav nonalignment are far outweighed by the advantages. Thus the United States and Western Europe are also watchfully waiting for the departure of Tito, for their commitment to the status quo may soon face its strongest test since 1949.

C. IMPLICATIONS OF A YUGOSLAV ALIGNMENT

It has been shown that both the Soviet Union and the United States and their respective allies have extensive political and geostrategic interests in Yugoslavia's alignment. The Soviet Union would prefer to see an Eastward leaning Belgrade since continued Yugoslav estrangement can only continue to have deleterious effects on the Soviet bloc. Eastern Europe, depending on the specific nation, can be seen to favor Yugoslav nonalignment, yet can hardly actively endorse it. The United States and Western Europe support Belgrade's posture based on their historical goal of liberalizing and dissolving the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. With these interests in mind, it is valuable to investigate the implications of a shift in Yugoslavia's policy away from nonalignment. While a total shift to alignment with Moscow or Washington may seem doubtful, it is the possibility of such a shift that causes the great concern over a post-Tito Yugoslavia.

1. Alliance With the East

An alliance with the Soviet bloc represents the Kremlin's greatest hopes for the future of Yugoslavia. It also represents the greatest fears of Western and Eastern Europe, not to mention those of the Yugoslav people. Certainly there are intermediate steps of semi-alignment that might be possible. Greater political, economic and ideological accord between Moscow and Belgrade, with continued Yugoslav non-membership in the Warsaw Pact is obviously a realistic scenario. However, it is the total shift that is of greatest concern and has the most potential for causing reaction in other parts of Europe.

Yugoslav allegiance to Moscow would represent an ideological victory of dramatic proportions for the Kremlin. First of all, it would prove that Moscow had been right all along, and that Tito's policies had in fact been unacceptable revisionism. Moreover, all of the "battles" that Tito had won would be overshadowed by the Soviet final victory of the "war". Outside of Yugoslavia, the most immediate consequences would be felt in Eastern Europe where Yugoslavia's alignment would be seen as a severe blow to any trends toward greater sovereignty and liberalization. Such was the effect of Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. A shift of Yugoslav loyalty to Moscow could be expected to have this result whether it were precipitated by intervention or not.

The "rehabilitation of the Yugoslav heretics" would most probably be a boost for "proletarian internationalism". Moscow would be rid of one of its most active opponents to the

institutionalization of the Communist world. The CPSU might find it considerably easier to achieve unity amongst the European Communist parties. It would certainly be a setback for Eurocommunism. The loss of the oldest and the best example of independent, national Communism would cause great concern in the Communist parties of Italy, France and Spain. Finally, if Moscow were able to create unity in the wake of a Yugoslav shift, it would be able to lead a concert of ideological policy opposed to the People's Republic of China. There are, today, numerous other trends that lend to polycentrism in the Communist world and Yugoslavia's independence is just one of them. As a result, stronger Moscow-Belgrade relations would not solve all of the Kremlin's ideological problems. But it would be a step in that direction.

Reorientation of Yugoslavia's policies toward the Soviet Union would represent a Russian political victory in a wider, non-ideological sense as well. Larrabee, in discussing the effects of this event on the rest of Europe, states:

While many European countries would not be directly threatened, the psychological impact would be considerable: many countries, both in the Balkans and outside, would see such a shift as further proof that the 'correlation of forces' was indeed changing in Moscow's favor.⁷¹

Due to Yugoslavia's image as a leader of the nonaligned, Larrabee's statement can be seen to apply outside of Europe as well. In light of recent opinion that the nonaligned movement has weakened, loss of Yugoslavia from its ranks would certainly accelerate its dissolution. This is not to suggest that there

would be a scramble amongst the neutral and nonaligned nations to align themselves with the superpowers. Yugoslavia is not that important. But its alignment with the Soviet Union would, at the least, serve as a blow to the independence and equality of the globe's smaller states.

Strategically, Moscow's defensive perimeter would be greatly strengthened and her offensive power would be greatly extended. If Yugoslavia allowed Warsaw Pact and Soviet troops to be stationed within her borders, the Soviet Union would exercise control of a line extending from the Baltic to the Adriatic. Furthermore, it would increase the power of the Russian Mediterranean naval force to an extent never before encountered. The implications of this shift in the military balance of Europe are staggering, for the two alliances and for numerous individual nations as well.

The effects this shift would have on NATO are quite clear. Greece especially would feel increased pressure for she would face the Warsaw Pact ground threat across her entire northern border. Turkey would be further isolated from the bulk of NATO's power, and would probably feel more pressure for combined Soviet-Turkish control of the Dardanelles. Russia would be in an excellent position to interdict NATO's maritime support lines to both these countries. Italy would, for the first time, face Warsaw Pact troops directly across her border. Russian warships, possibly including amphibious assault capability, would create a threat to Italy along her Adriatic coastline. Increased pressure would be felt at the Central

European front, since only Austria would stand between Soviet troops staged in Yugoslavia and NATO forces in southern Germany. Finally, while the Soviet fleet already challenges American naval power in the Mediterranean, use of Yugoslav harbor facilities for improved maintenance and logistic support would greatly enhance the flexibility and threat of the Soviet Navy in the entire area. In short, what has traditionally been a region of weakness for both blocs would be transformed into a stronghold of the Soviet Union.

Several non-NATO states would also be threatened. Romania especially, would see its sovereignty severely reduced by an easterly reorientation of Yugoslavia. According to John C. Campbell, "The importance of Romania and Yugoslavia to each other is self-evident. Each is convinced that a Soviet intervention in the other would soon be followed by the end of its own independence."⁷² This relationship is probably valid under any variety of circumstances, and would not necessarily depend on a Soviet military intervention. Austria would also be seriously threatened, for it would be surrounded on three sides by Warsaw Pact troops. Albania would lose its own valuable buffer state, and might find it necessary to shift its allegiance back to Russia. The Balkans as a whole would be in danger of becoming a Soviet sphere of influence.

Clearly the Soviet Union has little or nothing to lose by attaining Yugoslavia's loyalty. Not only would its power in Europe increase, but it would be better able to support its expanding interests in Africa and the Middle East. All of these

Soviet gains, however, imply that the United States and NATO have a great deal to lose by such an evolution. Possibly too much, or in other words, very possibly more than they are willing to lose. A 1971 panel study entitled NATO After Czechoslovakia, reflected this concern:

It is essential to the preservation of world peace that the Soviet Union should not misunderstand the profound U.S. concern for the maintenance of Yugoslavia's independence between the blocs. Any Soviet move against this nonaligned state, Washington should warn, would have to be regarded as a definite rejection of the course of coexistence and detente.⁷³

Such warnings have apparently played a part in deterring Moscow in the past. But with Yugoslavia's growing value, its expected post-Tito vulnerability, and questionable resolve in Washington, such statements may not be sufficient in the future.

Obviously the situation described above assumes the worst possible case, that of a total shift in Yugoslavia's foreign policy. It is that case, whether it were to take place slowly or be due to direct Soviet intervention, which most clearly illustrates the pivotal role that Yugoslavia could play in the security of Europe.

2. Alliance With the West

The possibility of an alliance with NATO is considered even more unlikely than the first. In fact, it is seldom even considered. Yet it may not be as impossible as it at first seems. Eurocommunism may soon force the United States into a new type of relationship with some of Europe's Communist parties. Yugoslavia is open to extensive Western influence through foreign trade, foreign news and the Yugoslavs working

abroad in Western Europe. It is as economically integrated with the West as it is with Comecon. And finally, and most importantly, the Yugoslavs do fear Soviet dominance. So however unlikely an alignment with the West might be, it is valuable to at least briefly investigate the consequences of such a shift.

A Yugoslav alignment with the West would clearly represent the crowning blow to Moscow's ambitions in the Balkans. Tito would not only have won the battles, but his successors would have won the war.⁷⁴ Such an event would spell the end of any Soviet dreams of slow, peaceful wooing of the Yugoslavs. Moscow's reaction might be expected to resemble its policies following the 1948 Tito-Stalin break. For example, an economic blockade could certainly be expected. Furthermore, a tightening of control in Eastern Europe would certainly be a logical result. Thus greater distance between Moscow and Belgrade might well mean less freedom for others in Eastern Europe.

NATO, though it would not have to be a signatory, would be greatly strengthened by a U.S.-Yugoslav pact. The American-Western alliance system would be secure across the entire European Mediterranean coastline (with the exception of little Albania). Greece and Turkey would be much less isolated. The Soviet fleet would be dealt a crushing blow, for the United States and its allies would control almost all of the European Mediterranean naval bases. The United States would clearly have an upperhand in the Middle East, since problems in Greece and Turkey would have somewhat less significance than they

have at present. In all, American capabilities in Europe and the Mediterranean would be expanded and Soviet capabilities would be correspondingly reduced.

If there is a chance the West might attempt to stop a Yugoslav shift toward Moscow, there is an even greater chance that the Soviet Union would endeavor to stop a similar shift toward the West. It would be too great a political blow and, in the long run, exert too much pressure on Eastern Europe for the Soviets to accept such a change. The chances of such an alignment are truly remote, for a major internal change would have to occur first. Yugoslavia's leadership, even after Tito, will still be Communist and it is unlikely that it will be any more prone to alliances with the West than Tito has been.

IV. THE ABSENCE OF BALANCE: THE SOVIET THREAT

A. YUGOSLAV NATIONAL DEFENSE

It has never been an easy task for a small, independent nation to ensure its security and its territorial integrity. Contemporary times in Europe are no different, especially in light of the existence of two opposing military blocs that are based upon two opposing superpowers. The majority of Europe's states have chosen membership in the two alliances as a method of securing their defense. Yugoslavia has chosen to remain clear of military alliances. But since nonalignment is not neutrality, Yugoslavia has still needed to guarantee its security in some manner. Its defense policy has gone through several alterations since 1945, generally reflecting the perceived threat and the manner in which it could best be opposed. Today Yugoslavia's armed forces and its defense policies reflect the country's internal multinational basis and its external nonaligned posture.

Since Yugoslavia cannot, by its own definition, join in any military defense pacts, it has taken extensive steps to bolster its own security forces. Its defense is based primarily on two organizations. First, the Yugoslav People's Army is a force in being of approximately 260,000 men and is considered to be the "...single most united organ of state or party organization in Yugoslavia, the one wholly Yugoslav body in which Serbs and Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians, Bosnians and

Montenegrins, have subordinated their ancient ethnic rivalries."¹ Secondly, the Territorial Defense Force (TDF), a reserve citizen army, is organized on a republican basis and is designed to assist the YPA by fighting a guerrilla-type war against any external aggressor. The sum of the two forces is Total National Defense or General Peoples Defense, and is designed to first deter aggression and secondly to inflict high costs on any invasion force. While the present organization has often been attributed to a Yugoslav threat reevaluation following the USSR's intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it is actually a function of modern realities of threat and weapons costs and historical experience.

The Yugoslav People's Army, which organizationally includes the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, evolved directly out of the Yugoslav partisan detachments of World War II. First formed in 1941, these detachments were comprised of volunteer citizens and were officially characterized as "...the combat forces of the Yugoslav peoples."² They were purposely dissociated with any political party. Each unit was attached to the territory on which it was formed and managed by a Commanding Officer and a political Commissar. Tito assumed command of all Partisan forces.

By November 1942, the number of detachments had grown significantly and the success of partisan warfare was sufficient to allow for a shift toward greater centralization. Large sections of partisan units were organized into Proletarian Brigades of the People's Liberation Army. No longer territorially

based, these brigades began participating in a combination of open and partisan warfare against the German occupation forces and occasionally against the Chetniks. Additionally, many partisan units were retained in order to mobilize more people and to serve as nuclei for more brigades.³ As the end of the war approached, fighting shifted to a predominance of open warfare along traditional-type fronts. Thus on 1 March 1945, the Yugoslav Army was established, further centralizing command and coordinating operations. The People's Liberation War ended May 15, 1945. At the time the Yugoslav Army, including Air Force, Navy, and other units, numbered about 800,000 soldiers.⁴

In the post-World War II years Tito was very clearly aligned with the Soviet Union, and perceived the American presence in Italy, Greece, and Europe in general, as his principal threat. Defense strategy during this period was characterized by a traditional or conventional approach to warfare. According to Lt-Col-General Milojica Pantelic, the Yugoslav People's Army had exclusive responsibility for national defense. Army, Navy and Air Force were all intended for "open warfare".⁵ Partisan units remained in existence, but for the time being received second billing to the organized army. The military budget was high and increased throughout this period as the Yugoslavs attempted to modernize their army.

The Yugoslavs expected significant military support from the Soviet Union and this expectation played a major role in some of Tito's early strategy decisions. Noteworthy was the decision to deemphasize the armaments industry, thus allowing

more expenditure in other facets of the war torn Yugoslav economy. The arms that Moscow sent were not, however, what the Yugoslavs expected. In a 1950 speech, Tito referred to the "brotherly aid" received prior to 1948; "Of 220 guns...⁸⁵ were obsolete but repainted; some of the tanks were worn out; and 30 mobile tank-repair shops were incomplete."⁶ This fairly typical support drove Tito to reassess his approach to armaments, and soon after the split with Stalin in 1948, he began to rebuild his armament industry. Robert Asprey states that between 1948 and 1952, \$250 million per year were poured into the armament industry.⁷ The Yugoslavs worked hard to become self-reliant in their acquisition of arms and by the early 1950's they were claiming self-sufficiency in production of ammunition, explosives, small arms, tanks, anti-aircraft guns, and certain naval vessels.⁸

After the 1948 split, Yugoslavia felt threatened from all sides. It was ill-prepared to successfully ward off a Russian attack if it were to come, yet it initially had no allies to come to its aid. Finally, however, its previous intransigence was forgotten and the United States provided the equipment and the commitment necessary to deter Stalin.

Interestingly, even before the United States began its military aid, Yugoslavia was considered relatively well defended. This assessment was based primarily on its large conventional army (as opposed to partisan forces). Though figures vary, the Soviet satellites bordering Yugoslavia were estimated to have between 400,000 and 500,000 troops, yet they

were considered no serious match for Tito's 350,000 man army.⁹ Only in the event of a combined attack by the Soviet Union and its allies was Yugoslavia's security considered to be seriously threatened. Even under those circumstances Western observers felt Yugoslavia would not be an easy mark for Moscow. According to Dana Schmidt, "It is the expert opinion here (in the West) that if the Russians themselves go into action in the Balkans it will mean that they are ready for a new world war."¹⁰ The probable high costs of an invasion were thus considered a major deterrent.

The Yugoslav budget and its military manpower levels also reflected the grave threat that existed until Stalin's death in 1953. Military spending reached a peak in 1952 when the over \$600 million spent on arms accounted for 20% of the country's net material product. Thereafter, the budget began to decrease, significantly so in 1953 when Tito suggested that defense budget cuts were necessary to keep the people from starving as a result of severe droughts.¹¹ Estimates on manpower levels vary greatly throughout this period ranging from 300,000 men to 800,000 men. It is doubtful that the army dropped significantly below 400,000 prior to Stalin's death, and it was certainly large in comparison to other individual Balkan and European forces.

Despite the apparent dependence on a large army, discussion of partisan units and partisan tactics once again became an important aspect of Yugoslav defense policy in the early 1950's. In May of 1952 Tito claimed to be able to muster two million

men in the event of war and was obviously referring to the mobilization potential of his partisan forces.¹² Such estimations led Western observers to speak of Yugoslav strategy as once again being based on a retreat into the mountains in the event of a Russian invasion. The best indication of a shift in Yugoslav strategy in the direction of a partisan orientation was the appearance in the October 1953 issue of Foreign Affairs of an article entitled "Territorial War". Written by Yugoslav Lieutenant General Dushan Kvedar, the article pointed out the valuable lessons of the World War II Partisan struggle and argued their future applications for small country defense. He argued that it is suicidal for small states to undertake frontal defense. Rather they should prepare for withdrawal behind pre-designated zones where territorial war (war that is waged over the whole territory of the country) can be undertaken. Other high points of Kvedar's article were his reference to the necessity of psychological preparation of the entire population, his condemnation of surrender, and the value of these tactics as a deterrence to would-be aggressors.¹³ The article undoubtedly reflected some aspects of Tito's plans in 1953.

A number of the policies that evolved during the late 1940's and early 1950's can still be seen in current Yugoslav defense strategy. Self-reliance in arms manufacture remains a high priority. The return to a partisan-territorial war concept began during that period and today many of General Kvedar's ideas can be seen in the army's organization and tactical plans. The use of high costs to any potential invader has been

consistently employed as a deterrent. Another deterrent was Tito's open use of the implied guarantee of American assistance.

In 1951 he said:

In the West there are voices which say that Yugoslavia is in danger and that an attack against Yugoslavia would imply a grave threat of a wider conflict. This does us no harm, on the contrary, since it is a question of our security and since it diminishes the possibility of anyone's deciding to attack.¹⁴

Another interesting evolution during this period was the establishment of Yugoslavia's last official military alliance. In addition to its American ties, the Yugoslav government entered into the Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey. Formed in 1954, this military pact is still in effect, but as Adam Roberts suggests, probably only because the three countries have forgotten its existence.¹⁵ Certainly it is of little military value today considering the relationships and the foreign policies of the three countries. At the time, however, the Balkan Pact contributed to the Yugoslav security arrangements since it tacitly linked the Yugoslavs even more closely to the United States which had underwritten Greek and Turkish security.

The thirteen years between May of 1955 and August of 1968 were characterized by a slow but steady shift in Yugoslavia's nonalignment. The Moscow-Belgrade rapprochement of 1955 spelled the end to Yugoslavia's alienation from the Communist world and also fore ordained the end to its special military relationship with the West. In 1958 when direct American military aid was ended, the U.S. had already supplied in excess of \$750,000,000

in military equipment. But because Congress began trying to tie "strings" to its aid, Tito turned to the Russians who were ready to fill the vacuum.¹⁶ After 1959 most Yugoslav armament imports were in the form of Soviet jet aircraft, tanks, and anti-aircraft missiles. By 1967 Yugoslavia's forces were equipped with a mixture of Russian, American, and Yugoslav weapons in both the Army and the Air Force, while the Navy was equipped primarily with Yugoslav and Russian weapons.

Despite the occasional political differences between Belgrade and Moscow, relations between the two no longer deteriorated to the point of a military threat. This lack of an external threat was dramatically illustrated in the pattern of defense expenditures and the manning levels of the Yugoslav armed forces. In 1956 defense spending accounted for 9.8 per cent of Yugoslavia's net material product. By 1960 it had dropped to 6.2 per cent, and by 1967 to 5.2 per cent.¹⁷ Manpower also decreased considerably. According to Asprey, by 1957 the YPA was down to 300,000 men.¹⁸ By 1967 this figure had decreased to about 220,000 men.¹⁹

From 1958 onward, a few hesitant steps were taken in the general direction of territorial and people's defense. Milojica Pantelic uses 1958 as a dividing year, during and after which changes were introduced in the armed forces which roughly corresponded to the institutionalization of the system of self-management. According to Pantelic "...the principle of combined open-partisan warfare was adopted."²⁰ This change was manifested by a restructuring of the armed forces along the

following organizational lines: there was to be 1) a force in being, well equipped and prepared to prevent a surprise attack and deep penetration, 2) a reserve force designed to be quickly mobilized when necessary, and 3) an increase in the number of partisan/territorial units assigned to the YPA and to be deployed throughout the country.²¹ Still missing was the emphasis on "peoples defense" that was to evolve later.

The first real indication of an official adoption of all peoples defense was seen in the revised 1963 Constitution. It stated that "The defense of the country is both the right and the duty of citizens, work and other organizations, the Federation, Republics, Communes and other socio-political communities."²² Despite this apparent shift toward a decentralized defense policy, the Yugoslavs did little more than shuffle toward a reorganization of forces or any real change in strategy. Because there was little threat during this period there was little concern over, or interest in, novel defense concepts. If anything, defense policy began to follow the pattern of decentralization characteristic of Yugoslav society as a whole. By 1967, according to Adam Roberts, "Military decentralization, in which the republics would for the first time have a significant degree of control over questions of national defense, was seen in many republican capitals as a necessary part of the reorganization of Yugoslav society."²³ For the time, however, no official change occurred and the army remained centralized.

The next official indication of changing policy was expressed by Col. Gen. Nikola Ljubicic in late 1967. The then

new State Secretary for National Defense advanced a variety of plans to be included in a pending alteration to the defense law. Most important were such concepts as 1) "general people's" defense in which all of society's resources are used, 2) the unity and high preparedness of both the army and the people in peacetime, and 3) the necessity of maintaining a strong army for rapid defense in order to prevent an aggressor from achieving quick decisive victories.²⁴ It is difficult to say how long it would have been before these concepts were actually enacted if the threat to Yugoslavia had remained low. What is known is that little had been accomplished by August of 1968, when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia.

Immediately after the invasion, Tito mobilized his defenses, such as they were in 1968, and looked once again to the West. Western assistance came in the form of vague promises of support which were nonetheless considered an adequate deterrent to the Soviet Union. It is highly questionable whether Moscow even considered an invasion of Yugoslavia, but the Yugoslavs were convinced that they were not as secure as they had previously felt.

The Soviet intervention shook Yugoslavia out of its military complacency. Territorial war and all people's defense, concepts which had been bantered about for years, took shape very quickly, and by February 1969 had been incorporated into a new National Defense Law. The new law was a sweeping reform of the country's defense. The reform was instituted for several reasons. First, in 1968, Yugoslavia was not prepared to defend itself against a

Soviet blitz attack if it came. Secondly, Yugoslav military planners felt a defense based on territorial war and people's defense was the only way they could effectively counter such a mass attack. And finally, a build up like that of the early 1950's was not possible. According to A. Ross Johnson in Total National Defense in Yugoslavia, "Current economic difficulties, the unavailability of outside assistance and the decentralized political system of the late 1960's all precluded the revival of a large scale standing army."²⁵ Thus concepts which had been discussed for over fifteen years were finally officially embraced.

The entire concept of Total National Defense is based upon a defacto admission that the regular army may not, in certain circumstances, be capable of repelling an attack at Yugoslavia's borders. The system of total national defense thus calls for a combination of territorial war (as Kvedar saw it) and total mobilization of the population. According to Pantelic, it is the "...right and duty - Of every working man and citizen to fight for the preservation of his freedom and self-management rights and to defend the sovereignty, independence and integrity of the country,..."²⁶ The "duty" aspect was spelled out in no uncertain terms; "No one has the right to recognize or sign the capitulation of the country or the capitulation of the armed forces. No one has the right to accept or to recognize the occupation of the country or any of its parts."²⁷

Another major aspect of Total National Defense is the coequality of the two forces of national defense, the Territorial

Defense Force and the YPA. The new defense law in 1969 laid down what was to be a complex and confusing organization. The YPA was still to be the national army and was to be equipped and organized by the central government. According to Adam Roberts though:

Article 14 stated that units of territorial defense, by contrast, 'are established by the commune, province and republic'. Articles 51 and 52 laid down that even in wartime territorial defense was the responsibility of the local civilian authorities, who were to 'direct the general people's resistance on their territory'.²⁸

Further elaborate details of the law described what commands, territorial or YPA, would be supreme in various situations of warfare. In 1974 a new Constitution and a new National Defense Law were adopted. As a result of the latter, according to Robert W. Dean, "The comprehensive grant of authority to lower echelon command...has been withdrawn;...the YPA has emerged in a strengthened and preeminent position..."²⁹ Command relationships were further defined with the YPA as the core of the National Defense system. Local command authority appears now to be restricted mainly to the instance of attack. Thereafter the YPA chain of command will control and coordinate operations.³⁰ Certainly there is still considerable freedom of action at lower levels. The entire theory of all peoples' defense necessitates the ability for local political and social defense units to act as they feel necessary to defend their territory. Otherwise total involvement of the population would be impossible to achieve.

The method of training and preparation of the TDF is another indicator of the army's important role. All military training

is administered by YPA officers. Furthermore, the pre-military training in the schools and universities is organized and supervised by YPA personnel.³¹ Finally, exercises are organized and planned by the army and all recent exercises have been designed to coordinate operations between YPA and TDF units.

The YPA's own training is extensive. A major post-War emphasis on training successfully corrected gross deficiencies in education and professionalism that characterized the Army at that time and established a system of training that still exists. Officers attend a succession of secondary schools and academies which are designed to develop "all-round socialist personalities," as well as capable military officers. Instruction includes extensive classroom work in military theory, Marxist philosophy, and technical subjects, as well as practical training in the field.³² Enlisted men are drafted for fifteen months (18 for the Navy) during which time they receive extensive training in frontal as well as guerrilla warfare and also undergo a program of political training. After their initial service, about 20% of the conscripts enter the YPA reserve while the remainder become part of the TDF.

Despite arguments that the YPA lost a degree of its prestige and responsibility for the nation's defense, it remains Yugoslavia's first line and plays a major role in repelling whatever type of attack may occur in the future. It is expected to be capable of resisting a "limited incursion" or an attack by a neighbor, entirely on its own.³³ On the other hand, it is in the event of a massive attack by a superpower

that the concept of general or all peoples defense becomes operative, and in that case YPA operations become coordinated with those of territorial defense units. YPA initial actions would be designed to meet the attack headon and slow it as much as possible. This opening phase of the war would allow time for the mobilization of territorial forces.

The YPA is not expected to incur heavy casualties in slowing the attack. The Yugoslavs have claimed the ability to mobilize half of the TDF within 3-6 hours, with full national mobilization possible in 48 hours.³⁴ As this mobilization occurred, the YPA would undergo a "descending transformation" from frontal warfare to partisan/guerrilla warfare and coordination with units of the TDF. Yugoslavs stress that the war thereafter would not be fought solely by many uncoordinated guerrilla groups. The territorial war would, on the contrary, be centrally commanded and organized, and while "It would have some characteristics of guerrilla warfare, (that) would not exclude the possibility of using heavy weapons, or large mobile formations,..."³⁵

The Yugoslavs are convinced that they would engage in territorial warfare for a considerable period of time. The war would eventually wear down the aggressor. As it did so, the YPA would undergo an "ascending transformation" (as the National Liberation Army did in World War II), shifting more and more to frontal warfare until the aggressor was defeated.³⁶ Theoretically Yugoslav losses would have been minimal and they would be back in control of their territory as well.

Today the Yugoslav People's Army consists of about 260,000 men. The army is by far the largest force with 193,000, followed by the air force with 40,000 and the navy with 27,000. These strengths have been fairly consistent over the last decade.

Estimates regarding the size of the Territorial Defense Force vary considerably. The eventual goal is to be able to place a total of three million people in the field, after the initial 1.5 million have been mobilized during the first 48 hours. According to Andrew Borowiec these are to be backed up by 1.3 million civil defense workers.³⁷ The total theoretical force, including YPA, totals between 4.5 and 5 million people, almost 25 per cent of the total population. With this number of defenders it is estimated that the occupation force would require 8.5 soldiers per square kilometer, or two million men, to completely subdue the country.³⁸

If the YPA is considered all-Yugoslav the TDF is very much the opposite. It is organized, trained and armed on local and regional levels. According to A. Ross Johnson, the TDF is "...politically responsive to local and republican political authorities, who continue to nominate candidates for TDF command posts and whose right to organize and direct national defense in their territories has been legitimized in the new Yugoslav constitution of 1974."³⁹ The regionally based units are expected initially to defend only their own republics, though that cannot be a very rigid rule considering overall expectations for the conduct of a long war.

Yugoslav leaders often refer to their strategy as that of a "hedge hog" comprised of hundreds of units throughout the country. Every commune, town, factory, sociopolitical organization and organization of associated labor is expected to have a plan for defense and to practice its implementation. Since all citizens are obligated to receive training in defense, hundreds of thousands of men and women have some knowledge of weapons.⁴⁰ In recent years all peoples defense has been broadened to include what is termed "social self-protection", which is both a right and a responsibility of all citizens. Clearly the purpose of the training and organization has been to establish a device which will ensure the mobilization of the maximum number of Yugoslavs in the event of an attack. The leadership is very well aware that they cannot expect manpower assistance from any direction, East or West.

The Yugoslavs have become increasingly independent in their arms acquisition for the same reason. According to General Stane Potocar, Yugoslavia at the end of 1977, was 90 per cent self-sufficient in the arming of its people.⁴¹ It still lacked the ability to build highly sophisticated weapons but actually needs very few of that type to carry out territorial war. Emphasis has been placed on an armament industry that can produce the simple, durable, easily serviced weaponry required for a highly mobile, partisan warfare. Though its forces still use American and Russian tanks and aircraft, Yugoslavia now builds some of its own aircraft and most of its naval vessels, including submarines. It claims complete self-reliance in production of

smaller weapons such as automatic and semiautomatic rifles, hand grenades, antitank weapons, antiaircraft guns and missiles, armored personnel carriers and other equipment of this type.

Yugoslavia's desire to become the prime producer of its arms has become an important feature of both its defense policy and its independent foreign policy. Since they cannot be sure who may be their enemy and who may be their ally, they will endeavor to become even more independent of Soviet and U.S. arms in the future. Despite this goal, however, and despite Yugoslav figures such as that above, the present Yugoslav arsenal is still a mishmash of mainly Soviet, American, and domestically manufactured arms. The TDF units are not as well equipped as the YPA, and in some cases, actually use World War II German and Italian weapons and Yugoslav reproductions of the same.⁴² Figure 5 provides a list of weaponry which has been compiled from various unclassified sources.⁴³

Although there have been Soviet and Yugoslav statements to the contrary, the Yugoslavs still see the main threat to their security as coming from the Soviet Union. Exercises "Freedom-71" and "Autumn-74" were both rehearsed defenses against a massive attack from the northeast.⁴⁴ Contributing to Yugoslavia's "seige mentality" was the disclosure in 1974 of a Soviet contingency plan called "Polarka". The plan called for a massive invasion of Austria by Czech, and later, Soviet troops. The ultimate goal would be an invasion of Yugoslavia. The entire plan supposedly was set to go into action on the occasion of Tito's death. The plan was disclosed by Czech Major General

ORDER OF BATTLE

Army Tanks - 1500 T-34, T-54/55 and M-47
650 M-4 and some PT-76
APC's - M-3, M-8, BTR-50P/60P/152, M-60
MICV - M-980
Antitank Weapons - M-36 tank destroyers, 82mm recoilless
rifles, 75mm RCL, 57mm, AT 75mm At, 100mm AT
Snapper and Sagger ATGW
Surface - Air Guided Missiles and AA Guns
SA-6, SA-7, SA-3, SA-2 missiles; ZSU-57-2 self-
propelled AA guns; 20mm, 30mm, 37mm, 40mm, 57mm,
85mm, 88mm
Artillery - 76mm, 105mm, 122mm, 152mm, and 155mm guns/
howitzers
Self-Propelled guns M-18 (76mm), M-36 (90mm), SU-100,
105mm, and howitzers
Rocket Launchers - 130mm multiple

Navy 5 patrol submarines (Yugoslav built, Soviet equipped)
1 destroyer (Yugoslav built - obsolete)
10 Osa patrol boats with Styx missiles (Soviet)
34 torpedo boats (14 Shershen - Soviet)
26 large patrol boats
30 minesweepers
31 landing craft
3 corvettes
Mi 8 and Ka 25 ASW helicopters (1 squadron)

Air Force
110 Mig-21 fighter bomber (Soviet)
95 Galeb/Jastreb fighter/ground attack (Yugoslav)
15 Kraguj fighter and ground attack (Yugoslav)
10 F-84 fighter and ground attack (U.S.)
15 RT-33A reconnaissance (U.S.)
25 Galeb/Jastreb reconnaissance (Yugoslav)
270

Additionally there are about 60 transports; C-47's,
Il-18, Yak-40, Caravelle, AN-12, AN-26, Li-2, Boeing
727-200
120 trainers
Mi-4, Mi-1, Mi-8, Gazelle, Alouette, Ka-25 helos
Building Orao multipurpose jet fighter with Romania

Figure 5

Jan Sejna who defected in 1968.⁴⁵ While the credibility of Sejna and Polarka have been questioned, they did little to make the Yugoslavs feel secure.

Regardless of what country or military bloc the Yugoslav's consider their greatest threat, it can be assumed that they would prefer not to fight them at all. Tito's entire policy is based upon the fact that small countries never gain and always lose when they are involved in bloc politics and wars. As a result, deterrence has grown to be a major factor in Yugoslavia's defense. Foremost is the guarantee to all possible aggressors that the Yugoslavs will fight. They have done much to advertise their law against capitulation for they want to ensure that Moscow knows that a "Czechoslovak style road march into Yugoslavia is not possible; that an invasion would have unpredictable consequences; that an attempt at occupation would be bloody, prolonged, and expensive in terms of manpower and material;"⁴⁶ Even their estimation of 8.5 soldiers per square mile is a deterrent factor, for the USSR could not presently mass two million troops in Yugoslavia without weakening its own defenses elsewhere.

Another "detering" strategy is Tito's own use of his country as a hostage for the balance of power. In January of 1977 he tied security in the Balkans to security in Europe and the entire world. He had done the same thing after the Czech invasion in 1968 when he was so bold as to suggest that if the Soviets tried the same thing in his country, the U.S. would probably intervene, with or without his invitation.⁴⁷ Though

Tito is quick these days to deny any dependence on America, he undoubtedly enjoys the continued possibility of a U.S. response to Soviet actions in Yugoslavia.

Two other aspects of policy contribute to the deterrent. Yugoslavia enjoys enormous support as one of the leaders of the nonaligned. A Soviet invasion would thus cost Russia dearly in influence in the Third World. Finally, in the last few years, Yugoslavia has hinted at an interest in atomic weapons. While it is doubtful that they have one, they have claimed the capability to develop one.⁴⁸

The Yugoslavs have an international image as rugged, capable, and determined fighters. The image goes back far beyond the warfare of World War II. For this reason few tend to disbelieve them when they say they will fight. Their defense policy today reflects an interesting mix of the old and the new. It is based on the partisan, guerrilla traditions. It recognizes the multinational quality of the society. It pays heed to the real threat to Yugoslav security and takes a practical approach in dealing with that threat. It is constrained by its lack of wealth and its lack of allies. And finally it employs a sophisticated system of political and military deterrence in hopes that it can avoid the horrors it experienced in World War II and throughout Balkan history. Whether or not the Yugoslavs can truly defend themselves successfully is another question.

B. WILL THE SOVIET UNION INVADE?

One of the most frequently mentioned scenarios for post-Tito Yugoslavia is that of a Soviet military intervention of

some sort. Moscow is presumably desirous of some degree of control over the Yugoslavs and their territory and the Yugoslavs are convinced that the Soviet Union is their principal potential military threat. Thus the possibilities seem to exist for a Soviet move of this type. The purpose of investigating the Soviet threat here is twofold. First, since the scenario is a common concern it is proper that it should be addressed in order to discern its factual basis if one exists and to investigate what might follow from a Soviet military move in Yugoslavia. Secondly, it provides an opportunity to analyze the ability of the Yugoslavs to successfully carry out their defense policy, and to point out any weaknesses that might exist in their present posture.

In looking at the possibilities of a Soviet invasion, one must first attempt to determine what Moscow would have to win or lose as a result of such an involvement. Military involvements in foreign countries tend to carry mixed blessings for the "intervener", and a Russian invasion of Yugoslavia is no exception to the rule. The gains of a Soviet attack and victory over Yugoslavia have already been discussed at length. The strategic benefits are obvious: naval bases for the Mediterranean Eskadra, overflight rights on the routes to the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, and ground bases resulting in an expansion of the Soviet outer defense perimeter. In addition to acquiring an important and strong ally in the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact would drive a significant wedge into the already weak southern flank of

NATO. Finally, the intervention, if it led to the eventual domination of Yugoslavia, would prove to be a significant ideological victory over Yugoslav Communism.

There are naturally a number of risks involved in a Soviet military venture in Yugoslavia (beyond military and personnel losses). The level of risk, in most cases, is inversely proportional to the degree that Moscow can justify its actions. That is, if the justification seems credible to other nations and parties, the political risks and costs will be low. But if the Soviets cannot convince others that their action is necessary and legal, they would stand to lose a great deal, even if they were militarily successful.⁴⁹ In the latter case, the Soviet Union would certainly hasten the decay of detente, lose much of its influence among the nations of the Third World, and suffer grave damages to its image within the Communist world.

The Soviet decision to intervene in Yugoslavia would obviously be based on a careful measurement and balancing of costs and benefits. Generally speaking, the strategic benefits would have to outweigh the ideological and political losses that would almost surely follow. The international situation at the time of the decision will play a major role and might tip the scales one way or another. Certainly the decision will be effected by the internal situation in the Soviet Union as well. If the benefits appear high and the costs low, then Moscow might determine that the time was ripe for achieving its political and strategic goals in Yugoslavia via military means.

The Soviet Union cannot expect to achieve its ultimate desires in Yugoslavia peacefully. It is not likely that a post-Tito Yugoslavia will move slowly or steadily toward a strong relationship with the Soviet Union. It might move closer, but it cannot be expected to move closely enough to satisfy the Soviet desires for warm water ports, permanent ship repair facilities, overflight rights, etc. This is mainly because to do so would require a major change in Yugoslavia's attitudes regarding its domestic structure and its role in the Communist world and on the international scene.

Since Moscow cannot hope to achieve its desires in Yugoslavia as a result of peaceful evolution, it is possible that it might attempt to gain them militarily. However, some major change would be necessary in order to prompt a Russian military attack on Yugoslavia. The change would need to encompass dual implications for Moscow. First, it would have to provide the justification necessary. Secondly, and closely related, it would have to be in a form that would cause Moscow to perceive a threat to its own security. Naturally as the level of the perceived threat increases, the requirement for justification decreases. There are three very plausible changes that could occur in Yugoslavia that would encompass these two characteristics.

First, and least likely, is the possibility of a political and military shift by Yugoslavia toward the West and NATO. Such a shift might be precipitated by economic problems that pull the Yugoslavs further West. It might also be caused by an increase in Sino-Soviet polemics or Soviet-Eurocommunist

arguments. In other words, if Yugoslavia itself perceives increasing threat from the Warsaw Pact or the USSR it might then begin to drift westward. However, some of the same justifications precluding a slow shift eastward apply to the reverse also. Additionally, there are even greater cultural and ideological barriers between Yugoslavia and the West. Nevertheless any barrier can be overcome in international politics. A Yugoslavia aligned with the United States would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union strategically, politically and ideologically. A military response designed to cut short such an alignment might easily be understood or should at least come as no surprise.

A second evolution in the Yugoslav situation that might solicit a Soviet military response would be a civil disturbance or civil war in the post-Tito era. A succession struggle or a strong challenge from national groups might threaten the very unity of the Yugoslav state. While many authors have recently downplayed the chances of such civil instability, outside interests and maneuvering might exacerbate problems to the flashpoint. In other words, this is a scenario the Soviets might themselves attempt to stage manage. In any case, a civil war in Yugoslavia is not likely to be contained within that country's borders. Opposing factions would be very likely to call for outside assistance. Moscow would probably be ready and willing to provide such assistance if for no other reason than it would be unable to afford not to be in on the division of Yugoslavia. Even if "fraternal assistance" were not requested, the Soviets

would be tempted to intervene due to the instability and spill-over effects a Yugoslav civil war could create throughout Europe.

The third scenario to be discussed here is that of a conflagration between Yugoslavia and one of its neighbors. The most potential lies in the Yugoslav-Bulgarian dispute over Macedonia. In late 1978, polemics between Sofia and Belgrade once again proved that the Macedonian issue was far from dead. As was mentioned earlier, Bulgarian attacks often coincide with bad relations between Moscow and Belgrade. Such was certainly the case in the late 1970's with the disagreements over Eurocommunism, Yugoslavia's improving relations with the Peoples' Republic of China, and Yugoslavia's criticism of Soviet and Cuban actions in Africa. This situation is one which could very easily be stage managed from Moscow. Given Sofia's historical allegiance, it is not difficult to envision the outbreak of hostilities between these two Balkan states, with an ensuing Warsaw Pact/Soviet invasion designed to rescue the Bulgarians. Again, in view of Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations, this particular scenario seems dangerously possible.⁵⁰

Of the above three scenarios, the first provides the least inherent justification for Soviet intervention. It would thus have to fabricate some rationale for its attack. The latter two scenarios provide significant justification, if only from the point of view of trying to keep peace in Europe.

In what manner would the Soviet Union intervene militarily in Yugoslavia? There would, first of all, seem to be three very basic possibilities open to the Kremlin.⁵¹ First, they

would probably much prefer to send proxy troops than their own. The potential for spill-over and escalation is such that Moscow would prefer not to chance having Russian troops come up opposite those of NATO or any one helping the Yugoslavs. But the availability of such proxies is doubtful. The next preference would be a Warsaw Pact invasion force. A multinational force would certainly lend credibility to the invasion itself and would still limit Soviet losses and involvement. There is much question, however, whether some Warsaw Pact countries would support an invasion of Yugoslavia. It would depend on the initial rationale and it is likely that individual countries would not perceive threats to their security in the same way that Moscow does. Finally, Moscow might choose to send Soviet troops into Yugoslavia alone. The benefits and the original threat would clearly have to significantly counterbalance the inevitable political costs of such a move. Furthermore, it can be assumed that this would only be done if the Soviet Union perceived a very grave and possibly imminent threat to its own security.

Of the above scenarios and force compositions, it would seem that the third scenario is most likely to cause Soviet military involvement in Yugoslavia, while the second troop composition would be the most likely method of attack. This composition provides the best mix of threat, credibility and justification. It should be noted, however, that a civil war in Yugoslavia has, due to the multinational character of the region, great potential for drawing other nations into the conflict. For example, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania would all be sorely tempted to

protect the lives of their respective ethnic minorities in Yugoslavia. Thus scenario number two can be seen to fit nicely with the Warsaw Pact invasion also. Finally, the first scenario, while it might be highly unlikely, might be perceived as a very great threat to the Soviet Union, and could cause a very virulent response.

However the attack comes and for whatever reason it is delivered, the likelihood of a complete surprise is low. Rising tensions preceding the outbreak of military action would probably cause at least a partial mobilization of the YPA and hundreds of units of the TDF. This benefits the YPA considerably since it alone would not necessarily have to hold back the enemy attack for the full 48-72 hours normally discussed. This factor adds significantly to the credibility of the Yugoslavs' promise of a long and bloody war. It is also the only hope the Yugoslavs have against a massive mobile invasion.

The Soviet Union is very well aware of Yugoslavia's defense posture and strategy. It thus knows that if it is to achieve its military and political objectives, it must do so quickly and decisively. Since the question of outside assistance to Yugoslavia will almost surely arise, the Soviets will attempt to seize political control of the country quickly enough to present the West with a fait accompli.⁵² Once this is done, the Soviets can go about their business, so to speak, in trying to defeat the armed resistance that will have returned to the World War II redoubts in the mountains located in western and northwestern Yugoslavia.

It is generally felt that the Soviet/Warsaw Pact massive invasion force would consist of 40-45 divisions including Soviet, Hungarian, Bulgarian and possibly Romanian troops. This force according to Graham Turbiville would consist of at least two airborne brigades, 480,000 troops, more than 10,000 tanks, 2500 medium artillery pieces, 1500 mortars and more than 700 multiple rocket launchers.⁵³ It would not be difficult for the Soviets to achieve air superiority. It can also be assumed that Moscow would send at least a cruiser task force to the Straits of Otranto to protect the entrance to the Adriatic. This would have the effect of signalling to the West that a major resupply of the Yugoslavs would be opposed.

Against this Soviet invasion force, Yugoslavia would put up the equivalent of about twenty divisions which are lighter in armor and responsible for the defense of some 2970 kilometers of border. Outnumbered at least $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 in total manpower, they would be even more greatly outnumbered due to their inability to concentrate their defense. The invasion force would also enjoy about a 5 to 1 superiority in tanks and other equipment.⁵⁴

The access or invasion points are not difficult to determine. Yugoslavia's terrain puts significant constraints on an invasion force and does make the job of the defending army a little easier. A quick glance at the map should suffice. The main invasion force would probably attack over the Danubian plains and flatlands in Northern Yugoslavia, entering from Hungary and possibly Romania. These forces would be assigned to seal Yugoslavia's northern borders, overrun the defenses and take

key cities such as Zagreb, Rijeka, Ljubljana, Novi Sad, and Belgrade as quickly as possible. Forces entering from Bulgaria would have more difficult terrain to overcome and would seal the southern borders and take Nis and Skopje.⁵⁵

Not surprisingly, Yugoslavia has the bulk of its personnel and armor stationed at these primary access points. They are deployed in northern Croatia, northern Serbia, and in southern Serbia and Macedonia. They have been stationed there since the 1968 time frame when the direction of the threat became dangerously clear to Belgrade.⁵⁶ The Yugoslavs have run several exercises which have responded to just such massive invasions. The exercises have included coordination with TDF units, defense against airborne assaults, and defense against amphibious assaults in the Adriatic.⁵⁷

If Western sources are correct, it would appear that both sides know much of what to expect from their adversaries. The invasion force must be large and it must be quick and it must be decisive. The defense, on the other hand, seems to accept these facts and will withdraw in as orderly a manner as possible, fully intending to carry the fight to the interior and eventually return to the conventional battlefield. In this way the Yugoslavs feel they can exact such a heavy toll on the invader that he can eventually be worn down and driven from the country, a la Vietnam. The obvious question then is: Who will win the war of attrition? Can Tito's successors really hope to turn Yugoslavia into the Soviet Union's own Vietnam war?

Naturally these questions are no more answerable than the others presented thus far. But there are some facts worth pointing out, and most of them deal with Yugoslav capabilities. First of all, the possibility of outside assistance to Yugoslavia must be considered. General consensus is that if the hostilities described thus far break out in a rather sudden manner, there is little that the United States alone or in concert with NATO could do to offset the initial Soviet victory.⁵⁸ The West could not provide manpower or supplies quickly enough to make a significant difference in the immediate outcome. What the West could possibly do would be to quickly establish links with the resistance forces, thereby bettering the chances of resupply in the protracted war.

The next question deals with whether the Yugoslavs are actually equipped well enough to do what they plan to do. Phillip Karber and Jon Lellenberg provide the best look at this question.⁵⁹ Organizationally, they seem capable, for while most ground force units are about 75% manned, much emphasis and practice has gone into integration with the TDF units. In the area of manpower, Yugoslavia has rather a unique problem. Almost one million of its militarily fit men are presently working elsewhere in Europe. Only if hostilities were preceded by a relatively lengthy period of tension, could these men be expected to be able to return in time for battle. Thus Yugoslav defense planners will be without a significant percentage of their most able fighters.

Regarding its own armor and firepower, the Yugoslav's tank force is old and maintenance is growing very difficult. Artillery is in a similar state, and is dependent on non-standard ammunition and is non-self-propelled. Defensive weaponry, while it has improved with some recent modern additions such as the Sagger ATGW and the SA-3, -6, -7 SAM systems, there are not yet enough of those to help much. Furthermore, their anti-tank systems tend to be immobile and unsheltered, and they lack both modern radar systems and anti-air weapons. A related area, mobility, is a very serious weakness in that only three brigades out of Yugoslavia's infantry forces are presently mechanized. This could improve in the near future if the Yugoslavs can produce their new M-980 MICV quickly enough.

The Yugoslavs face equally great obstacles in the area of support. Its communication equipment is old and inadequate especially for the added requirements of the total national defense concept. Air support is sadly lacking and cannot be depended upon. Even the new Orao will not satisfy the pressing needs for airpower for it will not be internally sophisticated. Finally, Yugoslavia today still has relatively few first class highways and railways. They are difficult and expensive to build due to terrain features, and once built are easy to disrupt due to the many bridges and tunnels. Thus logistic support will be undependable in any kind of scenario. The above is certainly a rather dismal picture. As Karber and Lellenberg point out, the Yugoslavs have modernization programs in effect for each of the areas discussed. But Yugoslavia is a poor

country and cannot afford modern, sophisticated military equipment. It must therefore hope that its deterrent strategies work, and barring that, it must depend upon an active guerrilla resistance.

There are other problems. Since World War II, frontier areas have become increasingly industrialized while those same areas have become depopulated. Since 1945 the urban population has increased from 20 to 35 per cent (42% by 1986).⁶⁰ Yugoslavia simply is not the same country that harbored the Partisans. There is economically more to lose outside of the cities, yet demographically, fewer people are there to defend those outer regions. Thus, as the people en masse move to the hills, there will be major difficulties sheltering and feeding them.

One interesting problem is that of the differing experiences of the country's youth and their parents. There are indications that the young people are tired of hearing about the glory of the Partisans. Furthermore, they are more cosmopolitan and materialistic, thus not as suited to the rigors of guerrilla warfare.⁶¹

Another clear cause for concern is based on the historical national problems of Yugoslavia. The ethnic imbalance of the officer corps might lead to misplaced loyalties in time of military crisis. For example, Serbs and Montenegrins, who dominate military leadership, tend to be culturally and historically more pro-Russian than the other ethnic groups. According to Robert Dean, however, there is little evidence to doubt their dedication, for "...the officer corps and the military leadership

remain firmly behind the principle of Yugoslav federation..."⁶²
This might provide solace in terms of a massive external attack since that sort of invasion normally draws the ethnic groups together, but if the war were to begin as a result of ethnic animosities, then the officer corps' loyalties would be severely tested. Furthermore, the TDF concept has resulted in arming and organizing Yugoslavs on their republican foundations. It thus has a distinct possibility of backfiring.

These questions point to the relatively certain fact that some Yugoslavs will not fight. Some will actually help the invaders. The percentages that follow either of those two courses may determine the ultimate outcome of the war.

The invaders face problems as well. The Soviet Union can in no way be sure that the Warsaw Pact will join in an invasion of Yugoslavia. Only Bulgaria can be assumed to be a sure ally. It is conceivable that Romania would attempt to help the Yugoslavs. Finally, there is still the very strong possibility that Soviet troops on Yugoslav soil, regardless of the circumstances, might serve to unite the Yugoslavs so greatly that the fighting would be as fierce, lengthy and bloody as Belgrade promises.

In summary, it seems as though the probability of a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia is very remote. The Yugoslavs will do their best not to cause the Soviets to fear or perceive a threat to their own security. Moscow stands to lose simply too much politically and ideologically, as well as in terms of men and arms in an attack.

If however, Moscow did feel compelled to invade Yugoslavia, it would have already decided to accept the consequences. Its losses would be enormous. But in the long run it would seem that it could achieve its strategic objectives. The Soviet position would not be analogous to that of the United States in Vietnam, for the Russians would have an unbroken ground link between its own homeland and the occupation forces in Yugoslavia. As stated earlier, the costs would be enormous but the Soviets could eventually break the back of the Yugoslav resistance.

The bottom line here, however, is still that Yugoslav deterrence will continue to succeed. It is just too expensive for the Soviet Union to become militarily involved in Yugoslavia, and there is much too much potential for such an involvement spreading elsewhere in Europe.

V. MAINTAINING THE BALANCE:
THE SEARCH FOR ALLIES

A. NONALIGNMENT AND THE AFRICA CONNECTION

Throughout the history of the nonaligned movement, the roots of which date roughly to the early 1950's, Yugoslavia has been either its leader or one of its leaders. Thus the mention of the movement or the country has generally conjured up the image of the other. Yugoslavia is clearly considered a champion of the rights of small states. Its opposition to superpower and bloc politics and its success in maintaining its independence have earned it the respect of all nations, weak and strong. This elevated image among nations has in turn increased Yugoslavia's own dedication to the theory and practice of non-alignment to the point where nonalignment is now the official theoretical basis of the country's entire foreign policy¹ and most especially its relations with the Third World countries of Africa.

Yugoslavia's own nonalignment came about gradually and was a direct result of its expulsion from the Cominform. Stranded between two worlds Tito was forced to develop new allies and a new form of international interaction if he was to keep his nation independent of both of the major blocs. His early contacts and friendship with Nasser of Egypt and Nehru of India, two men who were equally dedicated to maintaining their countries' independent postures, eventually evolved into a foreign policy based on the sovereignty and equality of all nations, regardless

of size or power. As his foreign policy was taking shape in the mid-1950's, Tito saw Africa as an excellent arena for expanding his influence, and even more importantly, for gaining political support. As Alvin Rubinstein states, the Yugoslavs saw in the new nations of Africa, "...the stuff of which influence is made; strategic and diplomatic importance, untapped markets and resources, surplus manpower..."² They thus solicited the support of African, as well as Asian, nations in every possible way, from the offer of military support to cultural exchange.

The first major sign of Tito's success occurred in September 1961 when the First Conference of Nonaligned Countries was held in Belgrade. Twenty-five heads of state met in the Yugoslav capital to express their concern over the tensions and critical situations existing in the world and to remind the great powers that their actions could have consequences that might effect all nations.³ It was an honor that Belgrade was chosen as the meeting site and the choice recognized Yugoslavia's leading role in bringing it all about. This first meeting was considered a success, if for no other reason than that it brought together the nonaligned leaders at a forum outside of the United Nations and thus established a precedent.⁴

It is at times difficult to pinpoint an accurate definition of nonalignment. As Leo Mates suggests, "By its appellation it is defined negatively, i.e., as a policy of nonparticipation in bloc groupings, military alliances or political blocs."⁵ While that is true, it has come to mean significantly more than that.

The doctrine is characterized by the demand for a decrease in bloc politics and superpower domination of international affairs and recognition of the equality and sovereignty of all nations.⁶ In practice this means regular meetings of the nonaligned group and extensive use of the United Nations as a forum at which small nations can make themselves heard.

It should also be pointed out that nonalignment does not mean neutrality, especially for Yugoslavia.⁷ While Belgrade's outlook on international disputes often seems to coincide with that of Moscow, the Yugoslavs openly differ with the Kremlin on questions of the international Communist movement and on Moscow's policies toward Eastern Europe. Nor is Belgrade hesitant to criticize the United States for its human rights campaign and its Middle East policies, to name just two. Non-alignment grants each country the right to take whatever stand it chooses depending on its own interests.

Since 1961, the nonaligned movement has grown considerably. The growing number of African states added significantly to its size. The Fifth Conference of Nonaligned Countries, held in Sri Lanka in August 1976, was attended by 86 nations. Of those, 44 of them were African countries, not including the outlying island chains. The only continental African states that are not members are the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia, for obvious reasons. It is understandable that the African nations should subscribe to nonalignment. The creed is appealing to almost all small nations, for in addition to those tenets already mentioned, it is highly opposed to colonialism and nuclear

proliferation and very much in favor of worldwide economic assistance of developing countries. The fact that it is not a neutralist policy has also been a major inducement.

The actual power that the nonaligned movement has had at any particular time is difficult to measure and is therefore also highly debatable. In 1970 Alvin Rubinstein stated that the movement was in "disarray".⁸ Yet in 1971 the People's Republic of China was admitted to the United Nations largely due to the voting of the nonaligned bloc and principally, the African nations. Numerous economic and financial support agencies have been established in the U.N. as a result of the group voting of the nonaligned bloc. So it appears, that the movement has at times achieved some success in its unity.

Any power that the nonaligned nations attain, evolves as a result of unity, and despite the above examples, unity was seen to be seriously lacking during the summer of 1978. At a July Conference for the Ministers of nonaligned countries, Tito was forced to try to reestablish nonalignment on its original peaceful foundation. The problem facing the group was that Cuba, whose influence is increasing rapidly, is militarily embroiled in several of the guerrilla wars going on in Africa. Furthermore its military involvement in Angola and Ethiopia is closely linked with that of the Soviet Union. Finally, the Sixth Non-aligned Conference was scheduled to meet in Havana in 1979 and Castro is reportedly harboring ambitions as Tito's successor as leader of the nonaligned. The "disarray" of 1970 was not nearly

the threat to Tito's movement, as the divisions brought about by Cuba's African policy.

Thus in the summer of 1978 Tito opened the meeting in Belgrade with a warning to the nonaligned nations against attempts to divide and weaken the movement. While he did not speak specifically of Cuba, it was very clear that he was referring to the Soviet-Cuban efforts in Africa, calling them "new forms of colonial presence and of block dependence, foreign influence and domination."⁹ After a few days, Cuba's policies were the subject of open debate, with Cuba carefully justifying its actions, while other countries threatened a mass boycott of the 1979 Havana Conference. By the end of the Conference a temporary compromise was achieved in that the final declaration "...failed to endorse the rights of non-aligned states to receive foreign assistance, as urged by the Cubans. On the other hand it failed to condemn foreign intervention."¹⁰

Short of a victory for Yugoslavia's moderate, anti-intervention side, the compromise was acceptable to the Yugoslavs. At the time, the Havana Conference was a full year away, plenty of time in which to politic and patch up the movement. Nevertheless, while the final declaration was a compromise, the closing Yugoslav address was considerably less so. The Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Josip Vrhovec, insured that his address referred to the nonaligned movements' struggle against imperialism, colonialism, expansionism, political hegemony and foreign domination as well as "...against foreign interference in the

internal affairs of independent sovereign countries..."¹¹ Tito was not about to pass up his opportunity to have the last word in the debate.

With all of the attention on Africa during the late 1970's it is interesting to review Yugoslavia's own African policy. It is naturally closely linked with nonalignment. Furthermore, it provides some enlightening insights into the Yugoslav modus operandi for spreading its influence and for creating global political support.

The extent of Yugoslavia's presence in Africa is significant considering its own limited wealth and size. While it cannot be considered a major influence on African events, it is most certainly a minor actor of importance. In actual fact, Africa is more important to Yugoslavia than Yugoslavia is to Africa. The relationships that have developed are of questionable value to the individual nations, while on a wholistic basis they have been very beneficial to Yugoslavia. Tito's support of the emerging bloc of African states has enabled him to maintain Yugoslavia's high profile on the international scene and has helped him battle the superpowers. It has also enabled Yugoslavia to find new markets for its manufactured goods and new sources of raw materials for its growing industry. The benefits accrued by the African states have been Yugoslav support of their anti-colonial policies, Yugoslav economic and technical assistance, and membership in and support of the nonaligned world.

Tito has used several methods to spread his influence in Africa. Politically, he has consistently supported anti-colonialist

and national liberation movements throughout the continent. His policies have ranged from public denunciation of colonial powers to direct military support for rebel movements. He has established trade relations with almost every African state. While some relationships are of little economic value, politically most have proven worthwhile. Additionally, though Yugoslavia can afford to grant little foreign aid, it has an excellent record of extending credits, providing technical assistance and experts, establishing joint ventures and granting university scholarships. Finally, Tito and his fellow Yugoslavs have utilized personal diplomacy in the form of state visits and exchanges that have made the Yugoslav model well known throughout Africa. All of these policies have assisted Yugoslavia in spreading its influence and even more important, gaining it respect and support on the international scene.

Yugoslavia's most visible policy in Africa has been its anti-colonial posture and its open support for decolonization and national liberation movements. In fact, according to Rubinstein, "Anti-colonialism has become the Yugoslav credit card to the Third World."¹² Yugoslavia normally supports indigenous populations in their struggles for self-government. If there are several indigenous movements, it will support the most non-Western group. If two non-Western factions oppose each other, Yugoslavia will most often support that group which has other nonaligned support. The Yugoslavs use the United Nations extensively in their support of these movements, but on occasion, they have been very bold and overt in their bilateral

assistance. The crises in Egypt in 1956, Algeria later in the 1950's, the Congo in the early 1960's and Angola during mid-1970's are illustrative of Yugoslavia's policies in Africa.

Egypt was Yugoslavia's first major ally in Africa. When Nasser came to power in 1952, Tito and the Yugoslavs were at first hesitant to recognize him due to their traditional view of military dictators. But a Yugoslav newspaper correspondent sent complimentary reports of Nasser's broadly based revolution to Belgrade. Yugoslavia responded with arms sales in 1954, and thus became the first non-Western nation to support Nasser militarily.¹³ By the time Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956, he and Tito had become allies and Yugoslavia supported the nationalization. A member of the U.N. Security Council at the time, Yugoslavia played a major role there and in the General Assembly in bringing about a solution using the Uniting for Peace Resolution. It was the only Communist nation to participate in the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Egypt. Yugoslav assistance to Egypt led to a strong relationship of mutual support that has lasted to the present time.

There are numerous reasons for the early friendship of Tito and Nasser. The Yugoslavs were in need of allies in the early 1950's. Egypt too, needed friends and Yugoslavia had demonstrated greater support than any other nation during the early stages of Egyptian independence. Furthermore, Yugoslavia's independent status was appealing to Nasser, for by 1955, Yugoslavia had been accepted by both Washington and Moscow as a totally independent state.¹⁴ These and other mutual interests

caused Tito and Nasser, who met for the first time in February 1955, to develop a relationship between their countries that proved to be a major factor in the early success of nonalignment. Yugoslavia learned from this, its first venture into African politics and its first support of a foreign anti-colonialist movement, that very lucrative and long-term opportunities might result from an effectively implemented African policy.

The Yugoslavs provided early support for Algeria as well. Contact was made between Algeria's National Liberation Front (FLN) and Yugoslavia's socialist Alliance as early as 1953. From the outset of Algeria's uprising in 1954, Yugoslavia openly supported the cause of FLN in the United Nations. At the same time it secretly provided valuable small arms to the Algerian rebels via Cairo and through coastal gunrunners. This military assistance continued throughout the struggle. Additionally, badly wounded Algerian soldiers were treated in Yugoslav hospitals, Algerian medics were trained by Yugoslav doctors and clothing and food were sent to Algerian refugees.¹⁵ In February 1962, Yugoslavia gave recognition to the Provisional Government. Once Ben Bella had succeeded in taking power, Yugoslavia was the first European country that he visited. Though Ben Bella was later deposed, Yugoslav-Algerian relations have continued to be good as a result of Yugoslavia's early support of the Algerian independence struggle.

The crisis in the Congo provided Tito with yet another opportunity to expand his influence in Africa. Yugoslavia

played an active role in the United Nations debates over the Congo, because Yugoslav leaders in Belgrade saw the Congo as the key to the independence of Africa.¹⁶ Though the Yugoslavs provided financial aid and personnel support for the U.N. peacekeeping effort, Tito was openly critical of Western policies and the ineffectiveness of the U.N. Early on, he accused the West of "...seeking to perpetuate their economic exploitation ..." ¹⁷ of the Congo, and later took the side of the Casablanca group in support of Patrice Lumumba. In December 1960, Yugoslavia withdrew its personnel and financial support of the U.N. forces in protest of the U.N.'s lack of support for Lumumba. Soon afterward, Belgrade recognized the Gizenga faction in Stanleyville. Once again Tito had supported an anti-colonialist group in opposition to the West.

In Angola, Yugoslavia again supported a national liberation movement. However, in this case there were three such movements and the Yugoslavs chose the one which they perceived to be the most Marxist and most non-Western, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Also, the other two groups were increasingly supported by the PRC and the United States, while MPLA was supported by the USSR. A number of Yugoslav ships assisted those of Russia in the delivery of military supplies to the MPLA in the Fall of 1975.¹⁸ When the MPLA was victorious, Yugoslavia was one of the first countries to recognize the Luanda based government. The relationship between the MPLA and its original supporters has continued and according to Thomas Henriksen, "Currently, the MPLA is relying on outsiders, mostly Cubans,

but also Russians, Algerians and Yugoslavs, to replace Portuguese administrators and technicians in education, health and, notably, agriculture.¹⁹ As recently as October 1977, Yugoslav military officials hosted the Angolan Minister of Defense and a group of Angolan war veterans. The Angolans thanked the Yugoslavs for their support of the MPLA and visited several Yugoslav military installations. It is probably that relations will continue to develop between Yugoslavia and Angola as long as the MPLA government remains in power in Luanda.

These four examples illustrate Yugoslavia's anti-colonialist policy in Africa. Tito has pursued this policy primarily in the pursuit of allies. He has certainly gained the friendship of those whom Yugoslavia has assisted. Additionally, his support of these movements has created an image for Yugoslavia that has helped improve its relations with other African nations. His policies have, at times, been calculated risks for his actions in support of Egypt and Algeria brought displeasure from the United States and France, respectively. But the gambles were worthwhile, for he has maintained relatively good relations with those two powers while gaining valuable allies in Africa.

Tito's Yugoslavia bears a close resemblance to many of Africa's developing nations. It too is relatively new and is comprised of several nationalities. It has won and zealously tries to maintain its own independence. Though it is still one of Europe's least developed countries, it has achieved a high degree of economic growth since the end of World War II. It has been able to balance the influence of the great powers while

intermittantly receiving aid from both. These factors obviously stand out to the leaders of newly independent African states struggling under the effects of poor economies, tribal dissonance and great power pressures. They can look to Yugoslavia and see a symbol of success, an indication that their goals are achievable.

One of the primary methods of influence building practiced by Yugoslavia has been that of personal and public diplomacy. Few heads of state travel as much or receive as many other visiting leaders as Josip Tito. From 1971-1977, President Tito visited 31 foreign nations. In that same period, 66 foreign dignitaries met with Tito in Yugoslavia. Tito himself has visited at least 17 African states, while his associates have visited several others. In 1961, he became the first Communist leader to visit African states located south of the Sahara. During a 1970 trip to southern Africa, he met with numerous heads of state and with representatives of liberation movements from Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia.²⁰ The results of these meetings are normally joint pledges of mutual support and dedication to nonalignment. They often lead to economic and cultural exchanges, and occasionally to military support and cooperation. Today, Yugoslavia maintains diplomatic relations with 38 African countries and has embassies in 21 of those. Belgrade is normally one of the first nations to grant recognition to a new state, for the Yugoslavs are well aware of the importance of such recognition in the eyes of the leaders and people of newly independent nations.²¹

AD-A072 150

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
THE POLITICS OF BALANCE IN TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA.(U)
MAR 79 P W DAHLQUIST
NPS-56-79-004


F/G 5/4

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

3 OF 3

AD
A072150



A second, and very important method of interaction between Yugoslavia and Africa, is that of foreign trade. Economic planners in Yugoslavia have long desired increased trade with Africa, primarily in order to reduce their dependence on trade with the West and the Communist bloc. Early on, it was expected that Yugoslav trade with the Third World would be very profitable. Planners believed that their manufactures, while not competitive of Western markets, would be of great demand in Africa. It was also felt that demand in these less developed countries would speed the industrialization process in Yugoslavia.²² Such was not the case, however. Yugoslavia was initially unable to supply the necessary credit for African nations to buy its exports. Furthermore, the developing countries had limited import capabilities and their own products were not competitive on the Yugoslav market.²³ Nevertheless, Yugoslavia has continued to press for increased trade with Africa and in the early 1970's these problems began to resolve themselves. In 1975, trade with Africa accounted for about five per cent of Yugoslavia's total trade, compared with about two per cent in 1971. Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Ghana and the Sudan have historically been the primary trading partners. Within the last two years, Zambia, Nigeria and Angola have also become important. In 1976, Yugoslavia conducted trade with at least 24 African states. Though this trade is not absolutely necessary to Yugoslavia's economy, it does help it minimize its dependence on Western and Eastern Europe, and it is an additional factor in maintaining continued political relations.

Yugoslavia provides a surprising amount of foreign aid in the form of credits and joint commercial ventures in Africa. By 1969, it had granted over \$230 million in credits tied to the purchase of its goods. Its privately owned companies are encouraged to establish joint ventures in Africa and they have an excellent record of good relations with the local governments. The following list reflects the wide scope of projects in which Yugoslav firms participate in on the African continent:

Zambia - maize development project

Guinea - bauxite mine, iron ore mine, furniture factory, hydroelectric plant, aluminum plant

Togo - hydroelectric plant

Sudan - two tanneries, cardboard factory, cement works

Uganda - slaughterhouse, conference hall, hotel, textile plant, airport terminal

Kenya - highway construction, generators for power plant

Ethiopia - hydroelectric plant, cement works, port facilities

Algeria - textile mills, leatherwear factory, food processing plant

Ghana - tractor plants, port construction, food processing plant

Egypt - tractor plant, fertilizer plant, crude oil exploitation facility

Tunisia - port construction, slaughterhouse, fishing harbors, earthen dam

Mali - slaughterhouse

Liberia - slaughterhouse

Gabon - conference hall

These joint ventures enable Yugoslav business firms to export

their manufactures and technology and receive inexpensive raw materials in return. Additionally, such enterprises help to build strong economic and political ties between Yugoslavia and the host countries.

Yugoslavia's technical cooperation has gained its people one of the best reputations in Africa. In fact, according to a 1973 Senate report, since the first team of Yugoslav experts "...was sent to Ethiopia in 1954, Yugoslav experts have effectively reinforced Africa's image of Yugoslavia as a constructive friend."²⁴ Yugoslav technical assistance has ranged from medical assistance to industrial and construction expertise and has, due to the nature in which it is given, been very successful. An excellent description of the Yugoslav method of administering their technical aid is offered by the Senate report:

Once assigned to an African country through the Federal Institute for International Technical Cooperation (Belgrade), Yugoslav experts come under the direct authority of the host government. They do not have any special diplomatic status, as have their UN, Soviet and some American counterparts. This approach was chosen to avoid any possible appearance of interference in the host countries' affairs.²⁵

Finally, Yugoslavia provides more than 1000 college fellowships per year to African students. These methods of providing aid reflect Belgrade's desire to be considered an ally and a partner amongst the developing nations of Africa.

Yugoslavia is too poor a nation itself to play a significant role in the economic development of Africa. Politically, however, Tito has already played a major role on the African continent and it can be expected that he will continue to do so in

the future. His policies have gained for Yugoslavia a great deal of respect in Africa. The relationships that have developed are a direct result of his desire to remain simultaneously independent of both East and West. That desire continues to exist today, and it is doubtful that Yugoslavia's African policy will change considerably in the foreseeable future. The success of the policy lies in the fact that the Yugoslavs have gone about spreading their influence and recruiting support in a constructive and friendly manner. It is to their credit that no African nation has perceived Yugoslav presences as a Communist threat, for regardless of Yugoslavia's small size, its presence might have been used as a tool for more covert intentions. That has never been the case, however, and today Yugoslav support, assistance, and diplomatic relations are welcome throughout the majority of Africa.

Tito's successors will benefit considerably from his achievements in nonalignment and his relations with African states. Not that those achievements are easy to measure. They are of a political nature and very difficult to assess. The primary benefit is that Yugoslavia now has many allies, and though they are small, they would oppose intervention in Yugoslavia just as Belgrade opposed intervention and colonialism in their own countries. This support, while not powerful in military terms, is probably a deterrent of sorts to any nation that desires to impose its will on Yugoslavia, for that nation would lose a great deal of influence and seriously damage its international image. This deterrent has been one of Tito's primary aims in

spreading nonalignment as widely as possible. It also explains the vigorous Yugoslav attempts in July 1978 to avoid a schism of the entire movement over African politics.

B. EUROCOMMUNISM: A TWO-EDGED SWORD?

The Eurocommunist phenomenon has generated considerable stir in recent years. Certain Western European Communist parties have begun to exert an apparently greater amount of influence within their own countries, within Europe, and within the worldwide Communist movement. As the importance of these parties has grown, the superpowers have had an increasingly difficult time determining their policies regarding them. Other countries, meanwhile, have watched and waited in order to see what it all means and to ensure that they are on the "correct" side when the dust clears. Yugoslavia, however, is one of the few countries, and its Party one of the few Communist parties, that have exhibited support for the Eurocommunists from the beginning. By doing so, the Yugoslavs have endeavored to capitalize on this new phase of Communist evolution.

The Yugoslavs have never liked being completely on their own in a hostile world. Thus whatever changes they made internally and however independent they have been from Soviet domination, they have also continued to attempt to improve their relationship with the remainder of the Communist world. Their formula for doing so has been simple and straightforward, and is a version of nonalignment designed for the socialist community. They have consistently called for open dialogue between

all Communist parties, they have demanded mutual respect and equal status at all forums, and they have boycotted any Communist conference or meeting at which these principles were not guaranteed. In short they have striven to remain a part of the Socialist community, but never to the detriment or sacrifice of their own independence as a Party or as a state. The one prerequisite of friendship has been mutual recognition of the equality of all states and parties, regardless of size or importance. Until recently they have had little success, for other parties, unlike the nonaligned states, have been reluctant to openly espouse and follow independent roads to socialism.

In recent years the LCY has at long last found the ideological allies it has so patiently waited for since 1948. In the Eurocommunist movement, however imprecise or ambiguous the term itself is, the Yugoslav Communists have discovered other parties which are willing to openly renounce their allegiance to Soviet-led Communism and proudly declare their own methods of achieving socialism. The rapid growth of relations between the LCY and the Communist Parties of Italy (PCI), Spain (PCE), and France (PCF) is indicative of Yugoslav support for the trends and independent policies those parties espouse. It also reflects the importance that these parties attribute to the LCY as a "ruling party" following its own road to socialism. While other parties are also considered "associate members" of the Eurocommunist movement, these three are the most important from the Yugoslav point of view.

The present affinity between the LCY and these three most important Eurocommunist parties did not evolve overnight. While the Yugoslavs have grown closer to the Communists in Italy, Spain, and France at an accelerated rate in recent years, the bases for these ties have, to varying degrees, existed for sometime. It is instructive to briefly trace the growth of the relationships between the Communists of Yugoslavia and those of the Eurocommunist parties.

It must be emphasized at the outset that in 1948, when Tito broke with Stalin, Yugoslavia was truly considered heretical throughout the Communist world. While the level of denunciation varied from party to party, no Communist Party failed to attack the Yugoslavs for their defection. This was as true of non-ruling parties as it was of those in power. Since that time, Yugoslavia's acceptance within the Communist movement has largely been dictated by Moscow. During periods of Moscow-Belgrade rapprochement, other parties have felt compelled or allowed to improve their relations with the Yugoslavs. But they have been in the habit of doing so hesitantly for they could never be sure if and when Moscow's own policy might once again shift. With the progressive dissolution of Russian control, this has become less and less true, but it is with this background that the attitudes of the PCI, PCE, and PCF must be viewed. For example, it might explain the fact that while the PCI and the PCE showed early signs of defying Moscow themselves, friendship with the LCY was in some ways more dangerous and had to be pursued more carefully.

Of the three parties, the Yugoslavs have developed the strongest links with the PCI. Even this relationship, however, had a typically weak beginning due to the events of the mid and the late 1940's. The Yugoslavs' success and revolutionary zeal caused them to be extremely critical of less successful and less aggressive parties at the end of World War II. Among those they criticized were the Italians.²⁶ Thus, when the Yugoslavs were expelled from the Cominform in 1948, the PCI would have been one of the last parties to consider supporting the heretics.

Conditions improved rather quickly, however, and by the mid-1950's the rehabilitation of the Yugoslavs coincided with the growth of polycentrist concepts within the PCI, and especially associated with Palmiro Togliatti. While the Italians were initially reluctant to forgive the Yugoslavs, by 1957 they were working hard to make recognition of Yugoslav-style independence more acceptable.²⁷ Togliatti and Tito appeared to agree on many things and a close relationship began to develop. The relationship was at times somewhat difficult to practice, however, because the Yugoslav stand almost necessitated a polemical style toward the Soviet Union, while the Italians preferred not to rock the boat too much. As Donald Blackmer states, "The PCI, unlike the Yugoslav party, was not prepared to go it alone."²⁸ The Yugoslav example was never, in itself, enough of a precedent to enable other Communist parties to consider similar complete defections of their own.

Though Yugoslavia remained a virtual "untouchable" in terms of full fledged alliances, the early ties between Tito and Togliatti served as the foundation for a continuation of good bilateral party relations. The PCI saw Yugoslavia as the best test of Soviet willingness or nonwillingness to recognize other roads to socialism. During the early sixties the two parties grew closer and the Yugoslavs openly praised the Italian Communists and their polycentrist tendencies. This was still a rather dubious honor under the circumstances but dialogue slowly increased and the Italian Communists expressed more and more support for a revision of Moscow's Yugoslav policies.²⁹ In 1964 Togliatti visited Belgrade for a second time, and together he and Tito expressed opposition to the ideological and political isolation of the Chinese Communists. Then in 1968 the PCI and the LCY both became part of a larger group which openly protested the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. The next high point in their growing bond was the 1976 Berlin Conference of European Communist Parties and the planning forums preceding it. Their common demand for unity through diversity and equality amongst parties strengthened the relationship further. Today, the mutual desire for independence and common security problems tie the two parties closer than ever and strengthens both in their efforts to remain free of Soviet domination.

The relationship between the LCY and the PCF has evolved much differently, is a much newer bond, and is also much weaker. The French were also victims of the zealous post-War Yugoslavs who attacked all who did not use any means whatsoever in order

to assume power. In 1948 the French, behind Maurice Thorez, were vicious in their revenge. They called Tito a traitor for building socialism with American dollars and compared his use of the term "socialist" to that of Mussolini.³⁰ The PCF distinguished itself by its furious attacks and its reluctance to change its mind vis-a-vis the decisions of 1948. In 1956, the French Communists, with much reservation and embarrassment, admitted to certain excesses in their treatment of the Yugoslavs in 1948. In 1958, however, with the airing of the Yugoslav Draft Program and the renewed attack on Belgrade from almost all quarters, Thorez and his fellow French Communists proudly claimed that they had always felt the original judgements were correct.³¹

The PCF's attitudes toward the LCY were thus clear, at least as long as Thorez was in charge. In 1963, when Moscow was again softening on Yugoslavia, the PCF followed suit, but once again with reservations. Typically, Thorez claimed to be trying to reestablish links with the people and the organizations of Yugoslavia, while continuing his fight against the revisionist leaders of the LCY.³² The events of August 1968, however, finally gave the Yugoslav and French Communists something in common, for both were opposed to the Soviet actions against the Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia. For the first time the PCF felt compelled, at least briefly, to openly oppose Moscow on a foreign policy issue. As a result of doing so, it found itself in a group which included the Yugoslavs.³³ Thereafter relations between the two parties grew slowly but steadily better. While

the French were somewhat late and reluctant in joining the "southern axis" which opposed the CPSU at East Berlin in 1976, their entry on the side of the Italian, Yugoslav, Spanish, and Romanian Communist parties sealed, at least temporarily, a new relationship with the LCY. Mutual desire for autonomy had proved strong enough to overcome the differences that had existed in the past.

The Yugoslav bond with the Spanish Communists is probably the fastest growing of the three. Yugoslav-Spanish cooperation dates back many years to the Spanish Civil War. There, many of Yugoslavia's World War II leaders cut their teeth as members of the International Brigade.³⁴ Yet in 1948 the PCE was as loyal to Moscow as most other Communist parties and thus criticized Tito and his fellow revisionists. Through the 1950's and early 1960's the PCE moved progressively toward national autonomy in its strategy for achieving socialism in Spain. It thus grew closer and closer to the parties of Italy, Yugoslavia, and Romania.³⁵ The Spanish were very quick to oppose the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and like the Yugoslavs, have remained critical of the Soviet action to the present time.

Throughout the preparations for the 1976 party forum, the PCE was aligned with the Yugoslavs, the Italians, and the Romanians. This group formed the core of the "southern axis" and was the instrumental group in turning the conference into a political and ideological defeat for the Soviet Union.³⁶ Since that time, relations between the LCY and the PCE have grown rapidly stronger. The Yugoslavs campaigned openly for the

release of Santiago Carrillo and for the legalization of the PCE in Spain. Party delegations are exchanged on a regular basis and Carrillo has himself visited Yugoslavia. The PCE is generally considered the most Eurocommunist of the Eurocommunists. The relationship between the Yugoslav Communists, the first "practicing" autonomists, and the PCE is therefore easily understood.

The basis of the Yugoslav policy toward all three of these parties, and the Eurocommunist movement as a whole, is the autonomist element of their strategy. Though he is certainly not a spokesman for the LCY, Milovan Djilas was undoubtedly accurate when he said that the one reason the Yugoslav Communists defend Eurocommunism is to constantly keep their distance from Moscow.³⁷ That reason alone is enough to explain the support that the Yugoslavs have thusfar exhibited for the Eurocommunists. There are, however, other aspects of Eurocommunism, and while there is little consensus in the West regarding just what is and is not part of Eurocommunist strategy, the Yugoslavs have defined it in rather specific terms. Their discussion of the question helps explain their present supportive policy and also points out some reservations they may have toward certain elements of the movement.

The official Yugoslav outlook centers on what are referred to as "positive trends and tendencies" emanating from the growth of certain Communist and workers' parties in Western Europe.³⁸ The Italian, Spanish, and French Parties are the most commonly mentioned. The Yugoslavs have praised them for

their response to national conditions, their independent roads to socialism, and their willingness to recognize other roads as well. This is only natural for those concepts are basic to Yugoslav Communists. Furthermore, the basic element of Eurocommunist strategy, outspoken independence from Moscow, has roots in the 1948 schism between Stalin and Tito. Much of the present movement reflects the high points of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and polemics over the past three decades, and in some aspects, even draws on the documents of those relations.³⁹ Thus an open dialogue between Communist parties, long called for by the heretics in Yugoslavia, is now becoming a reality and there appears to be a trend toward a democratization in the decision making amongst the Communist parties and states.⁴⁰

Despite the affinity that all of these parties have for each other, it appears that certain policies of the PCI, the PCE, and the PCF cause a degree of nervousness at the top levels of Yugoslavia's leadership. In fact, it seems that there are elements of Eurocommunism that challenge the very legitimacy of the LCY. Certain conclusions at the recent 11th Party Congress of the LCY indicate that there have already been major domestic reverberations that may be partially attributed to trends in Western European Communist parties.⁴¹

It is instructive at this point to determine the Yugoslav definition of Eurocommunism, for whether it is a movement or just a passing fad, it is apparently taken quite seriously in Belgrade. In official documents it is seldom referred to directly as Eurocommunism. In his official report to the 11th LCY Congress

in June, Tito spoke highly of the growing reputation and influence of some parties of Western Europe, the necessity for wider socialist development in various forms without universal models, and the advantages of pragmatic alliances with socialist and social democratic forces.⁴² He went on to speak of the negative tendencies represented by certain groups trying to "institutionalize" relations in the workers' and progressive movement. On another occasion, that of a visit by Poland's Edward Gierek, Eurocommunism was openly discussed and described as a "trend in the communist and workers' movement which suits the circumstances of the industrially developed countries of West Europe."⁴³ Tito's broad definitions tend to highlight the positive aspects of the trend and thus justify the general Yugoslav support.

More detailed definitions have been offered by the LCY's Aleksandar Grlickov, secretary in the Executive Committee of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, and the individual responsible for relations with other Communist parties. In May of 1977, he broke Eurocommunism down into several specific elements:

(1) On the strategy for assuming power he stressed the Eurocommunist emphasis on peaceful transformations to socialism through Communist party cooperation in parliamentary elections and through alliances with other progressive forces.

(2) He characterized these parties' foreign policies as dedicated to overcoming bloc politics slowly, and in the meantime "revitalizing", rather than abolishing, the Atlantic alliance.

(3) Individual countries and parties should be free of foreign influence in their transformations to socialism and should have complete control of their own wealth.

(4) Finally, regarding relations between workers' parties, he asserted that the Eurocommunist parties speak only for themselves and that relationships with Moscow should not be used as a yardstick in judging the acceptability of various roads to socialism.⁴⁴

Grlickov has since added to or expounded on various parts of this definition. Occasionally, he uses a shortened version referring to Eurocommunism as a non-uniform trend or strategy, which reflects the Eurocommunist parties' desires to peacefully achieve socialism using means applicable to the specific conditions within their countries.⁴⁵

It is much easier to find a Yugoslav definition than it is to find Yugoslav opinions on the various tenets or parts of Eurocommunism. Grlickov has pointed out that the LCY can support the trend on principle and is not obliged to state its views on each element of the strategy.⁴⁶ Indeed, to do so might appear to be passing judgment on someone else's road. In fact, however, the Yugoslavs have, on various separate occasions, commented on most of the elements mentioned by Grlickov. In looking at these comments, a pervasive underlying qualification to the Yugoslav acceptance of Eurocommunist strategy is discernible.

First and foremost, they make it clear that Eurocommunism is just one of several different roads and as such it is

generally and on principle not applicable to Yugoslavia. The LCY marked Gierek's June 1978 visit by once again extending full support to the Eurocommunists, "...but of course, not identifying with their strategy and all their views."⁴⁷ The Yugoslavs consistently point out that the strategies in question are designed to fit conditions that do not now exist in Yugoslavia and which did not exist there during the revolution. The Yugoslav revolution was played out according to internal necessities and today Yugoslavia continues to build socialism in a manner consistent with its own changing environment.⁴⁸

Based upon the historical Yugoslav approach to the world Communist process, the above statements would seem to be both consistent and sufficient. They have, however, often been expanded. For instance, while Grlickov recognizes the Eurocommunists' peaceful approach to socialism, he has recently pointed out that such an approach is not at all applicable to those countries in which armed struggle has already taken place, and furthermore, that there are countries today where violence may still be necessary.⁴⁹ He has also noted that even the Eurocommunists do not rule out the use of force in order to defend the wishes of the people.⁵⁰

While the question of human rights is not included in the Yugoslav definition of Eurocommunism, the Yugoslavs have felt compelled to respond to the question and the Eurocommunist approach to it. In an editorial comment in February 1977, Milika Sundic responded to Western European communist parties which had referred to oppression in Yugoslavia. He sternly

reminded them of the need for respect for separate roads and warned them against getting involved in polemics over human rights in other countries.⁵¹ Grlickov, a year later, felt it was necessary to emphasize the fact that democracy in social production, as exists to a degree in Yugoslavia, is a prerequisite for political democracy and human freedom.⁵²

The element of Eurocommunism that has received the most attention, however, is that of pluralism and the parliamentary process in which the PCE, PCI, and PCF have been willing to cooperate. The Yugoslavs have stepped up their legitimization process during recent years via a visible campaign to explain their form of socialist pluralism. This campaign may be partially designed to offset the effects of the Eurocommunists and their professed willingness even to be voted out of government. Self-management socialism has become increasingly discussed along with "self-management pluralism" which, according to Yugoslav writing, is a third and previously unknown alternative to multi- or single-party systems.⁵³ Yugoslav officials have devoted much time and space stressing the advantages of their system and they like to claim that while others talk of democracy at length, in Yugoslavia they are busy implementing it.⁵⁴ However much freedom of choice there is among Yugoslav workers, the fact remains that the LCY is not about to be voted out of power or even accept a challenge from another party. While it is granted that such a party may not presently exist, LCY leaders seem more determined than ever to spread the word about Yugoslav pluralism.

The point here is that certain elements of Eurocommunism, even as the Yugoslavs themselves define it, pose a threat to the legitimacy of the regime, just as is the case in the USSR and in some other Eastern European countries. Possibly this is even more true for Yugoslavia due to the openness of its society. Even its proud position as the most humane and open of the world's Communist states may be in jeopardy. The Western European Communist parties promise more political freedom than exists in Yugoslavia. Thus Belgrade's boast of relative freedom compared to its Eastern European neighbors may be negated somewhat by better examples in the West.

The parliamentary question is even more potentially damaging. There is already a comparatively high level of pluralism in domestic Yugoslav decision making. Furthermore, ethnic loyalties have challenged Belgrade's central authority in the past. Thus Yugoslavia may be ripe for rapid formation of contending parties based upon republican interests. Such tendencies in Croatia or elsewhere in Yugoslavia could conceivably be set off by electoral success or even the acceptance of electoral defeat by the Communists in Italy, for example. These possibilities may explain the increased campaign to sell Yugoslav pluralism and tie it to political democracy and human freedoms. The Yugoslavs are masters of legitimization and no doubt can deal effectively with such challenges, but it is necessary to recognize them nonetheless for these latent threats may be helpful in understanding any changes in Yugoslavia's policies.

None of the negative aspects of Eurocommunism are in themselves enough to change Yugoslavia's present attitude toward these parties. For the time being, the positive aspects outweigh the negative. Indeed, it may only be as power-sharing or ruling parties that these parties seriously threaten Yugoslavia's internal stability. As long as they do not hold a significant amount of power they will not shine too brightly as alternative examples to reformists in Yugoslavia. It is in the event that they do attain the requisite power to be considered ruling parties that the latent threatening aspects of their strategies become operative.

If these parties do attain such power a change in the Yugoslav regime's attitudes might evolve. If the LCY were to feel threatened by a ruling or power-sharing Eurocommunist party, the response would most probably be seen in a drop in the levels of Yugoslav support for that party or the trend in general. The LCY would not criticize, nor would it attempt to alienate the offending party. It simply would not support Eurocommunism as actively as it does at present. Clearly, the continued existence of such independent parties would still be beneficial to Yugoslavia in the fight against institutionalization of the world Communist process. But the Yugoslavs made their way for many years without the political and moral support of Eurocommunism. Even without Tito, it seems likely they would be willing to do so again. Thus their unbridled support of this trend may only be temporary. It will last, however, as long as they consider it beneficial.

In summary, it would seem that Yugoslavia approaches Eurocommunism in much the same way as the United States and the Soviet Union. That is, they approach it with mixed reactions. Belgrade is certainly pleased to have found allies in its efforts to steer a course separate from that of Moscow. On the other hand, neither Tito nor his successors can promise the degree of political freedom offered by the Communist parties of Italy, Spain, or France. The relationships the LCY presently maintains with the PCE, PCI, and PCF may thus be of a very temporary nature and may cool considerably if the LCY perceives any threat to its legitimacy. For the present, however, the LCY will continue to support the Eurocommunists no less than it would support any other party or group that respects the concept of different roads to socialism.

C. THE CHINA CARD

A third and a rapidly developing aspect of Yugoslavia's nonaligned balancing act is its relationship with the Peoples Republic of China. The Chinese Communists, due to their numbers and their power represent an expanding influence both within the Communist world and on the international scene. Yugoslavia's desire to establish closer relations with the PRC is therefore understandable. China is a counterweight to the Soviet desire to dominate the socialist world and furthermore offers an alternative to the blocs of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Traditionally Yugoslavia has not had very good relations with the Peoples Republic of China. In fact since 1948 there

have been long periods during which the two countries have had no official contacts at all. The LCY and the Communist Party of China (CPC), similarly, have often been the bitterest of enemies, openly and vehemently disclaiming the other's right to call itself a true follower of Marx and Communism. Despite this rather unfriendly history, however, 1977 and 1978 marked a turning point in their relations and indications were that they were moving closer together than ever before.

There are many factors which influence affairs between nations. In the case of the SFRY and the PRC there are a number of political and ideological factors which would indicate potential for excellent relations. Of the factors drawing Yugoslavia and the PRC together, by far the strongest is their mutual distrust of the Soviet Union. China has a long history of border disputes with Russia that the Communist regimes of the two countries have far but solved. Peking was nearly as concerned over the implications of the Brezhnev doctrine in 1968 as the nations of Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia's similar fears of Soviet intentions date back to 1948 and have seldom shown sign of being forgotten.

Both countries are likewise adamantly opposed to Soviet domination of world Communism. Like Yugoslavia, Communist China was early on a loyal supporter of Moscow's leadership, but since the late 1950's it also has claimed complete independence of thought and policy. China's challenge to the Soviets has obviously been more serious from a worldwide influence point of view since Peking could actually assume a

leadership position. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, has been more of a symbolic reminder of the death of monolithic Communism.

The PRC and the SFRY have, at least theoretically, very comparable outlooks regarding foreign affairs and the relationships of nations on the international scene. China's foreign policy has, since 1954, been guided by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. They are "...mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states - nonaggression, nonintervention in each other's affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence."⁵⁵ Obviously these principles coincide favorably with Yugoslavia's policy of non-alignment. In short, both nations demand the right to determine and follow their own policies, both internally and externally. Freedom from Soviet dominance is naturally a corollary of both doctrines.

Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of China also share similar views toward Eastern Europe. In the case of the Yugoslavs, they have always worked for the dissolution of Soviet control in the area in hopes that their own independence would become more secure. The Chinese have similar objectives. According to Vernon Aspaturian, the Chinese desire to loosen the bond between the USSR and Eastern Europe for four reasons. First, it would weaken the Soviet posture with respect to China by depriving it of human and natural resources. Second, it would make the USSR vulnerable to attack from the West. Third, Peking might be able to challenge Moscow's ideological supremacy by depriving it of its Eastern Europe constituency. And

finally, the PRC would hope to establish an ideological community between itself and Eastern Europe.⁵⁶ So while Yugoslavia and China do not have mutual long term designs for the future of Eastern Europe, they do most certainly agree on the principle of breaking down Soviet dominance of the area.

One particularly interesting aspect of commonality between these two nations is their recent historical development. Both the PRC and the SFRY evolved from self-won revolutions which were dependent on peasant or partisan forces. Neither Communist party received extensive assistance from the Russians.⁵⁷ In fact at one time or another in their struggles, both Tito and Mao were told by Stalin to go more slowly and be more patient.⁵⁸ Furthermore, both nations were established under the strong leadership of dynamic, charismatic individuals. Both Mao and Tito managed to construct auras of power around themselves. This power was then projected into the national characters of the two countries and enhanced both nations' self-images. As Alfred Low states, "Like Tito later, Mao, though a dedicated Communist, had never been Moscow's agent in the true sense of the word, but in the last resort was a self-made and independent man."⁵⁹ This characteristic has been reflected in the two countries' policies toward the Soviet Union.

Finally, both nations have individual reasons for desiring a close relationship with the other. Since its expulsion from the Cominform, Yugoslavia has sought better relations with Communist Parties that might challenge the Kremlin's pre-eminence. Secondly, in the practice of nonalignment, it has attempted to

develop broad international support. Contacts with East Asia can help strengthen Belgrade's international nonaligned image. Additionally, Yugoslavia's leaders are well aware of the Soviet concern over the possibility of two front wars. Belgrade's cultivation of ties with Peking would play on Moscow's fears.

China, on the other hand, can most assuredly recognize that Yugoslavia has been a weakness to the Soviet Union since 1948. It is Yugoslavia's success that makes Peking feel it is possible to further weaken Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.⁶⁰ Furthermore, if China cannot dominate world Communism, it at least prefers polycentrism, and support of Yugoslavia bolsters the polycentric movement. Finally, in Peking's debate with Moscow, much depends on power plays within the Communist bloc. When Sino-Soviet disputes arise, the Soviet Union cannot depend on Yugoslav support. It is understandable that Peking would try to retain Yugoslavia's support in these inter-bloc quarrels.

It would appear then that there are many forces pulling Yugoslavia and the PRC together. China's strong anti-Soviet policies, Yugoslavia's mistrust of the Kremlin, common foreign policies, and common socialist development all point to a potential for excellent relations. But, for a number of reasons, good relations between Peking and Belgrade have been the exception rather than the rule.

The greatest barrier to a Peking-Belgrade axis is the lack of geographical ties between the two nations. Neither country can expect much support from the other in the event of a struggle with the Soviet Union or any other enemy. As Chou En-lai is

often quoted as saying, "...distant water cannot quench fire."⁶¹ A by-product of distance is the total lack of cultural ties. The two countries have such diverse histories, languages and religions that there is no real opportunity for a close relationship of peoples.⁶² Clearly then there simply is no natural Chinese-Yugoslav connection.

The connection that does exist is tenuous indeed, for it is totally ideological and political. According to Robin Remington in "China's Emerging Role in Eastern Europe", "Peking's relationship to these countries (Eastern Europe) has been a function of ideological, organizational considerations flowing from their membership in what today has become a multiply defined 'socialist commonwealth'."⁶³ Such relationships are traditionally weak, especially when lacking in geographical or cultural foundations. Furthermore, Yugoslav-Chinese affairs have been based almost entirely on their changing relationships with the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia has cared about China only insofar as China affects Yugoslavia's freedom from the USSR.⁶⁴ China has historically cared about Yugoslavia only as a method of weakening the Soviet Union. Such relationships are not the stuff of which lasting alliances are made.

There are historical aspects which also preclude solid Peking-Belgrade relations. Yugoslavia was early on forced to turn to the West in order to withstand Stalin's pressures. Yugoslavia has since grown to be the most "westernized" of the Communist states and has much better relations with the capitalist world than most of the Communist bloc. China has, until

recently, found Yugoslavia's western connections extremely distasteful from an ideological point of view. Additionally, China developed close relations with Albania when that country defected from Moscow's satellite system in the early 1960's. Historical animosities between Yugoslavia and Albania make any union of these three countries very unlikely. Thus as long as Yugoslavia maintains good relations with the West and China does the same with Albania, the chances of a Chinese-Yugoslav axis are limited.

While their foreign policies seem to coincide, China and Yugoslavia have actually been opponents in international affairs, especially in the Third World. In the late 1950's and early 1960's many of the small and new nations of the world took part in movements designed to break down or circumvent the dominance of the super powers and their respective blocs. In their attempts to achieve a stronger voice in international affairs these nations established various organizations which themselves acted as blocs on the international scene. The People's Republic of China played a major role in the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization. Yugoslavia, meanwhile, led the movement of non-aligned nations. Both China and Yugoslavia were attempting to strengthen their own independence and bargaining position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Eventually Chinese and Soviet efforts to dominate AAPSO weakened that organization.⁶⁵ But Yugoslavia, despite its European location, had gained considerable support in the Third World and by 1964 the nonaligned movement had become the stronger of the two organizations.⁶⁶ Even worse,

from a Chinese standpoint, was that Peking's attacks on Yugoslavia during that period eroded China's own support in Africa and Asia. Yugoslavia will never be a major influence in the Third World but it has been a source of competition for Communist China in the race to gain friends in Africa and Asia.

Finally, the two countries have such different individual security requirements that it is difficult for them to reach agreement on several issues. To begin with, Yugoslavia is as opposed to Chinese domination of Eastern Europe as it is toward Soviet domination. Belgrade will thus watch carefully as China's Eastern Europe policy unfolds. They have occasionally found themselves at odds over countries like India who China sees as a security threat and Yugoslavia respects as a fellow founder of nonalignment.⁶⁷ Finally, China is a major political power with dreams of becoming a major military power. As such it has completely different views concerning disarmament and nuclear proliferation than little Yugoslavia, which actively supports arms limitations talks and force reductions.

Relations between Yugoslavia and Communist China are thus subject to a variety of both positive and negative forces. The dominant adhesive force is their mutual dislike of the Soviet Union. The dominant divisive forces are their opposing ideological orientations and their differing long-term aspirations for the world order. Depending upon which forces have been predominant during a given period, their relations have ranged from complete absence of diplomatic exchange to genuine accord and state visits.

Affairs between the PRC and the SFRY are best described in four phases. The first period began in the post-World War II years and ended in 1955. When Tito's unwillingness to "kow-tow" to Stalin's dictates in 1948 earned the Yugoslavs excommunication from the Cominform, the Chinese supported the Moscow originated resolution.⁶⁸ Then in 1949 the PRC was founded. The Yugoslavs were one of the first nations to extend recognition, most probably because they saw similarities between their revolution and that of the Chinese and therefore hoped to gain an ally. Belgrade's hopes were quickly dashed, however, when Peking did not grant reciprocal recognition. Instead the Communist Chinese remained loyal to Moscow and were therefore no friends of the Yugoslavs.

Yugoslavia vainly continued to try to recruit friends in the Communist world. For example, despite China's support of the Cominform resolution, Yugoslavia campaigned openly for the cause of the PRC in the United Nations. The official Yugoslav position was that "This Government (the PRC) enjoys the confidence of the Chinese people. The government of the Peoples Republic of China has the right to represent the Chinese people,..."⁶⁹ But Belgrade got little response until 1954, when Khrushchev's regime began to express a changed attitude toward Tito, and China followed suit. By 1956, the 1948 resolution was being called a mistake in both Moscow and Peking.⁷⁰ All aspects of Sino-Yugoslav relations soon began to improve.

Warm relations did not last long, however. In late 1956, Peking and Belgrade began to openly disagree on certain issues

being debated within the Communist world. China supported the Soviet invasion of Hungary in October 1956, while Yugoslavia objected to the Stalinist tactics employed. Furthermore, according to Hinton, Mao was particularly impressed with Soviet feats in missilery and space technology during the period. Therefore the Chinese were quick to raise the banner of Soviet supremacy.⁷¹ When Yugoslavia refused to recognize such supremacy and denounced Moscow's programs, the Communist Chinese became even more virulent in their attacks on the Yugoslavs than were the Russians. Mao launched a violent propaganda campaign against Tito and his "revisionist" domestic policies.⁷² On May 5, 1958, an article in Jen Min Jih Pao stated that Peking now felt that:

...the criticism contained in the Resolution of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties of June 1948 was basically correct...It is quite obvious that an open and uncompromising struggle must be launched against a series of anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist and wholly revisionist views...of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.⁷³

Yugoslavia responded in kind. On June 15, 1958, both countries recalled their ambassadors. Thus ended the second phase of Sino-Yugoslav relations.

The next period of relations was based greatly on the growing Sino-Soviet conflict. Chinese denunciation of Yugoslavia's revisionism continued as Peking and Moscow moved further apart. Albania defected from the Soviets to the Chinese and Khrushchev sought better ties with Tito in order to unify Eastern Europe. By 1962 the PRC and the USSR had taken to attacking each other by proxy. China constantly denounced Yugoslavia, while really meaning the Soviets, and the Soviets likewise aimed their attacks

at Albania. In fact during the early 1960's Moscow and Peking spent considerable time debating over Yugoslavia's right to membership in the socialist community of nations.⁷⁴

This period, which lasted until the latter part of 1968, was also characterized by rather consistent disagreement between Yugoslavia and China over political issues. China felt that the Soviets buckled under American pressure when the missiles were removed from Cuba, while Yugoslavia supported the move in the interests of world peace. When Albania shifted its allegiance to China, largely due to the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement, Yugoslavia could hardly be expected to move any direction except further from Peking.⁷⁵ Additionally, Chinese and Yugoslav policies and intentions in the Third World clashed during this period. In 1964, when most Afro-Asian states chose a second nonaligned conference over a second Ban-dung meeting, the Chinese could place partial blame on the Yugoslavs. Finally, China's militant dogmatism during this period placed her squarely opposite Yugoslavia in such issues as peaceful coexistence and nuclear test ban treaties.

Until late 1968, the one most unifying element of Sino-Yugoslav relations was missing. Except for a brief period between 1955 and 1958, whatever the two countries shared in common simply was not strong enough to overcome their respective good relations with Moscow. One of the effects of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, however, was the initiation of a new era of relations between the SFRY and the PRC. Finally they shared a mutual policy important enough to overcome most

other factors that in the past had precluded closer relations. The events of 1968 made them more suspicious than ever of their mutual antagonist, the Soviet Union.

During the last decade relations have improved rapidly and have been characterized by increasing exchange at a number of levels. In the spring of 1970 ambassadors were once again sent to Belgrade and Peking. At a reception in Peking on November 29, 1970, the two nations toasted the similarities between nonalignment and the five principles.⁷⁶ In 1971 Yugoslavia was a major supporter of China's successful bid to assume representation in the United Nations. Trade between the two countries has more than quadrupled and though its total volume is still small it is an indication of better relations. Between 1971 and 1977 the SPRY and PRC traded visits by their ministers for foreign affairs, secretaries for trade, and parliamentary delegations.⁷⁷

The best evidence of the enormous improvement in Sino-Yugoslav relations was the visit by Tito to Peking in September 1977. It was the first visit by Tito to Communist China and clearly marked a major turning point in almost 30 years of poor relations between the two countries. Tito was extremely well received. Large crowds greeted him and he was given the honor of being the first foreigner to visit the tomb of Mao-Tse-tung. Furthermore Tito's visit marked the establishment of relations between the two Communist Parties, a link as important as that of the states themselves.⁷⁸

In August of 1978, Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the CPC and Premier of the Peoples Republic, visited Yugoslavia, in addition to Romania. His visit thus sealed the new bond between the two countries. The reception given him matched that provided for Tito of a year earlier. He spent an entire week in Yugoslavia during which he visited several republics, including Macedonia (considered a direct affront to Bulgaria and the Soviet Union),⁷⁹ had extensive talks with Tito and was billed as the "first most eminent personality of China to visit Yugoslavia."⁸⁰

It is the flexibility of Yugoslav ideology and new leadership in the PRC that enables the two countries to almost euphorically greet their new relations. While they do not entirely ignore their previous differences, they no longer consider them important. Tito, in his welcoming toast stated that relations between the two were now based on the traditional common principles of their policies in addition to "...respect for contributions by all other countries, both to the building of one's own path of development and to equitable cooperation in the world."⁸¹ Such courtesies have not characterized these two countries' relations at any time in the past. Both leaders emphasized their people's admiration for the others' achievements in building socialism with special regard to the conditions prevailing in their respective countries.

The two leaders took different approaches when referring to other countries, however. Tito, for example, attempted to discount the implications of Hua's "Balkan holiday". In an

obvious reference to the Soviet Union, he stated that the PRC and Yugoslavia were "...promoting relations between (their) two countries...and not at the expense of good relations and cooperation with other countries."⁸² Hua, on the other hand, in an equally obvious reference, distinguished between the positive relationship of the SFRY and the PRC, and some others who see "...the nonaligned movement as a serious obstacle to implementation of their aggressive and expansionist policy. They are trying...to reorient it and subjugate it to their hegemonistic goals."⁸³ The Soviets criticized Hua for his "demagogic and hypocritical" remarks and noted their disappointment with the Yugoslavs for failing to dissociate themselves from the Chairman's anti-Soviet attitude.⁸⁴

Aside from the polemics, Hua's visit to Yugoslavia was substantially important to Yugoslavia for a number of reasons. First, Tito, despite remarks to the contrary, was certainly well aware in advance of the offensive nature of the visit as far as Moscow was concerned. In no way could Hua have gone to the Balkans without offending the Soviets. Due to differences over Eurocommunism, Africa, Cuba, and nonalignment in general, Moscow-Belgrade relations had not been good for some time. Hua's visit thus gave the Yugoslavs a chance to reassert their independence while gaining the added prestige of having the leader of nearly a billion people visit their own small country.

On the other hand, Tito does not unnecessarily aggravate Soviet leaders. Thus his comments can be seen as being partially in earnest. Looking at the visit in this manner, it can be seen

as merely another step in Tito's attempts to broaden the scope of nonalignment. The more support his country has in all corners of the world, the more maintainable nonalignment will be once he is gone. The Peoples Republic of China is a very important "corner". It is likely that Tito saw and planned for both of these aspects of Hua's visit.

Finally, one outcome of Hua Kuo-feng's visit to Yugoslavia was the news that the Communist Chinese were considering adopting some aspects of Yugoslavia's self-management for their own economy. This was startling and fascinating news. It was known that economic delegations had exchanged visits, but recently the favorable report of one of those delegations was considered at the highest level of the CPC. Furthermore, books by Tito and Kardelj explaining the system are reportedly undergoing a hurried printing in China.⁸⁵

The implications of Communist Chinese interest in self-management are stunning. According to one author, "A seal of approval from the world's largest communist party would elevate it (self-management) to a quite new level of relevance."⁸⁶ That is probably an understatement. The fact is that while some Eastern European regimes have borrowed aspects of the Yugoslav system, the overall concept has never before been taken very seriously by Communists outside of Yugoslavia. Now to have their system be considered applicable in the world's most populous Communist state would do wonders for Yugoslav Communists. Their internal image and legitimacy would increase

immeasurably. There is simply no greater compliment that the CPC could pay to their Yugoslav counterparts.

The Yugoslavs have benefited greatly from the general improvement in their relations with the PRC. Their independence is at least somewhat more secure, though the "distant water" concept still applies. In addition their image amongst the Communist states of the world has been significantly enhanced. As long as relations with the USSR remain cool and as long as an open-minded regime holds power in Peking, the Yugoslavs are likely to continue improving their relations with Moscow's arch enemy in the East.

VI. AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

The Yugoslavia that exists today is very much Tito's Yugoslavia. All aspects of its internal and external orientation are in some way attributed to his leadership. The Socialist orientation, the independent Communism, and the system of Self-Management are his constructs. Rapid economic growth and affluence are intricately associated with his tenure. Nonalignment and independence from both superpowers are solely credited to his own defiant independence. And finally, while multinationalism existed prior to his leadership, the apparent internal national stability did not. Understandably, it is very difficult to visualize Yugoslavia without Josip Broz Tito.

The end of Tito's tenure concerns many people, both inside and outside of Yugoslavia. The Balkan region as a whole, and Yugoslavia in particular, are historically unstable. Yet since the end of World War II, Tito has mastered the "politics of the middle" and created at least the appearance of stability. He has not always accomplished this with forethought and analytical planning. On the contrary, his leadership has sometimes been characterized by lurches and overreactions to crises. In between crises it has appeared that his principal policy has been to let well enough alone. Such an approach can work successfully when an aura of power exists around the leader of the country, but it may not be practicable when the leader and his charisma are gone.

What planning has occurred has been designed to perpetuate Tito's Yugoslavia in his absence. Theoretically the system that exists today can continue without him. The only aspects missing will be his personal charisma and his domestic and international prestige. But the system is totally untested under those circumstances and obviously cannot be tested until Tito is gone. To be untested, however, does not necessarily imply that Yugoslavia's system is incapable of meeting the many challenges that loom ahead. Tito may very well be correct in his assertion that his departure will not cause any changes.

Actually, on the surface, stability looks as though it should be relatively easy to maintain. After all, successors are designated, the system has been constructed and has been operating for a number of years, and the policies, both domestic and foreign, are already established. If Tito's successors maintain a course down the middle of the road, rule by consensus, and avoid substantive changes, they should have little difficulty. The problem is that environments and forces do not remain the same and systems must adapt to changing situations, values, and relationships. Thus, the successors can only allow the system to run itself, and the present policies can only be strictly adhered to until new challenges appear. At that point people, groups, and leaders often become divided. And it is at that point in time that the true test of Tito's legacy and the Yugoslav system will occur.

The success with which Yugoslavia meets the challenges of the future will be greatly determined by the interplay of three

categories of important actors. The first category is comprised of the actors that will definitely play the most decisive roles in the country's future. Internally, the LCY, the YPA, and the power-sharing personalities will be dominant. Naturally there are other groups in Yugoslavia that will have a say in the post-Tito decision-making, but it will be some combination of the Party, the Army, and the elite that will rule the country. Externally the obvious and principal actors are the Soviet Union and the United States. Their actions in dealing with Yugoslavia can effect its internal stability as well as its foreign policy orientations. A second category of actors includes those that have a limited potential to effect Yugoslavia's future. For example, geographical neighbors and ethnic emigre groups both may prove unimportant, but they have the potential to take certain actions that could lead to or create instability. A third and final group of actors are those that may be passively used for political support. In this category are China, the Eurocommunists, and the Nonaligned nations. None of these, with the remotely possible exception of the PRC, can really be expected to do much to help Yugoslavia in the event of an attack or even massive political pressure, but their political voice is, to some degree, a possible deterrent to Yugoslavia's enemies.

The actors and the relative importance of their roles will depend significantly on the period immediately following Tito's departure or death. For instance, if internally, the LCY, the YPA, etc. can quickly and smoothly consolidate power, then the

effects of the actions of external actors will be minimized. The interplay is still very important, however, for the external actions of even minor states, such as Bulgaria pressing its claims on Macedonia, can greatly effect the ability of the internal principals to consolidate power. Quite clearly, the longer that Yugoslavia goes without a powerful and decisive central authority, the more susceptible it is to challenges from within and without the state.

A number of the likely challenges have already been mentioned. Multinationalism and its divisive aspects was discussed at length in Chapter II, but it is important to try to assess just how serious or explosive it may be. It touches so many aspects of Yugoslav society and it is still the major problem of the country. Looking again at the three major groups, it appears that there is no threat of Serbian hegemony. Most Serb nationalists in the party were purged during the early 1970's, and what Serb feeling is expressed will probably take the form of support for the federation as a whole. It is very difficult to assess the depth of Croatian independence desires. It is probably true, however, that the feelings of Croat emigre groups in the West do not accurately represent the feelings of Croats in Croatia, who are probably more committed to the federation. Finally, Albanian demands are likely to grow and may require the greatest amount of attention in the future. Their desires for improved living conditions and greater autonomy threaten the other nationalities and the state itself.

In more general terms there are some very destabilizing aspects of multinationalism. First it is probably true that each of the republics would like more independence. Tito's death may be the catalyst that sets off their demands and the resulting clash of ethnic representatives in the central government might freeze decision-making. Secondly, the economic inequalities simply cannot be solved to the satisfaction of all. That factor is related to a third element, the mutually threatening nature of the various nationalities. In too many cases the gains of one ethnic group can only be achieved at the loss of another. Finally, while emigre groups may not necessarily be representative, they can definitely effect the domestic stability of the country by stirring up ethnic animosities through their actions on the international scene.

Fortunately there are a number of factors which tend to stabilize Yugoslavia's multinational character. The first factor to be considered is that the country's political independence from Russia is often equated with its unity. Thus, according to Robin Remington, the majority of Yugoslavs whatever their nationality, realize that "...they stay together or they hang separately."¹ Secondly, it is very questionable whether any of the republics is truly economically viable as an independent state. And over the past 60 years they have become increasingly interdependent. Thirdly, there is just no peaceful way in which the republics could divide themselves into separate and independent political units. The different nationalities are too greatly mixed and any boundary system proposed would

create extensive minorities within each unit. A good example is offered by the independent state that Croatian emigres demand. It would include Slovenia, Croatia, much of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and part of Serbia itself. Yugoslavs, regardless of their nationalities, are aware of the obstacles in the way of ethnic independence and, while that does not guarantee peace amongst them, it is at least a step in that direction. Finally, there does exist a Yugoslav nationalism born out of the last three decades of defiance, independence, and prestige in international politics. Dusko Doder offers evidence to the fact that Serbs, Croats and the rest are all openly Yugoslav when they play the Soviet Union in soccer or basketball.² It is their opportunity to openly express their independence from the Soviet Union.

It is impossible to measure just how far below the surface of Yugoslavia's society ethnic animosities may lie. Much evidence seems to, at least logically, support unity. Yet as recently as 1971 there was a major independence movement in Croatia. The national problems are clearly the most unpredictable aspect of Yugoslavia's future. Unfortunately, if they explode they can also lead to the greatest amount of instability there and possibly elsewhere in the Balkans and in Europe.

A second major challenge is the fact that the system itself is untested. It is not known how it will actually work. It may be that it will be pulled in so many directions that it eventually will simply come apart. Worse yet, external actors may not have the patience to wait for Yugoslavia to stabilize. It will be a

political unknown for a while and other states may feel very uncomfortable with a political unknown in their midst. They might take actions that are designed to push Yugoslavia in a particular direction. Such added challenges will not be needed and can only make eventual stability more difficult to maintain.

A third challenge for Tito's successors will be that of handling the openness of the Yugoslav borders and society. While political repression still exists and there is occasional "tightening up" politically, the fact remains that Yugoslavia has been becoming progressively more liberal and free over the last 30 years. This policy has worked relatively well with an authoritative and, for the most part, unchallenged ruler like Tito, but it will be more difficult for those who follow him to reconcile the pull between East and West and the probable demand for continued liberalization of society.

The economy and its increasing list of vulnerable aspects is a fourth challenge. With over fifteen per cent of its trade being conducted with the USSR it is likely that Yugoslavia is already feeling overly dependent on Moscow. It is certainly very dependent on Western Europe and has an increasing trade deficit with the capitalist countries. And recently the Yugoslavs have felt the pinch of rising prices for both Soviet oil and for Middle East oil. In the future, it will be increasingly more difficult to satisfy the consumer demands that are beginning to characterize Yugoslavia.

Soviet intentions will obviously be a major challenge to Yugoslavia's leadership. From Belgrade's point of view it will

probably be desirable to maintain as much distance as possible from Moscow. Yet this must be done carefully and unprovocatively for it is important that the USSR remain unthreatened by Yugoslavia's political posture. Suffice to say that the Yugoslavs will keep themselves well aware of Soviet actions and policies.

Finally, a related challenge will be that of continuing Tito's foreign policy. Nonalignment has now become an important aspect of domestic politics in the country and is probably a significant source of unity. But like Yugoslavia, nonalignment as a movement has never existed without Tito. Even with him still on the scene it is facing difficulties. His absence may also tend to weaken such policies as the China and the Eurocommunist "cards". Only time will show if Yugoslavia as a state has assumed some of Tito's prestige. If it has, his successors will be more able to carry on the present foreign policy.

Whatever the nature of the challenges, Tito's successors will find their own actions and decisions more effective if they early on recognize a few realities of their position. First, and foremost, they must be aware of the fact that their country is a potential confrontation area. According to Horhager, Yugoslavia's political uncertainty and its high geo-strategic value make it very prone to conflict.³ Furthermore the leaders may be working under terms of crisis management. In response to such conditions they may unite and thus improve their ability to make quick decisions. It is doubtful that that will occur, however, since power-sharing principles will

most probably rule the day and decision-making under such conditions is usually slow. Either way, their primary goal will be to maintain order and their ability to act quickly enough at key moments in time will determine their success.

There will be very definite limits on their freedom of action. For example, there is little that they can change regarding self-management or the federal organization of the state. According to A. Ross Johnson, the LCY will be limited in its liberalization or "Social Democratization" of the party and state without weakening its own function and letting nationalist tendencies run wild. On the other hand, it will be equally limited in its ability to increase its "command function" over society without similarly bringing about nationalist rebellion or civil war.⁴ Johnson's limits can be seen to apply, not only to the LCY, but to whatever combination of institutions and individuals succeeds Tito. These limitations imply that the people of Yugoslavia are quite satisfied with conditions just as they are and that they are dedicated to perpetuating Titoism without Tito. As a result, the successors will be likely limited to a middle-of-the-road approach to domestic decision-making. While "republican" pressures may work to overcome this conservationist urge, the basic tenor of domestic policy will have to be the maintenance of the status quo.

A similar limitation can be seen to work on external policy changes. Not only do the people enjoy Yugoslavia's international image, it can be assumed that after three decades of independence, there is a very definite limit on how much external influence

they will accept or allow. For instance, balanced nonalignment is much more desirable than close association with either of the superpowers. There is some room for movement within a nonaligned context in that some may prefer a more European orientation while others may prefer a greater pro-Arab-Third-World approach. But nonalignment must stay, in one form or another, even if a nonaligned split occurs. Keeping good relations with the Euro-communists will probably also be required since it tends to make the Yugoslavs feel less isolated. The developing relationship with China is possibly the most difficult to handle. Here the limits are more external since this policy has great danger of provoking the USSR and therefore must be pursued very carefully.

There are other provocative policies that will require careful handling. For example, though little is known about what type of arrangements exist between Yugoslavia and Romania, it is assumed that there are agreements that in some way would involve each other if one were to be attacked by the USSR or its allies. It is understandable why the two countries would have common security problems and Yugoslavia can effectively consider its Romanian border neutralized. It is better for Belgrade, however, to avoid entangling "alliance" that test its system unnecessarily. Being involved in a Soviet-Romanian dispute, such as that of December 1978 when it is believed that a coup of Romania was considered in Moscow, could be considered an unnecessary test.⁵ It is in the practice of this sort of policy that the leaders may feel the greatest limitations.

It would appear that Tito's successors will rule Yugoslavia much as he has done. They too will attempt to achieve balance by mastering the politics of the middle. And since they will be quite restricted in their freedom of action, they too may find themselves reacting to crises in lurches. It will be hard for them to avoid leading Yugoslavia in this way, but if they can avoid it they must do so. Lacking Tito's aura and prestige, they must try to rely on planning and anticipation in order to limit and manage crises.

The Soviet Union and the United States will be very influential in determining whether post-Tito Yugoslavia can evolve peacefully. This will be true whether their influence is exerted through action or inaction. Important here is that Yugoslavia is not and will not be a vital ally of either superpower. It may be, however, that its nonalignment, that is its non-alliance with the superpowers, is vital to both. According to Johnson:

A viable, integral, independent Yugoslavia, not attached to either the Warsaw Pact or NATO, is vital for the maintenance of geopolitical stability and progress in gradually overcoming the artificial divisions between the two halves of Europe.⁶

A shift toward an alliance with either bloc can thus be seen as very destabilizing. It is with that thought in mind that one must try to assess the intentions and probable actions of Moscow and Washington.

It is generally assumed that the Soviet leadership still desires some degree of control over Yugoslavia. It can be argued that they do not desire full integration of Yugoslavia into the

bloc for it might prove too destabilizing and unpredictable. It would probably best serve Soviet interests to have a significant control over Yugoslavia's foreign policy and alignment while leaving the handling of Belgrade's complicated domestic problems to the Yugoslavs. Such an arrangement might even be acceptable to some Yugoslavs since they would keep their freedom and their unique socio-economic structure while gaining the security guarantees of the Soviet Union. But this would only be true in the long term and the Yugoslavs are not at all likely to voluntarily enter into such an agreement.

How might Moscow achieve a more beneficial relationship if on the one hand it is reluctant to employ military force, while on the other, the Yugoslavs are not likely to peacefully accede to any change? One option would be to patiently wait, hoping that over time, Belgrade is more likely to slide further East than West. A second option would be to utilize political and economic pressures combined with clandestine intrigues in hopes of creating greater independence on the USSR and greater instability and weakness in Yugoslavia's government and society. Russia has made quite extensive use of this second option even while Tito has been in power so it is doubtful that they will hesitate to use it in his absence.

Soviet intrigues may be one of the most serious threats to Yugoslavia in the coming years. It is generally believed that the Soviets have close links with emigre groups such as the Ustache, and with dissident groups, also known as Cominformists, within the country.⁷ While these groups may be small, it is

feared that Soviet infiltration of them could lead to their actual use by Soviet agents. Furthermore such groups might, under certain circumstances, give the Soviets the justification for large scale involvement in the name of national liberation. A very disturbing threat to the Yugoslavs was posed by the discovery in the mid-1970's of a clandestine Communist Party of Yugoslavia. In April 1974 this group adopted a document, allegedly approved by Moscow and now known as the Bar Manifesto, which criticizes the present regime on ideological terms and calls for its replacement with a more classical communist government.⁸ Within two years the Yugoslav security service had captured and jailed most of the attendees of the meeting and another "Cominformist" (as such dissidents are called in Yugoslavia) threat was thus ended. But the danger lies not in this small group of men, but rather in the group's connection with some leaders in Moscow, for the Kremlin could conceivably intervene in Yugoslavia in behalf of these "healthy forces". It should be recalled that just such healthy forces in Czechoslovakia called on the Soviets in 1968. Political pressure could also be applied by more overt means such as denial of credits and trade restrictions or Warsaw Pact maneuvers near Yugoslavia's Bulgarian and Hungarian borders. It is the concern in the West that the Kremlin may employ some combination of these tactics in an attempt to either sway Belgrade to a closer relationship with Moscow, or to induce certain republics to secede.⁹

Soviet leaders also have certain limitations on their actions. They obviously cannot ignore the international situation where they could suffer political loss due to untimely aggressive acts toward Yugoslavia. Though detente seems to have crumbled in recent years, the Kremlin is still anxious to push SALT treaties through, and gain technology from the U.S. Furthermore it is already under fire for its policies in Africa so aggressive actions in Europe are not likely to be accepted lightly. Soviet leadership also faces its own impending succession crisis and may thus desire to avoid confrontation in the near future. And finally, it must be remembered that the Kremlin does have an increasingly independent and vocal constituency in Eastern European states who would probably not approve of bullying tactics toward nonaligned Yugoslavia. All of these factors will have some effect on the Kremlin's actions following Tito's death.

As in the late 1950's and 1960's, Soviet-Yugoslav relations have not been very cordial during the late 1970's. The two countries have been at odds over Eurocommunism, the Yugoslav relations with the Peoples Republic of China, the image of the nonaligned movement, Soviet-Cuban policies in Ethiopia, the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and Yugoslav-Bulgarian disputes over Macedonia. In a way their relations seem surprising in that it could have been expected that with their respective succession periods approaching, both Tito and Brezhnev would have endeavored to keep events on an even keel. In terms of regional stability, it would be more desirable for the

relationship to be improved before internal events in either country begin to take precedence.

In contrast, Yugoslavia's relations with the United States have improved considerably in recent years. President Carter in 1978 seemed determined to minimize the effects of his pre-election statements. On the occasion of Tito's departure from the U.S., Carter declared the United States to be supportive of Yugoslavia's "unity" as well as its territorial integrity and its independence.¹⁰ This may have been a veiled warning to Moscow to avoid involvement in the country's internal national problems. Improved relations have been reflected in increased arms sales and dialogue between Washington and Belgrade. Overall, the mood regarding American-Yugoslav relations during the summer of 1978 was optimistic and pointed to a strengthening relationship.

If the United States desires to maintain and improve its relations with Yugoslavia, however, the lessons of the early and mid-1960's must be kept in mind. Expectations must be determined realistically and in a manner that recognizes the internal and external limitations on Yugoslavia's leaders. In simple terms, Yugoslavia does not desire to provoke the Soviet Union, and its relations with the U.S. must therefore be developed carefully. American policy might be formulated in a manner designed to check any slow shift toward a Yugoslav-Soviet alignment. Favorable economic policies and limited arms sales when combined with continued political support may serve that purpose.

It should also be emphasized that much of what Moscow does will depend upon its perception of the Western commitment to Yugoslavia's nonalignment. It may be that a public consensus of NATO and American policy will be necessary to secure Yugoslavia's independence and stability. A lack of consensus will increase Belgrade's vulnerability to Russian pressure and intrigue.¹¹ The West should not, however, attempt to politically pull Yugoslavia in its own direction for such policies could be as dangerous to peace as those normally attributed to Moscow. The point is that external pressure, by either side, could exacerbate the already existing problems. Both Moscow and Washington must be made aware of each other's intentions in regard to Yugoslavia's future.

Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and the United States can, if they choose to do so, act in concert to maintain regional stability. Noncontentious policies followed by all three countries could ease the probable tension of the post-Tito period considerably. Despite conflicting interests in Yugoslavia, Moscow and Washington do have other interests in common, most especially the avoidance of confrontation in Europe. If they seriously desire to avoid any chance of confrontation over Yugoslavia, a mutual hands-off policy would best serve that purpose. As John C. Campbell puts it:

If security in Europe is of importance to the two powers in their present global relationships, then it should be worth the effort for a specific understanding on Yugoslavia by which each would make clear its intention not to intervene in that country. A tacit or unannounced agreement might be as effective as a formal one.¹²

Such an agreement would certainly be in the spirit of detente to say the least of the interests of Yugoslavia and possibly Europe as a whole.

It is very tempting, in investigating Yugoslavia, to try to develop an "equation" that will predict whether stability can be maintained in the post-Tito era. It is not possible to do so because there is only one constant value in the equation; that of Tito. As long as his presence affects the other values, those values have a limited effect on the solution. However, when Tito is removed from the equation, all of the variables gain added significance. But a prediction is still not possible because there are too many significant and indeterminable variables. This explains why there are few actual predictions and very little consensus regarding Yugoslavia's future. The best one can do is to present the forces and actors that will have significant influence on the situation. Even scenario building is very difficult due to the requirement for too many assumptions about aspects that can control the evolution of Yugoslavia's future. In short, "bottom line" predictions about Yugoslavia's future are likely to be inaccurate unless couched in general terms.

In general terms, opinion does range from unreserved pessimism to veiled optimism. For example, Andrew Borowiec feels that:

Yugoslavia's vital strategic position between the Danube and the Adriatic, between the Balkans and the Alps, its multinational tangle, its inherent economic problems and its overambitious foreign policy, clearly and simply spell danger.¹³

He also feels that the Yugoslav system has a basic flaw which stems from the government's inability to determine how much freedom is safe, and which results in "chronic tension".¹⁴ While the country does labor under the effects of the above factors, this author would argue that the tension is a natural result of maintaining a precarious domestic and foreign balance. There is, however, very definite potential for danger. At the other end of this rather narrow spectrum, one finds Johnson's conclusion that "Yugoslavia will at worst muddle through."¹⁵ But even this rather optimistic prognosis is quickly qualified by the possibilities of internal disorder blooming into regional conflict. It is the nature of the Yugoslav system and the longevity of the pre-post-Tito era that has led to the inability to assess the country's chances.

In the final analysis, it appears that so much can go wrong for Tito's successors, that something probably will go wrong. When this occurs, the Yugoslav system can react sufficiently and handle the crisis and thus muddle through. But this ability becomes very uncertain if the Yugoslavs are not left alone. External actors must exercise restraint and neglect opportunities to take advantage of Yugoslav weakness. Interestingly, the cultivation of external restraint is at least one purpose of Tito's foreign policy for it enhances the ability of the Yugoslavs to handle their own internal problems. If this policy fails, however, it is very possible that other aspects of Tito's system of balances will also fail, and that the situation or

crisis will escalate and involve other nations in Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union. That is a development which all interested parties should endeavor to avoid.

NOTES CHAPTER II

¹Thomas T. Hammond, "A Brief History," In Yugoslavia, Edited by Robert F. Byrnes (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, 1957), p. 3.

²Ibid., p. 6.

³Paul Lendvai, Eagles in the Cobwebs, (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969), p.72.

⁴Hammond, p. 12.

⁵A. Ross Johnson, Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 16.

⁶Hammond, p. 13.

⁷Ibid.

⁸George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), p. 70.

⁹Ibid., p. 41.

¹⁰Dusko Doder, "A Land Without A Country," The Wilson Quarterly, Spring 1978, p. 87.

¹¹"Development of the Yugoslav Peoples Army, "Yugoslav Survey, October-December 1961, p. 921.

¹²Tito's Official Report to the 11th Party Congress in Borba, 21 June 1978, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report Eastern Europe, (Washington, D.C. -- hereafter FBIS-EEU), 7 July 1978, p. 14-9.

¹³Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The Balkans, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 10.

¹⁴Doder, "A Land Without A Country," p. 82.

¹⁵Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, p. 33.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 36-37.

¹⁷Jelavich, p. 18.

¹⁸Hammond, "A Brief History," p. 4.

¹⁹Ibid.

- ²⁰Hoffman, p. 51.
- ²¹Hammond, p. 5.
- ²²Doder, p. 86.
- ²³Hammond, p. 4.
- ²⁴Jelavich, p. 11.
- ²⁵Francois Fejto, A History of the Peoples' Democracies, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 203.
- ²⁶Thomas F. Magner, "Yugoslavia and Tito: The Long Farewell," Current History, April 1978, p. 156.
- ²⁷Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 114.
- ²⁸Gordon C. McDonald, et al., Area Handbook for Yugoslavia, (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 80.
- ²⁹Andrew Borowiec, Yugoslavia After Tito, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 40.
- ³⁰Shoup, p. 100.
- ³¹Ibid., p. 261.
- ³²Robert R. King, Minorities Under Communism, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 14.
- ³³Ibid., p. 26.
- ³⁴See Ivan Avakumovic, History of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, (Aberdeen, Great Britain: The Aberdeen University Press, 1964) and Adam B. Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952).
- ³⁵Shoup, p. 110.
- ³⁶Hoffman, p. 83.
- ³⁷Shoup, p. 105.
- ³⁸Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1969), p. 281.
- ³⁹R.V. Burks, The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., 1971), p. 6.

- ⁴⁰Ibid., p. 7-11.
- ⁴¹Shoup, p. 120.
- ⁴²Ibid.
- ⁴³Hoffman, p. 481.
- ⁴⁴Johnson, Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito, p. 8.
- ⁴⁵Lendvai, p. 183.
- ⁴⁶Burks, p. 20.
- ⁴⁷Lendvai, p. 198.
- ⁴⁸King, pp. 134-140.
- ⁴⁹Shoup, p. 263.
- ⁵⁰F. Stephen Larrabee, "Yugoslavia at the Crossroads," Orbis, Summer 1972, p. 385.
- ⁵¹Johnson, pp. 18-19.
- ⁵²Robin Alison Remington, "Moscow, Washington and Eastern Europe," In The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Detente, Edited by William E. Griffith, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), p. 348.
- ⁵³William Zimmerman, "The Tito Legacy and Yugoslavia's Future," Problems of Communism, May-June 1977, p. 39.
- ⁵⁴F. Stephen Larrabee, Balkan Security, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), p. 6.
- ⁵⁵Johnson, p. 28.
- ⁵⁶"Constitutional System of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia," Yugoslav Survey, August 1974, p. 95.
- ⁵⁷Johnson, p. 25.
- ⁵⁸Ibid., p. 5.
- ⁵⁹Dusdo Doder, The Yugoslavs, (New York: Random House, 1978), pp. 33-35, and Borowiec, p. 41.
- ⁶⁰Doder, The Yugoslavs, p. 32.
- ⁶¹Tad Szulc, "Yugoslavia's Jitters," The New Republic, 30 October 1976, p. 25.

⁶²Doder, The Yugoslavs, pp. 22-23.

⁶³Burks, p. 49.

⁶⁴Tito, in Politika, 23 May 1971, as cited by Robin Remington, "Yugoslavia - The Strains of Cohesion," Survival, May-June 1972, p. 119.

⁶⁵Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, ed., The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy 1948-1958: A Documentary Record, (New York: Prospect Books for the East Europe Institute, 1959), p. 40.

⁶⁶M. George Zaninovich, The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia, (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 74.

⁶⁷While the regime presently gives credit to Tito and Kardelj for inventing self-management, Djilas claims most of the credit. Doder, The Yugoslavs, p. 187. Certainly Djilas must have been influential in the original design. Dusko Doder acknowledges this role but gives Kardelj credit as "the real architect of self-management." Doder, p. 99.

⁶⁸Zaninovich, p. 74, and Doder, The Yugoslavs, p. 97.

⁶⁹Doder, The Yugoslavs, p. 98.

⁷⁰Zaninovich, p. 74.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 78.

⁷²Vernon V. Aspaturian, "East European Relations With the USSR," in The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe, ed., Peter A. Toma, (Tuscon, Ariz.: University of Arizona Press, 1970), p. 284.

⁷³Rudolf Bicanic, Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia, (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 145-147.

⁷⁴Zaninovich, p. 51.

⁷⁵McDonald, pp. 318-319.

⁷⁶Steven Rosefield, "Comparative Marxist Economies," lecture delivered at U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 14 August 1978.

⁷⁷Fred Bernard Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 143.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 145.

79Bicanic, p. 157.

80They are limited to holdings of 10 hectares (24.7 acres),
Richard F. Staar, Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, (Stanford,
Ca.: Hoover Institute Press, 1977), p. 187.

81Borowiec, p. 81.

82Ibid., pp. 80-81.

83Ibid., p. 80.

84Doder, The Yugoslavs, pp. 80-81.

85Ibid.

86Ibid., p. 43.

87Ibid.

88Borowiec, p. 85.

89Doder, The Yugoslavs, p. 104.

90Ibid.

91Ibid., p. 105.

92Duncan Wilson, "Self-Management in Yugoslavia," Inter-
national Affairs, April 1978, p. 260.

93Borowiec, p. 82.

94Larrabee, Balkan Security, p. 11.

95Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power in Europe, 1945-1970,
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 23.

96Bicanic, p. 170.

97Ryan C. Amacher, Yugoslavia's Foreign Trade: A Study
of State Trade Discrimination, (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1972), p. 34.

98Borowiec, p. 78.

99John C. Campbell, American Policy Toward Communist
Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead, (Minneapolis, Minn.: The
University of Minnesota Press, 1965), p. 73.

100Singleton, p. 273.

101Edvard Kardelj, "The Political System of Socialist Self-Management," Socialist Thought and Practice, July-August 1978, p. 21.

102"Constitutional System of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia," pp. 84-120.

103A. Ross Johnson, "Is Yugolsavia Leninist?", Studies in Comparative Communism, Winter 1977, p. 407.

104Avakumovic, pp. 60-89.

105Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform, pp. 4-10.

106Robin Alison Remington, "Eurocommunism and Yugoslavia," an unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Eurocommunism, Eastern Europe, and the USSR, held at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 20-21 August 1978, p. 7.

107Robin Alison Remington, "Fundamental Forces Determining Post-Tito Yugoslavia," an unpublished paper presented at the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research Mediterranean Seminar, 26 May 1977, p. 34.

108Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Whither Yugoslavia," Current History, May 1973, p. 204.

109A. Ross Johnson, Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito, p. 19.

110Richard F. Staar, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1975, (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institute Press, 1975), p. 112.

111See Staar, Yearbook - 1972, p. 101, and Yearbook - 1975, p. 112, and FBIS-EEU, 26 June 1978.

112Staar, Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, p. 201, and Tito's Report to the 11th Party Congress, FBIS-EEU July 1978, Supplement, p. 46.

113Staar, Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, p. 201.

114Tito's report, p. 45.

115FBIS-EEU, 26 June 1978.

116Tito's report, p. 45.

117Ibid.

118Robin Remington, "Fundamental Forces Determining Post-Tito Yugoslavia," p. 41.

- 119Doder, The Yugoslavs, p. 112.
- 120William Zimmerman, "Rejoinder" to Johnson's "Is Yugoslavia Leninist?", Studies in Comparative Communism, Winter 1977, p. 410.
- 121Doder, The Yugoslavs, p. 114.
- 122Tito's report, p. 41.
- 123Bernard Ziffer, "National Security," Yugoslavia, ed., Robert F. Byrnes, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1957), p. 161.
- 124Ivan Gosnjak, speech 26 December 1952. Quoted by Jack Raymond, "Yugoslavia Drops Anti-Revolt Corps," New York Times, 27 December 1952, p. 1.
- 125Tito, speech on 21 December 1971, Narodna armija, 24 December 1971, as quoted in Staar, Yearbook - 1972, p. 107.
- 126There had even been previous discussion of republics purchasing their own weapons abroad. Such was the extent to which decentralization of the army was being considered.
- 127Johnson, Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito, p. 25.
- 128Robert W. Dean, "Civil-Military Relations in Yugoslavia, 1971-1975," Armed Forces and Society, Fall 1976, p. 46.
- 129Ibid., p. 30.
- 130Ibid., p. 20.
- 131Remington, "Moscow, Washington and Eastern Europe," p. 351.
- 132Dean, p. 22.
- 133Tito, speech at Brioni, 22 December 1977, as reported by TANJUG in FBIS-EEU, 23 December 1977, p. 12.
- 134David A. Andelman, "Yugoslavia's Army, Even Divided is the Power," New York Times, 5 March 1978, sec. 4, p. 5.
- 135Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 200.
- 136Tito, speech at Brioni, 22 December 1977, p. 12.
- 137Vladimir Bakiric interview with Frankfurter Rundschau (December 17, 1971) as cited by Robin Alison Remington, "Armed Forces and Society in Yugoslavia," in Political-Military Systems Comparative Perspectives, Edited by Catherine M. Kelleher, (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 178.

138Remington, "Armed Forces and Society in Yugoslavia,"
p. 185.

139Borowiec, p. 18.

140The other two members of the post-War inner circle,
Milovan Djilas and Aleksandar Rankovic, were purged: Djilas
in 1953 due mainly to his own disenchantment with Communism,
and Rankovic in 1966 for attempting to prematurely exercise
his role as Tito's successor.

141Borowiec, p. 18.

142Doder, The Yugoslavs, p. 100.

143Szulc, "Yugoslavia's Jitters," p. 25.

144Borowiec, p. 20.

145Tito as cited by Borowiec, p. 21.

NOTES CHAPTER III

¹Mihajlo Saranovic, "China: Internal and External Aspects," Socialist Thought and Practice, September 1978, p. 68.

²Paul Lendvai, Klaus Knorr, and John Galtung, Europe and America in the 1970's: II Society and Power, (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), p. 27.

³F. Stephen Larrabee, Balkan Security, p. 4.

⁴Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 418-423.

⁵Malcom MacKintosh, The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact, (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969), pp. 11, 18.

⁶Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform, pp. 4-10.

⁷Vernon V. Aspaturian, "East European Relations With the USSR," pp. 289-290.

⁸Drew Middleton, "Yugoslavs Report that Tito Rebuffed Brezhnev on Air and Naval Rights and a Role in the Warsaw Pact," New York Times, 9 January 1977, p. 8.

⁹John C. Campbell, "Soviet Strategy in the Balkans," Problems of Communism, July/August 1974, p. 2.

¹⁰Larrabee, Balkan Security, p. 2.

¹¹Middleton.

¹²Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans In Our Time, (New York: Norton, 1967), p. 427.

¹³Ghita Ionescu, The Break-Up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe, (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1965), p. 46.

¹⁴Bass, p. 53.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 57.

¹⁶Veljko Micunovic, Yugoslavia's former ambassador in Moscow (1956-1958 and 1969-1971) recently published his memoirs under the title Years in Moscow 1956-1958. In it he gives excellent accounts of the meetings which took place between Tito and Khrushchev prior to the invasion of Hungary, and the rash of accusations that followed.

- ¹⁷Bass, pp. 66-67.
- ¹⁸Milorad Drachkovitch, "Tito's Yugoslavia in Khrushchev's Era," in East-Central Europe and the World: Developments in the Post-Stalin Era, ed. Stephen D. Kertesz, (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), p. 300.
- ¹⁹Bass, pp. 107-108.
- ²⁰Ibid., pp. 192-193.
- ²¹J.F. Brown, "Soviet-Yugoslav Rapprochement?", World Today, September 1962, p. 367.
- ²²"Yugoslavia's Position in Connection With Intervention in Czechoslovakia by the Armed Forces of the Five Warsaw Pact Member Countries," Yugoslav Survey, November 1968, p. 131.
- ²³"Contrary to the Interests of Socialism and Peace," Literaturnaya Gazeta, 4 September 1968, p. 14, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 18 September 1968, p. 23.
- ²⁴Ibid., pp. 23-24.
- ²⁵Pravda, 26 September 1971, p. 1, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 26 October 1971, p. 39.
- ²⁶Larrabee, Balkan Security, p. 10.
- ²⁷Staar, Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, p. 271.
- ²⁸K.F. Cvlic, "Yugoslavia After Tito," The World Today, April 1976, p. 128.
- ²⁹F. Stephen Larrabee, "Yugoslavia at the Crossroads," p. 394.
- ³⁰George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, p. 102.
- ³¹"Yugoslavia Reaffirms Aims to Arm to the Utmost," New York Times, 4 May 1948, p. 9.
- ³²"Truman Reaffirms Aim on Aggression," New York Times, 23 December 1949, p. 6.
- ³³"Carter Greet's Tito Warmly," San Francisco Chronicle, 8 March 1978, p. 12.
- ³⁴Larrabee, Balkan Security, pp. 3-4.
- ³⁵U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings on S3318, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958, p. 173.

³⁶U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Recent Developments in Europe, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, p. 86.

³⁷Larrabee, Balkan Security, p. 13.

³⁸K.F. Cviic, p. 128.

³⁹John C. Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1967), p. 24.

⁴⁰U.S. Department of Commerce, "Market Profiles for Western Europe and Canada," Overseas Business Reports, January 1977, p. 26.

⁴¹Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, pp. 25-26.

⁴²Stephen A. Garrett, "On Dealing With National Communism: The Lessons of Yugoslavia," Western Political Quarterly, September 1973, p. 540.

⁴³Dusko Doder, "Carter Welcomes Tito, Underscores Friendly Relations," Washington Post, 8 March 1978, p. A16, and Bernard Weinraub, "U.S. to Sell Arms to Yugoslavia and Widen Military Cooperation," New York Times, 14 October 1977, p. A6.

⁴⁴U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, L, No. 1290, 16 March 1964, p. 394.

⁴⁵Drew Middleton, "Rusk: Ties Austria and Yugoslavia To NATO Security," New York Times, 16 November 1968, p. 1.

⁴⁶Murrey Marder, "Kissinger, Tito Discuss Possible Arms Supply to Yugoslavia," Washington Post, 5 November 1974, p. 16.

⁴⁷Doder, "Carter Welcomes Tito, Underscores Friendly Relations."

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹John C. Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, p. 49.

⁵⁰Paul Underwood, "Tito's Neutral Road-Toward Moscow," New York Times, 26 November 1961, sec. 6, p. 32.

⁵¹E.W. Kenworthy, "U.S. to Shelve Polish Aid Plea Because of Berlin Crisis; Tito Also Faces Delay on Request," New York Times, 14 September 1961, p. 5.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Jack Raymond, "Sale of U.S. Jets To Tito Disclosed," New York Times, 14 October 1961, p. 1.

⁵⁴Report, "Senator Tower Scores Deal," New York Times, 14 October 1961, p. 8.

⁵⁵Lloyd Garrison, "Rusk Asserts Aid to Yugoslavia Kept Nation Out of Soviet Bloc," New York Times, 19 October 1961, p. 15.

⁵⁶Report, "Eastland Unit Says Tito Combats West," New York Times, 12 November 1961, p. 50.

⁵⁷Paul Underwood, "Tito Charges U.S. Exerts Pressure," New York Times, 14 November 1961, p. 1.

⁵⁸Felix Belair, Jr., "Senate Bans Aid to Red Countries," New York Times, 7 June 1962, p. 1.

⁵⁹Report, "Yugoslavs Regret Action," New York Times, 9 June 1962, p. 10.

⁶⁰Max Frankel, "U.S. Envoys Warn On Cuts In Red Aid," New York Times, 15 June 1962, p. 1.

⁶¹Report, "Trade & Aid," New York Times, 17 June 1962, sec. 4, p. 2.

⁶²Campbell, p. 63.

⁶³Paul Underwood, "Aid Plan Allays Belgrade's Fears," New York Times, 7 October 1962, p. 21.

⁶⁴Campbell, p. 65.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶George Liska, Alliances and the Third World, (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 31-32.

⁶⁷Ibid., P. 19.

⁶⁸Aurel Braun, "Soviet Naval Policy in the Mediterranean: Yugoslavia and the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine," Orbis, Spring 1978, p. 125.

⁶⁹Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Says Most Lands Receiving Arms Aid are Abusing Rights," New York Times, 13 March 1977, p. 1.

⁷⁰Charles Mohr, "Tito at Talks With Mondale Attacks U.S. on Rights," New York Times, 22 May 1977, p. 3.

⁷¹Larrabee, Balkan Security, p. 5.

⁷²John C. Campbell, "Insecurity and Cooperation: Yugoslavia and the Balkans," Foreign Affairs, July 1973, p. 789.

⁷³NATO After Czechoslovakia, (Washington, D. C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1969), p. 8.

⁷⁴From Tito's own personal point of view this may or may not be true, for it is difficult to say what repulses him more, domination by Moscow or alignment with Washington.

NOTES CHAPTER IV

¹David A. Andelman, p. E5.

²"Development of the Yugoslav Peoples Army," Yugoslav Survey, October-December 1961, p. 921.

³Ibid., p. 922.

⁴Ibid., p. 925.

⁵Milojica Pantelic, "The Role of the Armed Forces in the System of National Defense," Yugoslav Survey, November 1969, p. 30.

⁶Tito speech on 28 December 1950 Documents on International Affairs 1949-50, (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 505-506. Cited by Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 144.

⁷Robert B. Asprey, "Tito's Army," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1957, p. 49.

⁸Bernard Ziffer, "National Security," p. 164, and "Belgrade Termed Set for Defense," New York Times, 23 December 1953, p. 9.

⁹Dana Adams Schmidt, "Rumors and Threats over Balkans," New York Times, 23 July 1950, sec. 4, p. 4. Concern at the time was that growing conflict in Korea might be a feint and that Yugoslavia was Moscow's real target.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Jack Raymond, "Defense Fund Cut Set by Yugoslavs," New York Times, 26 December 1952, p. 3.

¹²"Pact Abstention Explained by Tito," New York Times, 1 May 1952, p. 10.

¹³Dushan Kvedar, "Territorial War," Foreign Affairs, October 1953, pp. 91-108.

¹⁴Tito, speech to Guards Division, Belgrade, 16 February 1951. Quoted in Documents on International Affairs 1951, (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 379, cited by Roberts, pp. 146-147.

¹⁵Roberts, Nations in Arms, p. 148.

¹⁶Elie Able, "U.S. Finishes Aid to Tito's Forces," New York Times, 26 March 1958, p. 8.

¹⁷Roberts, p. 194.

¹⁸Asprey, p. 49.

¹⁹The Military Balance 1967-1968, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968), p. 43.

²⁰Milojica Pantelic, "The Role of the Armed Forces in the System of National Defense," p. 31.

²¹Ibid.

²²Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1963, Article 252.

²³Roberts, p. 157.

²⁴Nikola Ljubacic, "Yugoslavian National Defense," Borba, 3 December 1967, as reprinted in Survival, Fall 1968, p. 49.

²⁵A. Ross Johnson, Total National Defense in Yugoslavia, (Santa Monica, Ca.: The RAND Corp., 1971), p. 2.

²⁶Milojica Pantelic, "The System and Organization of National Defense," Yugoslav Survey, May 1969, p. 2.

²⁷Roberts, p. 187.

²⁸Ibid., p. 177.

²⁹Robert W. Dean, p. 26.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid., p. 27.

³²"Military Schools of the Yugoslav Peoples Army," Yugoslav Survey, May 1975, pp. 89-97.

³³Roberts, p. 174, and A. Ross Johnson, The Role of the Military in Yugoslavia An Historical Sketch, (Santa Monica, Ca.: The RAND Corp., 1978), p. 8.

³⁴Johnson, Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito, p. 47.

³⁵Roberts, p. 175.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Borowiec, p. 45.

- ³⁸Johnson, Total National Defense in Yugoslavia, p. 2.
- ³⁹Johnson, The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia, pp. 8-9.
- ⁴⁰Roberts, pp. 180-181.
- ⁴¹Stane Potocar, in interview with Nasa Obramba, in FBIS-EEU, 27 December 1977, p. 113.
- ⁴²Alex Horhager, "Yugoslavia's Defense: The Logic of Politics," Military Review, June 1977, pp. 62-63.
- ⁴³See The Military Balance 1977-1978; Phillip A. Karber and Jon L. Lellenberg, After Tito: Yugoslav Security and U.S. Sales, (McLean, Va.: The BDM Corp., 1977); Horhager; and Graham H. Turbiville, "Intervention in Yugoslavia: An Assessment of the Soviet Military Option," Strategic Review, Winter 1977, p. 66.
- ⁴⁴Horhager, pp. 62-63.
- ⁴⁵James Burnham, "The Polarka Project," National Review, 12 April 1974, p. 426.
- ⁴⁶Johnson, Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito, p. 50.
- ⁴⁷"Moscow Gets the Point as an American Chats with Tito," New York Times, 27 October 1968, sec. 4, p. 4.
- ⁴⁸Ivan Kukoc, as quoted in NIN, 13 March 1977, as reported in FBIS-EEU, 16 March 1977, p. 19.
- ⁴⁹According to most authors, Moscow is still paying the political and ideological costs for its 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia, despite the initial appearance of success.
- ⁵⁰Karber and Lellenberg, pp. 12-15.
- ⁵¹Karber and Lellenberg provide three types of attack also but approach the problem somewhat differently. They refer to a Surprise Attack, a Surrogate Attack, and a Massive Attack, each one designed to achieve rather different goals.
- ⁵²Ibid., p. 22.
- ⁵³Turbiville, pp. 69-70.
- ⁵⁴Ibid.
- ⁵⁵Ibid.
- ⁵⁶Karber and Lellenberg, p. 16.

⁵⁷See Horhager, Turbiville, and Johnson, Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito.

⁵⁸Karber and Lellenberg, p. 60.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 35-40.

⁶⁰Roberts, p. 205.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 217.

⁶²Dean, p. 51.

NOTES CHAPTER V

¹Tito officially refers to Yugoslavia as "Socialist, Self-Managing and Nonaligned Yugoslavia." Tito's Report to the 11th Party Congress, p. 1.

²Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 91.

³Documents of the Belgrade Conference of the Heads of State of Government of Nonaligned Countries, in Leo Mates, Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy, (Belgrade: The Institute of International Politics and Economics, 1972), p. 386.

⁴Rubinstein, p. 110.

⁵Mates, p. 75.

⁶Rubinstein, p. 320.

⁷In fact "...the whole concept of neutrality is foreign to Marxism and Marxism-Leninism." The dialectic and the "class struggle" simply do not allow for neutrality. Peter H. Vigor, The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality, London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 178.

⁸Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Yugoslavia's Nonaligned Role in Africa," Africa Report, November 1970, p. 14.

⁹Tito, Speech "Non-Alignment--a United and Independent Factor in World Politics," Socialist Thought and Practice, July-August 1978, p. 7.

¹⁰Dessa Trevisan, "Nonaligned States Devise Formula to Avoid Split," The Times of London, 31 July 1978, p. 4.

¹¹Josip Vrhovec, "Vrhovec Address to Closing Session," TANJUG, 30 July 1978, in FBIS-EEU, 1 August 1978, pp. 11-2.

¹²Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, p. 91.

¹³Ibid., p. 233.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 236-239.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 85-89.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 89.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "The Soviet Intervention in Angola: Intentions and Implications," Strategic Review, Summer 1976, pp. 94-95.

¹⁹Thomas H. Henriksen, "Angola and Mozambique: Intervention and Revolution," Current History, November 1976, p. 155.

²⁰Report, "President Tito's Visit to Some East and West African Countries," Yugoslav Survey, May 1970, p. 115.

²¹Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, p. 185.

²²Bicanic, p. 175.

²³McDonald, pp. 448-449.

²⁴U.S. Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations, Africa Report from the Continent, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, p. 150.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Adam B. Ulam, p. 36.

²⁷Donald L. M. Blackmer, Unity in Diversity Italian Communism and the Communist World, (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1968), p. 116.

²⁸Ibid., p. 117.

²⁹Ibid., p. 336.

³⁰Francois Fejto, The French Communist Party and the Crisis of International Communism, (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 19.

³¹Ibid., p. 105.

³²Ibid., p. 144.

³³Kevin Devlin, "The New Crisis in European Communism," Problems of Communism, Nov-Dec 1968, p. 58.

³⁴Phyllis Auty, Tito A Biography, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 114.

³⁵Guy Hermet, The Communists in Spain, (London: Saxon House, 1971), p. 78.

³⁶Kevin Devlin, "The Interparty Drama," Problems of Communism, July-Aug 1975, p. 28.

³⁷Milovan Djilas, Interview in Corriere Della Sera, 29 January 1978, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Eastern Europe, (Washington, D. C. -- hereafter, FBIS-EEU), 6 February 1978, p. I4.

³⁸Borba, 21 June 1978, in FBIS-EEU, 7 July 1978, p. I4-9.

³⁹Especially noteworthy here is the Joint Soviet-Yugoslav Declaration, Belgrade, June 2, 1955. In it Moscow pledged support of the concepts of "mutual respect for, and non-interference in...internal affairs." Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury eds., The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record, (New York: Prospect Books for the East Europe Institute, 1959).

⁴⁰Robin Remington, "Eurocommunism and Yugoslavia."

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Tito's Official Report to the 11th Party Congress in Borba, 21 June 1978, in FBIS-EEU, 7 July 1978, pp. I4-9.

⁴³Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service, 3 June 1978, in FBIS-EEU, 5 June 1978, p. I7.

⁴⁴Aleksandar Grlickov, Interview in Vjesnik, 30 April, 1 and 2 May 1977, in FBIS-EEU, 6 May 1977, pp. I5-9.

⁴⁵Aleksandar Grlickov, Interviews in The Times of London, 27 January 1978, in FBIS-EEU, 30 June 1978, and in Politika, 31 December 1977 and 1 and 2 January 1978, in FBIS-EEU, 19 January 1978.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷TANJUG, 3 June 1978.

⁴⁸Aleksandar Grlickov, "The National and the International," Socialist Thought and Practice, April 1977, pp. 3-36.

⁴⁹Aleksandar Grlickov, Interview on Radio SKOPJE reported by Belgrade Domestic Service, 27 May 1978, in FBIS-EEU, 2 June 1978.

⁵⁰Grlickov interview in Politika, 31 December 1977, and 1 and 2 January 1978.

⁵¹Milika Sundic, Editorial reported by Zagreb Domestic Service, 23 February 1977, in FBIS-EEU, 24 February 1977.

⁵²Aleksandar Grlickov, Interview in NIN, 12 February 1978, in FBIS-EEU, 23 February 1978.

⁵³Edvard Kardelj, "The Political System of Socialist Self-Management," Socialist Thought and Practice, July-Aug 1977, pp. 3-26 and Tito's address to the 11th LCY Congress in Borba, 21 June 1978.

⁵⁴Grlickov interviews in The Times, 27 January 1978, and in NIN, 12 February 1978.

⁵⁵Alfred D. Low, The Sino-Soviet Dispute, (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1976), p. 78.

⁵⁶Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Has Eastern Europe Become a Liability to the Soviet Union?", in The International Relations of Eastern Europe, ed. Charles Gati, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 21.

⁵⁷Harold Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1972), p. 196.

⁵⁸Stalin, in 1945, suggested that the Chinese Communists should make a peace with Chiang Kai-shek. Low, pp. 55-56. He made similar suggestions to Tito during World War II regarding a temporary pact with the Yugoslav royalist forces.

⁵⁹Low, p. 37.

⁶⁰Robin Remington, "China's Emerging Role in Eastern Europe," The International Politics of Eastern Europe, ed. Charles Gati, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 103.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 96.

⁶²John C. Campbell, "Yugoslavia and China: The Wreck of a Dream," in Policies Toward China, ed. A.M. Halpern, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), pp. 368-369.

⁶³Remington, "China's Emerging Role in Eastern Europe," p. 82.

⁶⁴Campbell, "Yugoslavia and China: The Wreck of a Dream," p. 369.

⁶⁵Alan Hutchison, China's African Revolution, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1976), pp. 78-79.

⁶⁶Charles Neuhauser, Third World Politics: China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, 1957-1967, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 54-55.

⁶⁷McDonald, p. 285.

⁶⁸Henry Wei, China and Soviet Russia, (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965), p. 230.

69"Yugoslavia and China," Yugoslav Survey, July-September 1962, p. 1506.

70Ibid., p. 1508.

71Hinton, pp. 213-214.

72Ibid.

73"Modern Revisionism Must Be Criticized," Jen Min Jih Pao, 5 May 1958, quoted in "Yugoslavia and China," Yugoslav Survey, p. 1516.

74Low, p. 137.

75Hinton, p. 215.

76"Relations Between Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of China," Yugoslav Survey, February 1972, p. 108.

77Mihajlo Saranovic, p. 71.

78Ibid., p. 72.

79Yugoslavia had been carrying on a renewed polemic over their conflicting policies and attitudes regarding Macedonia since June 1978. Moscow had supported Bulgaria.

80Commentary issued by Belgrade Domestic Service, 17 August 1978, in FBIS-EEU, 18 August 1978, p. 11.

81Tito, TANJUG, 21 August 1978, in FBIS-EEU, 22 August 1978, p. 16.

82Ibid.

83Hua Kuo-feng, TANJUG, 21 August 1978, in FBIS-EEU, 22 August 1978, p. 110.

84"Hua Kuo-feng's Stay in Yugoslavia," Pravda, 25 August 1978, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 27 September 1978, pp. 1-2.

85"Mr. Hua In Search of Ideas," The Times of London, 26 August 1978, p. 13.

86Ibid.

NOTES CHAPTER VI

¹Robin Remington, "Yugoslavia - The Strains of Cohesion," Survival, May-June 1972, p. 117.

²Doder, The Yugoslavs, p. 23.

³Hornhager, p. 59.

⁴A. Ross Johnson, Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito, p. 2.

⁵"Moscow Had Coup Against Romania's Ceausescu Organized Via Prague," Kronen-Zeitung, 8 December 1978, pp. 3-4, in FBIS-EEU, 12 December 1978, p. D1.

⁶Johnson, Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito, p. 2.

⁷Borowiec, p. 53.

⁸Ibid., p. 45 and p. 57.

⁹Drew Middleton, "A Post-Tito Yugoslavia Is Worrying NATO," New York Times, 26 June 1977, p. 3.

¹⁰David Binder, "U.S. Affirms Backing For Yugoslav Unity," New York Times, 10 March 1978, p. 3.

¹¹Cvilić, "Yugoslavia After Tito," pp. 132-133.

¹²John C. Campbell, "Insecurity and Cooperation: Yugoslavia and the Balkans," Foreign Affairs, July 1973, p. 786.

¹³Borowiec, p. 9.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁵Johnson, Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito, p. 59.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Amacher, Ryan C. Yugoslavia's Foreign Trade A Study of State Trade Discrimination. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972.
2. Asprey, Robert B. "Tito's Army." Marine Corps Gazette, July 1957, pp. 48-53.
3. Auty, Phyllis. Tito A Biography. New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1970.
4. Avakumovic, Ivan. History of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Aberdeen, Great Britain: The Aberdeen University Press, 1964.
5. Bass, Robert and Elizabeth Marbury, ed. The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy 1948-58: A Documentary Record. New York: Prospect Books for The East Europe Institute, 1959.
6. Bertsch, Gary K. "The Revival of Nationalisms." Problems of Communism, Nov-Dec 1973, pp. 1-15.
7. Bicanic, Rudolf. Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
8. Blackmer, Donald L.M. Unity in Diversity Italian Communism and the Communist World. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1968.
9. Bombelles, Joseph T. Economic Development of Communist Yugoslavia 1947-1964. Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution, 1968.
10. Borowiec, Andrew. Yugoslavia After Tito. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977.
11. Braun, Aurel. "Soviet Naval Policy in the Mediterranean: Yugoslavia and the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine." Orbis, Spring, 1978, pp. 101-134.
12. Burks, R.V. The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia. Santa Monica, Ca.: The RAND Corp., 1971.
13. Campbell, John C. American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1965.
14. ----- "Insecurity and Cooperation: Yugoslavia and the Balkans." Foreign Affairs, July 1973, pp. 778-793.

15. Campbell, John C. "Soviet Strategy in the Balkans." Problems of Communism, July-Aug 1974, pp. 1-16.
16. -----. Tito's Separate Road. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1967.
17. -----. "Yugoslavia and China: The Wreck of a Dream." In Policies Toward China. Edited by A.M. Halpern. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965.
18. Clissold, Stephen, ed. A Short History of Yugoslavia From Early Times to 1966. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1966.
19. "Constitutional System of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Yugoslav Survey, August 1974, pp. 1-132.
20. Cviic, K.F. "Yugoslavia After Tito." The World Today, April 1976, pp. 126-133.
21. Dean, Robert W. "Civil Military Relations in Yugoslavia 1971-1975." Armed Forces and Society, Fall 1976, pp. 17-58.
22. Denitch, Bogdan Denis. The Legitimation of a Revolution The Yugoslav Case. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976.
23. Devlin, Kevin. "The Interparty Drama." Problems of Communism, July-Aug 1975, pp. 18-34.
25. -----. "The New Crisis in European Communism." Problems of Communism, Nov-Dec 1968.
26. Djilas, Milovan. Conversations With Stalin. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962.
27. -----. The New Class. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1957.
28. Doder, Dusko. "A Land Without a Country." The Wilson Quarterly, Spring 1978, pp. 80-95.
29. -----. The Yugoslavs. New York: Random House, 1978.
30. Fejto, Francois. A History of the Peoples Democracies. trans. Daniel Weissbort. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971.
31. Garrett, Stephen A. "On Dealing With National Communism: The Lessons of Yugoslavia." Western Political Quarterly, Sept 1973, pp. 529-549.

32. Gati, Charles. ed. The International Relations of Eastern Europe. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976.
33. Griffith, William E. ed. The Soviet Empire-Expansion and Detente. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976.
34. Grlickov, Aleksandar. "The National and the International." Socialist Thought and Practice, April 1977.
35. Hammond, Thomas T. "A Brief History." In Yugoslavia. Edited by Robert F. Byrnes. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, 1957.
36. Hinton, Harold. China's Turbulent Quest. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1972.
37. Hoffman, George W. and Fred Warner Neal. Yugoslavia and the New Communism. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962.
38. Horhager, Axel. "Yugoslavia's Defense: The Logic of Politics." Military Review, June 1977, pp. 56-63.
39. Ionescu, Ghita. The Break-up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1965.
40. Jelavich, Charles and Barbara Jelavich. The Balkans. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965.
41. Johnson, A. Ross. "Is Yugoslavia Leninist?" Studies in Comparative Communism, Winter 1977, pp. 403-407.
42. -----. The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: An Historical Sketch. Santa Monica, Ca.: The RAND Corp., 1978.
43. -----. The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case 1945-1953. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1972.
44. -----. Total National Defense in Yugoslavia. Santa Monica, Ca.: The RAND Corp., 1971.
45. -----. Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito. The Washington Papers, 2, 16. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1974.
46. Karber, Phillip A. and Jon L. Lellenberg. After Tito: Yugoslav Security and U.S. Arms Sales. McLean, Va.: The BDM Corporation, 1977.
47. Kardelj, Edvard. "The Political System of Self Management." Socialist Thought and Practice, July-Aug 1977, pp. 3-26.

48. King, Robert R. Minorities Under Communism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973.
49. Kvedar, Dushan. "Territorial War." Foreign Affairs, October 1953, pp. 91-108.
50. Larrabee, F. Stephen. Balkan Security. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977.
51. ----- . "Yugoslavia at the Crossroads." Orbis, Summer 1972, 377-395.
52. Lendvai, Paul, Klaus Knorr, and John Galtung. Europe and America in the 1970's: II: Society and Power. London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970.
53. Lendvai, Paul. Eagles in the Cobwebs. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969.
54. Ljubicic, Nikola. "Yugoslavian National Defense." Borba, 3 December 1967, as reprinted in Survival, Fall 1968, pp. 48-49.
55. Low, Alfred D. The Sino-Soviet Dispute. Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1976.
56. MacKintosh, Malcom. The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact. London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969.
57. McDonald, Gordon C., et al. Area Handbook for Yugoslavia. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1973.
58. Magner, Thomas F. "Yugoslavia and Tito: The Long Farewell." Current History, April 1978, pp. 154-158.
59. Mates, Leo. Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy. Belgrade: The Institute of International Politics and Economics, 1972.
60. NATO After Czechoslovakia. Washington, D.C.: The Center of Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1969.
61. Pantelic, Milojica. "The Role of the Armed Forces in the System of National Defense." Yugoslav Survey, Nov 1969, pp. 29-38.
62. ----- . "The System and Organization of National Defense." Yugoslav Survey, May 1969, pp. 1-8.
63. Remington, Robin Alison. "Armed Forces and Society in Yugoslavia." In Political-Military Systems Comparative Perspectives. Edited by Catherine M. Kelleher. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1974.

64. Remington, Robin. "China's Emerging Role in Eastern Europe." In The International Politics of Eastern Europe. Edited by Charles Gati. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976.
65. Remington, Robin Alison. "Moscow, Washington, and Eastern Europe." In The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Detente. Edited by William E. Griffith. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976.
66. ----- . "Yugoslavia and European Security." Orbis, Spring 1973, pp. 197-226.
67. Remington, Robin. "Yugoslavia-the Strains of Cohesion." Survival, May-June 1972, pp. 117-120.
68. Roberts, Adam. Nations in Arms The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defense. New York: Praeger Publishers for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976.
69. Rubinstein, Alvin Z. "Whither Yugoslavia?" Current History, May 1973, pp. 202-206.
70. ----- . Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970.
71. ----- . "Yugoslavia's Nonaligned Role in Africa." Africa Report, Nov 1970, pp. 14-17.
72. Shoup, Paul. Communism and the Yugoslav National Question. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.
73. Silberman, Laurence. "Yugoslavia's 'Old' Communism." Foreign Policy, Spring 1977, pp. 3-27.
74. Singleton, Fred Bernard. Twentieth Century Yugoslavia. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.
75. Staar, Richard F. Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe. Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1977.
76. Staar, Richard F. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 197-. Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1972, 1974, 1975.
77. Szulc, Tad. "Yugoslavia's Jitters." The New Republic, 30 October 1976, pp. 22-25.
78. The Military Balance 1967-1968. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968.
79. Turbiville, Graham H., Jr. "Intervention in Yugoslavia: An Assessment of the Soviet Military Option." Strategic Review, Winter 1977, pp. 62-73.

80. Ulam, Adam B. Expansion and Coexistence Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1973. Second Edition. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974.
81. ----- . Titoism and the Cominform. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952.
82. Vanneman, Peter and Martin James. "The Soviet Intervention in Angola: Intentions and Implications." Strategic Review, Summer 1976, pp. 92-103.
83. Vigor, P.H. The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality. London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.
84. Vucinich, Wayne S. ed. Contemporary Yugoslavia Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.
85. Wei, Henry. China and Soviet Russia. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965.
86. Wilson, Duncan. "Self-Management in Yugoslavia." International Affairs, April 1978, pp. 253-263.
87. Wolfe, Thomas W. Soviet Power in Europe, 1945-1970. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.
88. Wolff, Robert Lee. The Balkans in Our Time. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974.
89. Zaninovich, M. George. The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968.
90. Ziffer, Bernard. "National Security." In Yugoslavia. Edited by Robert F. Byrnes. New York: Praeger Publishers 1957.
91. Zimmerman, William. "The Tito Legacy and Yugoslavia's Future." Problems of Communism, May-June 1977, pp. 33-49.

PERIODICALS

Africa Report

Armed Forces and Society

Current History

Current World Leaders

Economist

Foreign Affairs

Foreign Policy

International Affairs

Marine Corps Gazette

Military Review

National Review

New Republic

Orbis

Overseas Business Reports

Problems of Communism

Socialist Thought and Practice

Strategic Review

Studies in Comparative Communism

Survival

U.S. Department of State Bulletin

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

Western Political Quarterly

Wilson Quarterly

World Today

Yugoslav Survey

OTHER SOURCES

Christian Science Monitor

Current Digest of the Soviet Press

Foreign Broadcast and Information Service (FBIS), E. Europe

Los Angeles Times

New York Times

The Times (London)

Washington Post

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. Copies
1. Defense Documentation Center Cameron Station Alexandria, VA 22314	2
2. Library, Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93940	2
3. Department Chairman, Code 56 Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93940	2
4. Assistant Professor J. Valenta, Code 56Va Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93940	5
5. Assistant Professor D.P. Burke, Code 56 Bq Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93940	5
6. Lieutenant Paul W. Dahlquist 1706 Sherry Drive Bellevue, Nebraska 68005	5
7. Naval War College Library Newport, Rhode Island 02840	1
8. United States Naval Academy Nimitz Library Annapolis, Maryland 21402	1
9. Armed Forces Staff College/Library Norfolk, VA 23511	1
10. National War College/Library Fort Lesley J. McNair 4th and P Streets SW Washington, D.C. 20319	1
11. National Security Council European Affairs Executive Office Building Washington, D.C. 20520	1

- | | | |
|-----|--|---|
| 12. | Department of State Library
2201 C. Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20520 | 1 |
| 13. | U.S. Department of State
Bureau of European Affairs (EUR/EE)
2201 C. Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20520 | 1 |
| 14. | Office of External Research
U.S. Department of State
2201 C. Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20520 | 1 |
| 15. | U.S. House of Representatives
International Relations Committee, Suite 55021
Room 2170 RHOB
Washington, D.C. 20515 | 1 |
| 16. | U.S. House of Representatives
International Relations Committee
International Political & Military Affairs
Subcommittee
Room 709, HOB, Annex 1
Washington, D.C. 20515 | 1 |
| 17. | U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Suite 44651
Subcommittee on European Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510 | 1 |
| 18. | Regional Director of European Affairs
Office of ISA
Room 4D80
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301 | 1 |
| 19. | The Joint Chiefs of Staff
J-3, Special Operations Division
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301 | 1 |
| 20. | The Joint Chiefs of Staff
J-5, Europe/Middle East/Africa Division
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301 | 1 |
| 21. | Captain John L. Beck, USN
Chief of Naval Operations (OP-602)
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20350 | 1 |

22. Chief of Naval Operations (OP-611) 1
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20350
23. Director of the Hoover Institution on War 1
and Peace
ATTN: Dr. Milorad Drachkovitch
The Hoover Institution on War and Peace
Stanford, University
Stanford, CA 94305
24. Dean of Research, Code 012 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940